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Abstract 
The idea that the payment of commission to those working within the financial 
services sector is not in the interests of consumers is gaining ground. Legislation 
now exists banning the majority of such payments within the financial advice sector. 
This work considers compliant strategies that might be employed to the benefit of 
both the adviser community and their clients.   
To ascertain existing attitudes, beliefs and practices amongst advisers and product 
providers semi-structured interviews were conducted and the existence or absence of 
recurring themes analysed using Applied Thematic Analysis techniques.  The needs, 
as opposed to wants of consumers were identified by analysing records of what 
clients had actually done and comparing these with their original requirements.   
Analysis showed that product providers’ aims only partly satisfied the needs of 
consumers and that independent financial advisers are seen as elements of providers’ 
distribution channels. IFAs espoused the view that they were free from any influence 
from product providers, without being able to demonstrate what other sources of 
revenue they had. Furthermore, the income they did receive was usually calculated 
as a percentage of the value of the investment product sold, both initially and 
thereafter.      
Changes in practice are inevitable for to survive as Independent Financial Advisers 
and Planners there must be compliance with the regulations that a regulator imposes. 
Commissions, by any name, will ultimately be replaced by a fees-based service. To 
comply a knowledge of business management, including cost awareness and product 
pricing, will be vital. Invoicing clients transparently for the entirety of the service 
will ensure that businesses operate ethically and have long-term futures that are no 
longer reliant upon product providers. Furthermore, they will be organised around 
the constituent parts of the title, “Independent,”  “Financial” and “Adviser/Planner.”  
This work points towards a practical solution.  
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 Section 1 – Introduction and Background 
Chapter 1  
1.1 Introduction 
 
Those reading this will have a personal interest in what it says, whether or not they 
recognise it at the outset, for we are all interested in our own well-being, whether it 
be for the present or the future. That well-being takes the form of our ability to 
protect ourselves, our families, our friends. The most used measure of that ability is 
expressed by the amount of money that is available to us now and the amount which 
will be available in the future. That capability to provide protection is manifested in 
the capacity to shelter, feed, clothe and compete for the right to use and acquire 
scarce resources (Maslow, Frager et al. 1970) 
That calls for planning, which you may feel you can do yourself. However, as 
matters soon become more complex you may feel that the services of a Financial 
Planner or Financial Adviser could be an advantage, because they understand 
investment and savings and are required to act in your best interests and we all know 
what their role is, don’t we? Well, not necessarily, so read on.  
As our species has evolved we have learned that money is a better substitute as a 
bargaining tool than the overt aggression of war, although its effects may ultimately 
be no less invasive, or damaging. We are also a gregarious species preferring to live 
in groups and encourage the development of individual skills for the benefit of the 
wider group. To encourage us to improve those skills, where they continue to be 
required, we reward the supplier, usually in the form of money, so that they feel 
confident enough to abandon any attempt to provide their every need personally, 
because they sense themselves better empowered to acquire the bulk of their needs 
by acquiring it from others, again usually using money to encourage another party to 
provide it (Keynes, 2006).    
So our desire to survive instinctively drives us towards acquiring the tool or tools to 
ensure it. If money is the main medium for this then the first step is to ensure that it 
is available when it is needed or expected to be needed. As the previous paragraph 
suggests we do this by building skills that enable us to work or team up with others 
who work, as in a marriage. In a modern society we also recognise that we usually 
live beyond an age where we continue to be able to work and in the last 200 years 
have developed a community system which allows individuals to cease working, but 
continue to receive the means for survival in the form of pensions (Blackburn 2003).  
At an individual level all of this is performed ultimately as a form of self-interest, but 
since we live in a community of fellow creatures it must be expected that each 
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member of that community is driven by personal self-interest, which at an individual 
level is seen as more important than that of its neighbours.  
So in summary, we have needs and those needs can best be met directly by the 
balanced application of personal skills and the availability of money. Therefore, the 
more time that is sacrificed to the addressing of needs by using personal skills, the 
less the time that is available to employ in the acquisition of money. So the choice 
filters down to a decision as to whether the time cost of not going to work, and 
thereby not earning money to pay for the purchase of those needs from another party, 
is greater than or less than the saving made by providing for those needs personally. 
Given that beyond the faint notions of a hunter/gatherer existence no-one is capable 
of feeding, housing, maintaining and protecting against the ravages of illness the 
need to look to one another for assistance is paramount. In effect we seek support 
from others to act as our agents in providing for our needs. In return we reward them 
with some of the money we have received as a reward for providing for the needs of 
others who have requested that we apply our own skills, at a cost below what it 
would have cost them to do it, to meet a particular need. In effect we overtly or 
subliminally undertake a personal cost/benefit analysis.  
Of course, each agent has his or her own self-interest at heart, as alluded to above. Is 
it likely that they will place their interest above that of your own and if they do could 
that introduce, in effect, a conflict of interest?  As a self-interest it follows that must 
be the case, because anything else represents self-sacrifice and altruism and thus, by 
its very nature is not self-interest, unless placing another’s interest above your own 
ultimately serves your own, which is then a common interest.  
In a modern society, the simple agent is less apparent, often working within much 
larger organisations, but these are once again a different form of community where 
the needs are defined as being narrower, but nonetheless, reliant upon individual 
members of that community to provide skills in exchange for money. We know these 
organisations by many names: firms, partnerships, corporations, local and national 
authorities, but all can be or are available as agents acting for the individual and all, 
therefore, have interests which could conflict with our own self-interest (Jensen and 
Meckling 1979).  
Some of those agents are very demanding and insistent that we provide monetary 
contributions to them, for example local and national government agencies to 
provide for roads, policing, rubbish collection, education and health programmes. At 
a personal level these are non-discretionary costs – we have to pay them as part of 
the cost of being a member of that community.  
Others are available to supply a critical need, but compete with other potential 
satisfiers of that need for our custom, for example food manufacturers. Such 
expenditure is effectively also non-discretionary, but retains a personal ability to 
direct it towards a particular agent using subjective decisions. These may include 
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perceived quality, cost and suitability. To protect their own self-interest those agents 
may attempt to draw potential customers to them, as opposed to supporting a 
competitor, by highlighting, that is marketing, apparent positive aspects of their 
product/service, but they are not likely to draw attention to any of its drawbacks or 
shortcomings, unless obliged to do so by some other body.  
Such other bodies are often known as regulators, have statutory powers granted by 
government (an agent of the community) and are empowered to act as agents for that 
same community themselves.  But again they will have self-interest, not least in their 
own survival, for survival is at the root of all self-interest.  
So if you want to ensure a flow of money to meet current needs and short-term and 
long-term future needs you need to have a job and somewhere to place any savings 
for the future and all of this seems to be in the hands of agents of one sort or another. 
The challenge is to determine which agent or agents to employ in your quest and 
how to decide whether they are and remain fit for your purpose. 
I refer later on to the work of March and Simon who observed that we reach our 
decisions by applying some or all of the knowledge, information and data within our 
personal remit, but excluding any existing input which remains beyond the 
boundaries of our cognition (March and Simon 1958).  However, when seeking 
advice on financial planning three main avenues of such input appear to be available, 
namely the provider/producer of investment products, the financial adviser, in one or 
more of their many guises, or friends, colleagues and relatives.  Each group may be 
perceived as having different levels of expertise, which they may or may not be 
prepared to share, and each one should be recognised as being an agent and not 
necessarily wholly or even partially yours. You may also recognise that your own 
position is possibly one of being an agent acting upon behalf of your family or 
colleagues. 
Each one of these groups positions themselves in different ways in relation to the 
issue of supporting the financial planning requirement and how they do this is 
explored in the work that follows. 
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1.2 - The Purpose, Framing and Scope of the 
Project 
 
As alluded to in the introduction to this work we are all agents in one form or 
another and we all have a primary interest in our personal well-being and money, or 
money equivalent, is a major expression of that well-being. You will read this to see 
if it has anything of value for your personal advantage, because we all like to think at 
a superficial level that we are already safe and secure and therefore only need to look 
for enhancement. It may be that the reality is that at a subliminal level we feel 
insecure and instinctively seek to ensure our survival. This all begs the question, just 
how secure are we, if at all, and how permanent is that security. 
So if you wish not only to survive in the business of independent financial planning, 
but to thrive you would do well to reflect upon Peter Drucker’s observation, “that 
business purpose and business mission are so rarely given adequate thought is 
perhaps the most important cause of business frustration and failure” (Drucker 
1974). Yes it is an old idea, but rather like breathing some practices tend not to age 
(Mintzberg 2013). 
In addressing the issue of exactly what purpose is in the context of this project, I 
refer to J A Pearce’s work  regarding mission statements (Pearce 1982) who held that 
purpose statements generally identify some or all of the following: 
• The product or service, the market and the nature of delivery; 
• The aims and objectives of the community of practice; 
• The philosophy, or statement of basic beliefs, values, aspirations and 
priorities; 
• Self-concept, or understanding of place within the environment and 
position relative to competitors; 
• The present and future public image; 
• The attitude to insider and outsider claimants, interest groups and/or 
stakeholders. 
These purpose statements provide the foundations for the development of this project 
with each one of the interview topics evolving from one of them.  These have been 
used to seek the views of three different communities with a mutual interest in the 
financial planning process. 
We live in such communities and have done for millennia – it is an established 
method for improving our chances of survival, both as a group and individually. In 
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fact, we live within a variety of communities, which might include business types, 
geographical location, occupation, gender, age group, race, language, religion and 
many others (Young 2011). Our communities’ security and therefore our own, can 
be increased or reduced in one of two general ways, namely through decisions made 
by ourselves and through decisions made by others. It could be helpful to frame this 
in terms of a SWOT analysis, because looking at our personal strengths and 
weaknesses (or limitations) and the context within which they are obliged to exist, 
can provide a basis for understanding why we are where we are and how we might 
move on to achieve our future goals. 
Fundamentally, we would all like to know where we are now, where we are going 
and how we are going to reach our destination. To do it we will need to engage with 
agents claiming to act upon our behalf, because there is a limit to our capacity and 
ability to undertake many tasks personally or as an organisation. In doing so we and 
they will all be asking why we wish to commit to each of these potential 
relationships – the “what’s in it for me?” question.  Is the relationship likely to 
become a zero-sum game with equal winners and losers and if so into which camp 
will you and they fall (Schelling 1960)? Alternatively, could it be that this proposed 
arrangement has the potential for a win-win outcome, fruitful for all concerned and 
the basis for a continuation of the relationship in the longer-term (Nalebuff, 
Brandenburger et al. 1996)?  
The ultimate purpose of this work is to stimulate debate, explore current thinking and 
consider opportunities that may shape the future for the financial planning sector. It 
is framed by consideration of both apparent and possible future employment, or 
avoidance, of particular moral codes, ethics and forms of remuneration within the 
financial planning community and how members of that community believe these 
might assist in maintaining their survival, or providing commercial advantage, or 
lead to their demise.  
The following table summarises how, in undertaking this work, I have sought to 
understand the different drivers and cultures that exist within the various sub-sectors 
of advisers and planners, product providers and consumers and how they view one 
another. What shared goals do they have apart from increasing their wealth, where 
there is a potential for conflicts of interest how can these be resolved, if at all and do 
these three groups coordinate their activities and aims in such a way as to ensure that 
the outcomes produce something which is for the common good, at least in the 
main? 
The data, information and insight gained from these sources have provided the basis 
for the evaluations, conclusions and recommendations presented in Chapter 6. 
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Source Type Research Methods Employed Sets Numbers 
 
Consumers 
Semi-structured interviews 2 
Semi-structured questionnaires 76 
Client Files Analysis 50 
Independent Financial 
Advisers 
Semi-structured interviews 7 
Unstructured surveys 97 
Product Providers Semi-structured interviews 3 
 
Literature 
Reviewing books, magazines, 
research papers in addition to general 
articles relating to this work  
260+ 
Table 1 - Sources, Methods and Ranges Employed in this Research 
 (Cawdell K E 2015) 
 
In restricting my research enquiries to those operating within the three groupings 
referred to earlier, I acknowledged that other parties have an interest, but at a 
different level and with a different purpose. The selected three are seen as being very 
closely inter-related, but unequal, stakeholders. The possibility of creating focus 
groups amongst independent financial planners to encourage greater freedom of 
expression and a less constrained view of contributors’ true attitudes was to be 
employed, in addition to one-to-one interviews. With the aim of providing a 
common starting point for all discussions a range of discussion topics was prepared, 
with all contributors encouraged to avoid seeing these as boundary limitations and to 
expand their responses beyond these.  
Given that the meetings were constructed round the provision of a menu of topics to 
employ in meeting with contributors, how each topic was chosen is important, 
because it could and probably did have an influence upon the general direction of the 
responses and outcomes. A review of the list of topics sent to each contributor prior 
to a meeting reveals that the list was expanded after the early meetings had taken 
place. Originally, it had been hoped that themes relating to morals and ethics would 
emerge during the conversations, but the reality was that this could not be relied 
upon, with some contributors embracing the philosophies in general and others 
avoiding the subjects. In consequence a topic relating to integrity was added for all 
contributors’ consideration prior to the meeting and subsequently considered in 
greater detail in Chapter 3.8. It was only whilst writing this report that I recognised 
that the rationale for compiling this menu of topics reflected Pearce’s purpose 
statements, to which I referred earlier. It might be suggested that either this confirms 
the logic of the approach, or that I have been driven subliminally by a concept 
absorbed earlier in my academic development. 
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The ultimate aim of these meetings, which were recorded verbatim with the 
contributors’ agreement, was to compare and contrast the themes resulting from the 
transcripts, in addition to noting their regularity or complete absence from some 
responses.  
Critically, however, knowing and being able to articulate what independent financial 
planners and their associated players want is and remains vital and as recorded later, 
meeting this aim by direct research was torpedoed at an early stage. This led to 
abandoning one approach for independent financial planners altogether and changing 
the process of obtaining responses from private individuals. Nevertheless, this 
outcome in respect of consumers was an important one, because further investigation 
revealed that concomitant research by another financial planner using quantitative 
methods as a basis for his master’s dissertation had met with the same impediments.  
This example of specific third party academic commentary aiding, supporting or 
challenging my own results and interpretations has been replicated by the gathering 
of recent literature appertaining to financial planning issues provided by specialist 
journalists and the professional bodies and used throughout this work.  
These are expanded upon in later chapters, but are extremely relevant when it comes 
to attempting to understand how the independent financial planning sector can move 
from where it is now to a long-term, sustainable future. 
By now you may be confused by the apparently cavalier way in which the terms 
“adviser” and “planner” are used, apparently interchangeably, as in independent 
financial adviser and independent financial planner? If so, you are not alone and 
what follows intends to delve deeper into this apparent inconsistency, along with the 
way in which other words used within the financial planning sector might also be 
considered bewildering. 
  
15 
 
1.3 – The Discussion Topics – their Origins, 
Determination and Purpose 
The initial motivation for providing a menu of topics was to assist all contributors in 
marshalling their thoughts in readiness for our meetings. My concern with this was 
that in providing topics there could be a suggestion that these shaped the content and 
direction of discussions (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Whilst this was not my espoused 
intention, it could nevertheless have been an unintended consequence, a product of 
my own ontology. 
Although it is important to bear in mind this potential weakness, it was thought to be 
worth the risk to ensure that contributors could begin their involvement by 
discussing areas with which they might feel generally comfortable and confident – 
essentially a catalyst for the loosening of tongues. As we shall see later this 
stratagem was very successful in some ways, encouraging and facilitating the 
development of contributors’ own thoughts and perspectives on current issues and 
future developments. 
Table 2 below sets down the exact topics as provided to contributors at least a week 
prior to their meeting. 
 
Table 2 - Menu of Potential Topics for Discussion 
 
The context within which these topics have emerged and developed was initially 
determined by various statutes and reviews seeking changes in the way in which the 
financial services sector functioned is set out in Table 3 - 57 Years of Regulation in 
1 In your opinion what purposes does a financial planning firm aim to fulfil? 
  
2 What is the role of a financial adviser? 
 
3 How would you describe the characteristics of fees?  
 
4 What are the features of commission as applied within a financial planning 
firm? 
5 What do you believe to be the barriers to future financial success and 
development in the independent financial advice sector? 
6 From your perspective what will be the future role of experience, education 
and qualification within the financial planning sector  
7 What product/service range is offered by the financial planning organisation 
with which you are most familiar? 
8  In a general sense in what way does integrity shape the process of financial 
planning?  
16 
 
the Financial Services Sector. Its comparatively timid offering commenced with the 
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act in 1958 
Year Event 
1958 Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 
1984 Gower Report – “Review of Investor Protection” 
1986 Financial Services Act 
1988 1986 Financial Services Act implemented – regulation by Self-Regulating 
Organisations (SRO’s) arrives for IFAs  
1994 The Personal Investment Authority replaces the Financial Intermediaries, Managers 
and Brokers Regulatory Authority (FIMBRA) & the Life Assurance and Unit Trust 
Regulatory Organisation (LAUTRO) 
2000 Financial Services and Markets Act 
2001 The Financial Services Authority assumes responsibility for regulation – SRO’s 
abolished 
2008 Failure of Northern Rock Bank amid worldwide financial collapse. 
2011 Legislation introduced to set up the Financial Conduct Authority 
2013 Financial Conduct Authority replaces Financial Services Authority - Retail 
Distribution Review findings implemented resulting in widespread banning of 
commission payments  
Table 3 - 57 Years of Regulation in the Financial Services Sector 
 
 Following the much later Gower Report the UK Parliament introduced a scheme of 
regulation for investment business in the form of the Financial Services Act 1986, 
which came into effect in April 1988. Prior to the implementation of this legislation 
impediments were not enforced on the ability of anyone to sell insurance and 
investments products, other than the necessity to hold an agency with a provider. 
Such agencies could be obtained and were offered without any real difficulty. After 
implementation it followed that a framework of monitoring would be required 
leading to the formation of organisations tasked with duties that include overseeing 
of compliance with the regulations.  
The era of the free-floating agent effectively ceased in April 1988 to be replaced by 
organisations ever more focused upon developing practices that were consistent with 
the regulations contained in the first Act and in the subsequent Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 which introduced the concept of “Treating Customers Fairly”, 
a Retail Distribution Review and, following the financial collapses of 2008, the 
restriction of the payment of commission in exchange for the sale of a provider’s 
financial product.  
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Topic 1 sought to reveal whether firms for which contributors worked or engaged 
with employed practices aimed at meeting these requirements with a view to 
strengthening their futures or simply to appear compliant.   
Topic 2 is set within the landscape provided by the original 1986 Act which set 
down adviser classifications. These determined whether a financial adviser was tied 
to the selling of one supplier’s products or had multiple agencies entitling him/her to 
be described as an independent financial adviser. The 1986 Act required that 
appropriate advice accompanied a sale, but the later 2000 Act with its emphasis on 
“Treating Customers Fairly” shifted that emphasis towards the advice process and, as 
is expanded upon later in this work, the implied necessity to charge activity-related 
fees.  
Topics 3 and 4 explored how advisers differentiated between those fees and a 
commission, if indeed they did, because the current regulator has reiterated its 
determination to remove commission-like payments from the sector. This in turn 
must be interpreted as generating a major change in the ability of firms to survive 
where those differences are not understood and, therefore, are without an alternative 
plan.    
Topic 5 had been proposed as a discussion point capable of revealing espoused 
attitudes, of both a group-think and personal nature, and the extent to which beliefs 
were rooted in short-term or strategic modes. 
This led on to appraisals concerning the source of future advisers with sufficient 
experience and whether there was a need for higher levels of education and 
qualifications, as raised when contributing to Topic 6. In this context it is worth 
remembering that before the introduction of regulation in 1988 an individual’s 
capacity to sell a financial product was limited only by that individual’s ability to 
obtain an agency or agencies of product providers. As a consequence most solicitors 
and accountants in the United Kingdom were active in the sector and held such 
agencies, in addition to insurance companies’ representatives, insurance brokers and 
sundry other persons across the realm. How many of these agencies existed is not 
recorded, because in such an unregulated setting records of this nature were not 
required, but it was thought, conjecturally, to be not less than 130,000, a figure 
which was quite possible given the size of the legal and accounting professional 
bodies referred to above.   
When mandatory qualifications were first introduced as a result of the 1986 Act the 
numbers working as financial products salespersons fell dramatically and when the 
minimum requirements were raised by the later Act they dropped even further. By 
October 2013 the number of appropriately qualified and authorised financial 
advisers, that is excluding stockbrokers and discretionary fund managers, was 21,496 
(www.ftadviser.com published 25/11/2014).  
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This topic also offered contributors the opportunity to consider whether they thought 
that enhanced experience, education and the raising of qualifications requirements 
would ensure the facilitation of the necessary resources required to provide a purely 
advisory service generating fee income. 
Topic 7 provided an opportunity to consider whether or how the service range 
offered matched the aims unveiled during the consideration of Topic 1. Were the 
ranges consistent with the sector’s development within the framework proposed by 
the Financial Conduct Authority and an organisation’s sustainable future or simply a 
continuation of what had always been undertaken, namely the selling of financial 
products in exchange for a commission. 
Finally, Topic 8 evolved from the current attempts to develop consumer trust in the 
financial services sector, about which much has been written, particularly by bodies 
such as The Personal Finance Society, and is referred to often in the succeeding 
chapters of this work. Whilst the term trust was implicit in the 1986 Act, replacing 
the age-old concept of caveat emptor, its introduction into the mainstream of 
strategic rhetoric was via the 2000 Act with its reference to Treating Customers 
Fairly. Contributors’ understanding of the concept of integrity, or their lack of it, was 
used to inform this work with prevailing attitudes and interpretations, reaching out 
into issues of ethics and morals.     
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In addressing all three contribution groups I had intended to employ this same menu 
of topics for discussion. The hope was that in doing so themes from three or more 
different perspectives would emerge, thereby employing some of the features of 360 
feedback techniques (Antonioni 1996). To achieve this discussion topics offering the 
opportunity to think in terms of providers or consumers, or even better both, were 
required. As a base point, therefore, topics were created around marketing mix 
concepts, embracing the marketer’s position (Borden 1964) and that of consumers 
(Lautenborn 1990). 
 
 
Figure 1 - Different Attributes of a Sales Representative and a Professional 
Guide 
 
As an independent financial adviser you may wish to reflect upon your own status, 
as intimated in the above diagram, before considering the views of your peers and 
emergent themes recorded later. You may also wish to consider Christensen, Cook 
and Hall’s work that took Lautenborn’s thoughts and expanded them across a 
broader range of delivery concepts (2005). If you prefer the term independent 
financial planner, then you should also be able to discern why the different label is 
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important to you and why and what impact it has on the arrows’ directions. You will 
also be interested in considering the contributions of your peers and others towards 
determining the appropriateness of each term, to be discussed in later chapters.  
In the previous chapter, I admitted to subsequently having recognised that this suite 
of questions also reflected Pearce’s Statements of Objectives. The first topic offered 
contributors the opportunity of articulating and expanding upon their thoughts in 
respect of this most fundamental of business requirements, that of understanding the 
whole reason for the existence of the organisation, be it composed of one person or 
many. 
In an attempt to differentiate between the roles of a financial planning organisation 
and those employed by it the second topic sought to examine their thoughts on the 
role of a financial planner, as distinct from the organisation’s. These first two topics 
were intended to discover whether, particularly in the case of one-person businesses, 
there existed an understanding of the various component elements of an organisation 
and the need to focus energies in ways that maximised efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy (Sheldon, 1996). 
As an introduction to a later theme my next two topics, addressed in Chapters 3.3 
and 3.4 respectively, strove to gain an understanding of how certain critical words 
are construed. In these cases, an expansion upon the meaning, nature and 
characteristic of the words “fees” and “commission” were considered, because with 
the implementation of the regulator’s Retail Distribution Review in January 2013, 
fees became obligatory, whilst commissions payments were almost completely 
outlawed, at least in theory. How was this required change now being interpreted 
amongst the three groups? A perspective on this is offered in Chapter 3.2 by way of 
analogy to a duck and the characteristics of commission. 
The fifth topic had in mind an element of this project’s title and one which goes right 
to the heart of every businessperson’s thinking, namely “What do you believe to be 
the barriers to future financial success and development in the independent financial 
advice sector?” With a nod to Michael Porter’s Five Forces (Porter 1980) the degree 
of understanding of the current and future environment was sought, together with 
thoughts on future skills and strategic planning requirements.  
In asking in Chapter 3.6, “From your perspective what will be the future role of 
experience, education and qualification within the financial planning sector?” an 
opportunity was offered to address how these three attributes might impact upon the 
members of each contributor group. Whose experience was being considered, the 
provider’s, the financial adviser’s or the private individual’s and experience of what? 
In terms of education was this at a primary, secondary, tertiary, professional or 
consumer level and how could that play a part in addressing the previous topic. What 
is the quality of qualification, how is it set and how is it perceived by, as Pearce puts 
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it amongst his Purpose Statements, insider and outsider claimants, interest groups 
and/or stakeholders? 
“What product/service range is offered by the financial planning organisation with 
which you are most familiar?” was posited to obtain an insight into how each group 
saw the role of financial planners, if indeed they saw one at all. Was it seen as 
providing a narrow or broad range of services and was there an expectation that the 
range required a short or long-term relationship. It was deliberately couched in terms 
which allowed respondents to approach the topic from a consumer or supplier stance, 
or both.  
As admitted earlier the final topic was proffered as a later addition. Whilst 
professional ethics has suddenly become an important theme for professional bodies, 
urged on by the current regulator, references to ethics or morality were not included 
in responses from financial planners during the earliest meetings. So, “In a general 
sense in what way does integrity shape the process of financial planning?” was 
added to the topics menu in an attempt to tease out such a discussion without directly 
mentioning the words, and without suggesting that it was restricted to just one of the 
group’s behaviours. 
These were the origins, determinations and purposes of the discussion topics. They 
were conceived in marketing mix theories and organisational purpose concepts with 
the aim of providing a comfortable starting point from which contributors could 
develop their own thoughts and express their own views. It was made very clear to 
contributors that these were not intended to be prescriptive, but as initial openings to 
their unrestricted thoughts. I believe that the emergent themes cast a fascinating light 
on the attitudes of the various parties to the sector and how some of these themes 
could define the future for the independent financial adviser or planner.  
In undertaking such research it must always be the aim of the researcher to avoid 
influencing outcomes by imposing their own attitudes upon the process, a matter to 
which I have referred at the beginning of this chapter in relation to the selection of 
discussion topics. By providing an outline of my own lived experience in the next 
chapter I document how my journey and personal traits have brought me to this point 
and how, in recognising that, I have attempted to avoid skewing the results.  
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1.4 - My Professional Journey and its Impact 
upon the Rationale for undertaking this Project 
In this section I revisit my career path with the aim of understanding how my 
journey into this project evolved.  
My professional journey commenced in 1961 with employment as a junior bank 
clerk with the Westminster Bank. It was still an era when retail banks concentrated 
upon the practice of acting as deposit holders for longer-term savers, repositories for 
short-term cash and providers of private and commercial loans to those able to 
provide suitable collateral. The money advanced to borrowers was sourced from a 
relatively small portion of the funds deposited with the banks for longer-term saving. 
Income was generated from fees charged to customers for the maintenance of their 
current accounts, the interest charged on loans and through the overnight lending 
system in the Money Market managed in the City of London. Costs came in the form 
of running the branch networks around the country and the interest paid to 
depositors. Banks were seen as institutions which were staid, reliable, respected and 
consistent in remaining with their core purpose as service providers. 
The bank I joined has long been subsumed into a group calling itself Royal Bank of 
Scotland, whose independence was recently forcibly surrendered to the UK Treasury 
by reason of desperate need and its standing reduced from respect to derision and 
worse. 
For anyone wishing to enter business the lessons to be learned from these changes 
and more importantly their causes are salutary. When banks decided to promote, that 
is sell, the lending of funds, without requiring suitable security, they increased their 
risks levels significantly and ultimately in the next economic downturn suffered 
major losses as borrowers defaulted. This was an early example of seeking short-
term profits without considering the probability of longer-term costs, something 
which they then repeated many times and on a much grander scale when selling life 
assurance policies, motor and home insurance, pensions transfers, precipice bonds 
and payment protection plans. They had moved from an ethos of providing a service 
for which they charged to one in which sales targets and commissions earned were 
key and the customer was merely the means to achieving success. 
Following three years with the bank I joined an engineering company, Dexion Ltd, 
as a cost accounts clerk. The work familiarised me with the need to know what the 
costs of the business were and what drove those costs. I later recognised that when 
an organisation understands its costs characteristics it is in a stronger position to 
protect itself from elements such as under-pricing or simply mispricing its products 
or services. This recognition developed in me a three-step approach to business 
management, namely what do we need, what will it cost and finally how will we pay 
for it?  The practice of cost accounting developed into what is now known as 
management accounting, a process that employs this three-step approach and 
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broadens it to embrace the technique of comparing actual emerging outcomes with 
the planned outcomes, thereby facilitating the taking of corrective, timely 
adjustments where required.  
Two years with Dexion was followed by spells of employment with a private 
forestry company which relied for its success on the prevailing punitive tax rules 
applicable to the very wealthy and the Courtaulds empire, where production workers 
were paid on the basis of the work completed, not on the sales value of the 
merchandise created. In the Courtaulds case the company eventually ceased trading 
because overseas competitors could produce the same merchandise for a fraction of 
the cost. The forestry company ceased trading when the government of the day 
substantially diminished the benefits available under the tax relief rules and the 
overall tax rates. In summary both suffered from having failed to consider the 
possibility of changing business contexts and prepare accordingly.   
Looking back, as I developed my management skills during an era when managers 
were often promoted on the basis of time served, I found myself constantly frustrated 
by my ignorance of what the role, as opposed to the status, of a manager was then 
and is now. If one understands the broader requirements it becomes possible to 
attend to these, whilst avoiding areas that fall beyond those boundaries. Given that 
Henri Fayol had provided a workable summation of a manager’s functions my 
ignorance, and the ignorance of my peers, appears with hindsight all the more 
irksome (Pugh and Hickson 2007). His pronouncements on the role of a manager 
may have been theory, but as a route map in a period of evolved management, as 
opposed to trained management, it would have been an illuminating beacon.  
If consideration of management practices of the pre 1980’s could lead to the 
development of a generally more informed and competent manager could this be 
replicated elsewhere? Could closer scrutiny of the role played by financial planners 
now and the extent to which it mirrored those earlier practices, assist in the 
achievement of improving the financial and ethical relationship aspects, referred to 
previously? In Chapters 4 and 5 I visit the question of whether there should be 
greater emphasis on Fayol’s framework of planning, organising, commanding, 
controlling and coordinating within the management of this sector, as in all others.  
As the final days of Heath government (1970-74) drew to an end I left Courtaulds 
and became self-employed, a status familiar to many independent financial advisers 
and planners.  
The term entrepreneur has recently been hijacked to describe all who are self-
employed. Whilst it does not have a universal definition (Gartner 1990), according to 
Jean-Baptist Say (Burns 2001) true entrepreneurs shift economic resources from an 
area of lower productivity to an area of higher productivity and greater yield. Did I 
have the skills and aptitudes necessary to be an entrepreneur, as opposed to being 
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simply self-employed; by the time I had discovered that I had the die had been long 
cast?   
The nature of my self-employment soon became that of a personal lines insurance 
broker, remunerated by a commission paid by the insurance company to me, the size 
of the commission being dictated by a percentage rate pre-set by the insurance 
company and applied to the premiums I collected. The same principle applied to life 
assurance policies which I sold; the cost of the effort and resource I applied to the 
selling of such products was not taken into account, which was contrary to the three-
step process referred to above. Such a method of remuneration could be both a 
blessing and a curse, partly because costs could exceed commissions earned on the 
sale and vice versa, and partly because there was a temptation to sell some products 
simple because they involved little effort for comparatively substantial reward (A 
£50 per month life assurance premium could generate a commission of £1,130, for 
example) The lack of a relationship between costs of the business and its income 
generating model struck me as flawed, then and now.   
Notwithstanding the aforegoing, an interesting facet of motor insurance broking is 
that the purchaser is almost always driven by price (Yeo, Smith et al. 2001). 
However, before the advent of e-marketed products the buyer had the opportunity to 
discuss the appropriateness of a particular motor insurance policy with their broker. 
At that point the benefits of taking a more expensive, but more suitable cover could 
be discussed before purchase. The broker was remunerated by a commission paid by 
the product provider as a percentage of the premium collected, but the buyer could 
be better informed before the contract was sealed, because the broker had added 
value in the form of advice. With the virtual removal of the personal lines broker 
from the market the availability of such added value has also been lost. What 
remains is the highlighting of product price and a statutory list of its features; 
potential buyers are provided with information but are not necessarily better 
informed.  
The strength of the broker distributed system was that whilst the broker was 
motivated to sell a product to earn a commission, the level of that commission 
tended to be constrained by the prevailing premium in the market. The weakness was 
that the broker expert may have had very limited knowledge of his or her subject and 
this weakness could and did extend to the sale of financial products, such as a range 
of life assurance products.  
My own dilemma was rooted in that nagging tension between an unspoken 
admission of lack of competence attended by the moral dilemma of adopting the 
guise of an expert broker and aspiration. What I could do and do well was to prepare 
and apply budgets. Budgets, as I observe in Chapter 5, ensure that a business has a 
plan to cover the short term, can facilitate comparing that plan with reality and offer 
the opportunity to highlight potential weaknesses in the times ahead. They also 
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provide a basis for avoiding losing money over the longer term and I was very keen 
to do that. 
In March 1976 Harold Wilson unexpectedly tendered his resignation as Prime 
Minister, his successor Jim Callaghan lost the struggle to remain in post and in 1979 
Margaret Thatcher was swept into power full of revolutionary zeal. Change was in 
the air and from the chaos of the “winter of discontent” we were led into an era of 
deregulation, offering many of the opportunities and threats of the free market. By 
the mid 1980’s it was clear that it was possible to have too much of a good thing and 
that regulation of the financial services sector was both desirable and necessary. The 
result was the enactment of the Financial Services Act 1986, requiring regulated 
accountability. The press challenged the concept of self-regulation for the financial 
services sector, suggesting that it was not possible for an industry to police itself, 
although despite the recommendations of the Leveson Inquiry into press regulation 
they continue to support the idea for themselves (Leveson, 2012).  
From an intermediary perspective this offered the options of remaining as an 
independent introducer of business, tying oneself to a particular insurance company, 
whilst remaining self-employed, or withdrawing from the sector entirely. In any 
event the insurance company remained the source of remuneration and dictator of its 
terms and levels, within the boundaries set by the new regulators. Notwithstanding 
these issues, what had now been incubated was a clear desire to narrow down even 
further my choice of career and, by extension, the nature of a yet-to-be considered 
doctoral project; I was focusing upon the financial services sector and taking on the 
role of adviser and planner to and for clients. 
Perhaps it was at this point that I first began to think strategically. In my view being 
tied to one company could only result in my being obliged to achieve targets and sell 
to customers regardless of their real needs, which for me was morally unacceptable. I 
opted for independence and sat the embryonic and non-mandatory life and pensions 
examinations of the Chartered Insurance Institute. My success in these examinations 
provided me with improved knowledge, self-esteem and competitive advantage and 
the ability to provide enhanced guidance to clients.  
Regulation brought with it substantial additional cost, a prescriptive framework and 
the attention of a press eager to expose the lack of technical skill and knowledge of 
the greater part of the life assurance industry’s sales forces. It seemed to me then that 
a drive towards setting standards at a level of competence far in advance of the 
extant setting was a virtual certainty. Thousands of others in the sector decided to 
exit to avoid having to meet these modest requirements, making it less competitive 
for those who remained (Sparrow, Matlay et al. 2001).  
The recognition that I was an Independent Financial Adviser recommending 
investment, protection and savings plans, often on the basis of their perceived tax 
advantages, without having a basic knowledge of taxation, smacked of moral 
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bankruptcy and was responsible for a shift in my paradigm. I determined to study at 
the advanced level of examinations, equivalent now to Qualifications and 
Curriculum Authority’s (QCA) Level Four. From passing the G10 Taxation and 
Trusts paper I proceeded to pass two further papers, one in Personal Investment 
Planning (G20) and the other in Pensions (G60) and achieve, according to the 
Chartered Insurance Institute (CII), professional status. The appetite for study had 
been whetted and the discipline to study within a distance learning framework, 
nurtured. The needle in the moral compass was now aligned rather more closely 
towards ethical north, a yoking together of the issues raised in Chapter 3.6 on 
experience, education and qualification with Chapter 3.8 on integrity. 
Shortly after the completion of my professional examinations the CII invited me to 
become an examiner providing an opportunity to understand the general level of 
achievement being attained by my occupational peers, whilst at the same time 
facilitating my continuous professional development.  
Completion of my professional examinations was followed by further study, but this 
time of an academic nature, namely a Master’s Degree in Business Administration 
(MBA) 
A very important outcome of the MBA course was the developing of a facility for 
understanding the benefits of reflective writing and recording (Winter, Buck et al. 
1999). A requirement was to keep a written record, using reflective techniques. As 
the weeks passed I noticed that recording an event also provided the opportunity to 
consider how that event might have evolved, how I had addressed it and how I might 
have approached it in a different way. In considering issues of a problematic nature 
the pedestrian recording of it enabled my brain to consider the alternative 
perspectives, including how the other parties to the event might have thought and 
what they might see as a resolution (Deutsch, Coleman et al. 2011). 
As part of the process of studying towards the award of my degree I had taken the 
opportunity to undertake research and reflection constituted a key part of the process.   
An important learning point in the course covered the significance of broadening and 
maintaining networks of relationships during and after the completion of my degree. 
As a result, I consciously built a network of people, with the objective of widening 
my connections and contacts. Because the underlying principle was not simply sales 
related, but rooted in a desire to maintain wider social intercourse with people, for its 
own sake, I discovered an ever-growing array of opportunities for academic, social 
and business development.  
Such outcomes owe more to the concepts of the Socialisation, Externalisation, 
Combination and Internalisation (SECI) model and the enabling context of Ba, 
creating opportunities to be acted and reflected upon and then again repeating the 
process, and much less to the manufacture of predetermined selling opportunities 
(Nonaka, Toyama et al. 2005). In effect it is about dynamic knowledge creation and 
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engaging in a long-term strategy, as opposed to the short tactical stratagem. In terms 
of its usefulness in relation to this project it provides a framework for compiling 
sources for robust research amongst relevant stakeholders within the industry and 
profession and thereby stimulating further discussions amongst those participants 
with their peers and associates.  
When networking and reflection are considered within the context of my own 
psychometric profiles, referred to towards the end of this review, they assist in 
identifying what is practical (for me), what I should avoid and the most likely route 
to achieving positive outcomes for all concerned.  
Indeed, given that my personal characteristics include a desire to communicate 
knowledge to others taking up a parallel career as a university lecturer was a natural, 
although previously unconsidered, development. Not only could I continue advising 
clients within our practice, I could inform my lectures with an immediacy not 
generally available to students, particularly at post-graduate levels. That is I could 
teach not only about business and finance, but for business and finance (Tolley 
1983), an approach supported by Linda Hicks (2002) when referring to Kolb and his 
colleagues. They suggested that partnerships between education and industry should 
create feedback loops which enable interactions between ideas and action.  
You will observe later from remarks made by a number of contributors to this 
research that they too believe that such links, established from quite an early age 
could have a considerable bearing upon the future success, or otherwise of the advice 
and planning sector. From a DProf perspective underpinning professional practice, 
both current and proposed, with suitable pedagogical concepts should provide a solid 
platform for consideration of how to motivate change. 
Whilst occupied by my preparation for lectures, studying for the PGCAP and seeing 
clients, our university department decided to introduce a new BSc in International 
Finance degree, an area which aligned closely with my overall experience. As a 
consequence I undertook negotiations with two of the main professional bodies, to 
ascertain what their expectations of such a course would be and then arranged for a 
focus group composed of Chartered Financial Planners. This enabled active 
professionals to discuss their expected future requirements, consistent with what they 
saw as developments within their sector, whilst at the same time enabling the 
university to understand their perspective. It also provided a foundation for the 
maintenance of future links between that element of the financial services sector and 
the university. 
From a personal perspective the term “future” can be interpreted as covering both a 
planned and an emergent horizon, with the former sometimes playing the role of 
director and sometimes the directed. 
Thus, my plans for my future included the undertaking of research and the 
compilation of knowledge which would lead to the completion of my DProf. 
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Furthermore, I wished to assist in changing the existing culture of the financial 
planning sector to the mutual advantage of what at this stage I presumed to be the 
main stakeholders, namely regulators, suppliers, consumers and advisers. What is the 
evidence that this might be possible and to what extent do I have the facility to 
attempt this? More importantly, however, how do such desires interfere with the 
need to take a completely independent research position exploring the influences of 
morality, ethics and remuneration on the existence, development and survival of the 
independent financial advice sector?  
An underlying aim in recording my journey and lived-experience is to seek to 
highlight potential conflicts of personal interest with professional and academic 
goals and recognition of such latent contradictions is a rational starting point. 
Conducting research in a manner intentionally free of bias would also leave open the 
door to having such pre-conceptions imbued with a liberal dose of realism. 
In my formative years my internal radar was turned towards the simplistic notion 
that there is right and wrong and that the latter should be resisted. Subsequently the 
practicalities of life have dictated that some modification of that viewpoint was 
required, but what emerged from the analysis of psychometric models, referred to 
below, is that the core principal of focusing upon the aim of achieving perceived 
changes for the meeting of common needs is important and this is expanded upon in 
Chapter 5.  
So what are my core competences? It would be easy to describe these as rooted in 
accounting and finance. However, there is an argument for suggesting that it lies in 
an ability and desire to absorb, apply and transfer information and knowledge. The 
reality is that this latter interpretation can be seen as a tool in both the business 
world, where clients are assisted with their financial management, and academia 
where students are assisted with their own theoretical and practical development.  
What are my core characteristics? Assessments using a variety of different 
psychometric testing techniques have been employed to determine these with 
relatively clear outcomes. 
In terms of Myers Briggs I have an ENTJ indicator, for which types the definition is 
that such individuals are frank, decisive, leaders in activities who develop and 
implement comprehensive systems designed to solve organisational problems. They 
tend to be good in anything that requires reasoning and intelligent talk, such as 
public speaking and are usually well informed and enjoy adding to their fund of 
knowledge (Myers 1990). 
My Enneagram Personality Type 1 is defined as a reformer, who at the highest grade 
of the healthy level can have an intense sense of right and wrong, underpinned by 
personal religious and/or moral values and seeks to be rational, reasonable, self-
disciplined, mature and moderate in all things. Type 1’s will strive to be principled, 
fair, objective and ethical. However, at less healthy levels they exhibit characteristics 
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of dogmatism, self-righteousness, intolerance and inflexibility (Baron and Wagele 
1994). 
Of course such psychometric guides are not cast in stone, but can present a general 
guide to my core personality and character, that is what is available to work with in 
my life, under both favourable and adverse circumstances and moods, which will 
include the undertaking of this project. Such work can also be invaluable in helping 
to understand the nature of others whose lives and work formed part of my overall 
DProf study. 
With my Myers-Briggs Typology Indicator suggesting an ENTJ profile (sometimes 
referred to as the Field Marshall type) and the Enneagram Type 1 indicating a wish 
to enlighten others, it was not surprising that I eventually positioned myself within 
the advice sector. 
In the twenty years before starting my MBA I thought I could see a need for change 
and indeed had expressed that need amongst fellow advisers. Given that the need (a 
change from remuneration by commissions to fees in the interests of clients and our 
own businesses) conflicted with the culture of the industry I found it difficult to 
articulate how such a change would be of advantage. The MBA, which I regard as a 
working document, not simply as a certificate on the wall, was the stepping stone 
which has enabled our business to formulate and employ a practical working model 
of an alternative way of conducting a financial planning practice that placed fees at 
its centre.  
However, to attempt a reframing of any organisation without taking into account 
lessons offered from the past would be to raise the possibility of exchanging one 
latent failure for another. My earliest career experience demonstrated the staid, but 
successful methods employed in the banking sector of the time. Many, perhaps most 
people found that they could carry on their normal lives without the assistance of a 
bank account, so banks concentrated on a much narrower customer base. Those 
customers understood that they had to pay a fee for the management of their 
accounts and interest on loans advanced by their bank. Lending to the bank was 
rewarded with interest paid to the depositor. The illusion of free banking was not 
offered; the charging structure was uncluttered and relatively transparent.  
In planning the long-term future for our own business the past experience of the 
banking sector suggested that we too should focus upon a narrow client base, 
concentrate upon providing a service as opposed to products and charge explicit fees 
for the work undertaken, which is what we have done. 
By itself changing the modus operandi of an organisation without taking account of 
the contextual changes would be unlikely to achieve sustainability. For the private 
forestry company, fundamental changes in taxation law and application effectively 
destroyed their market. For Courtaulds overseas competition rooted in much lower 
labour costs forced them from the world stage and ultimately every other one as 
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well. Strategic thinking demands that an organisation has in place plans to address 
potential external changes, something that neither of these organisations appear to 
have had. It is said that the only constant is change, so to ignore that maxim risks 
future oblivion.  
A fundamental change in the near environment of the financial planning sector is the 
constantly altering value of assets, rising and falling in a sometimes random fashion. 
To rely upon such assets as a basis for generating income is foolish and avoidable. If 
the service provided is advice for which a fee is paid at an agreed rate, changes in 
asset values, legislation and individual circumstances will not have a direct impact 
upon the organisation’s remuneration; indeed such changes will often generate 
additional fees. 
However, a failure to maintain its knowledge base will be detrimental, so the need to 
ensure that its human resources contain individuals of a suitable professional and 
academic standard will be paramount, for it is impossible to charge for advice if that 
advice is flawed or incomplete. Because banks moved into the wider financial 
services area without first having recruited personnel with appropriate qualifications 
and understanding and moved from a service to a sales culture they ultimately paid 
and continue to pay substantial penalties, both of a monetary and reputational nature. 
So my past working experience suggests that clarity of purpose, an ability to address 
change and potential change and transparency of charges are essential to maintaining 
the long-term future of any independent financial planning organisation. The 
operating framework for our own organisation was constructed in recognition of this. 
The avoidance of doubt amongst consumers with respect to the meaning of words 
and phrases used in financial services is also important. To this end Appendix 1 
provides a glossary to assist understanding of the thorny issue of the intended and 
interpreted meaning of words and terms employed.  
With all of these thoughts in mind we now move on to reflect upon the views of 
others who are involved as stakeholders in the independent financial planning sector.  
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Section 2 – Methodologies and Methods 
 
Chapter 2 – Project design: Methodologies and 
Methods 
Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke stated that “No plan of operations extends with 
certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength” (Hughes 2009). 
In this observation he was reflecting upon Clausewitz’ remarks concerning the 
tension of interfacing the theory underpinning a plan with the reality of applying that 
plan. It would, therefore, have been a colossal deceit on my part to believe that my 
overall plans for the undertaking of this project would be capable of surviving intact, 
once the application of the plans had been commenced in the form of engagement in 
the research and analysis processes. 
Notwithstanding this, there had to be a framework in place capable of providing a 
broad pattern of guidance to assist the development of the project whilst at the same 
time being flexible enough to adapt to the changing contexts and unexpected 
perspectives, which would arise during the gathering of data and information. 
Indeed, it would have been disappointing if one of the most exciting possibilities of 
undertaking such a project did not emerge, namely the emergence of the unexpected. 
It is in this context that my project design sought to engage methodologies’ 
characteristics rather than their complete frameworks. My early thoughts considered 
how to gather data and information, which I believed would be vital in the 
construction and completion of this project, in a manner capable of ensuring the 
robustness and reliability of the outcomes and these were encapsulated in the 
following diagram.  
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Figure 2 - Depiction of the Application of chosen Methodologies and Methods 
(Cawdell K E 2015) 
 
The aims, objectives and outcomes referred to in the project planning phase are 
presented in diagrammatic form overleaf and these emphasised the need to focus 
upon the overall purpose of the project, namely identifying a method capable of 
assisting the survival of financial planning consultancies. 
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Figure 3 - The Pyramid of Purpose (with acknowledgements to Paton, Cameron 
& Preston 2000) 
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The Project’s Purpose 
At the apex of the aforegoing diagram was the project’s purpose. It must be admitted 
that when commencing this stage of my research programme I had not thought in 
terms of providing a purpose. Nevertheless, as I worked through the early stages of 
this programme it became apparent that without a purpose the project lacked focus. 
In spite of this recognition that purpose evolved in parts, with the present outcome 
embracing, what I believed would be, contributory issues. It was admitted and 
recognised that it was perfectly possible that the purpose could change again, 
although any significant alteration would lead to substantial changes throughout the 
various elements leading towards a successful conclusion.  
My choice of purpose was embedded in my understanding the responsibility of the 
senior manager in any business, which is firstly to ensure the survival of the 
organisation (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983). This understanding emerged during the 
completion of my MBA and as such has work-based roots, because that research was 
based upon the practice in which I worked. What I brought to that practice was and 
remains my personal ontology and a perspective which, because of my career 
journey, has not been imbued with the former or existing cultures within the 
corporate insurance sector (Janis 1972). This may be seen as both a boon and a 
burden given that some might argue that I have limited understanding of the way in 
which the industry works and the genesis for its rationale. Conversely others might 
accept that not being immersed in the ways of such a set of paradigms will provide 
opportunities for some lateral thinking. 
Clearly, in constructing my project it was going to be important to bear in mind that 
aspects of my personality should be controlled with a view to ensuring that my 
psychometric profile, referred to in the introduction to this work, did not create 
unnecessary tensions as a result of my natural adversarial approach not being 
sufficiently restrained. 
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The Main Aims  
In support of the project’s main purpose three aims had been selected and these were 
identified in the diagram. The first of these sought to ascertain whether motivational 
factors adopted by or imposed upon advisers could have a direct or indirect impact 
upon the longer term survival of their organisations. In addressing this element of the 
project, I believed that it would first be necessary to identify what motivational 
drivers existed within the community of practice, before attempting to assess 
whether a positive correlation with survival rates could be observed and whether this 
could be interpreted as evidence that a cause and effect relationship was present.  
It was intended that the research for this element would be undertaken by engaging 
three main clusters, namely focus groups, one to one discussions with representatives 
of consumers, distributors and advisers and by undertaking a literature review of past 
and current thinking. Given that the quasi-professional bodies now have education 
departments, I also intended to engage in one-to-one discussions with their 
representatives, inviting contributions of both an academic and professional nature. It 
was recognised that there was a possibility of perspectives on the subject changing as 
a result of the social and geographic context of the contributors and with this in mind 
I was to seek contributions from focus groups situated in various diverse parts of the 
UK. 
My general observations of the average IFA's perspective on the development of the 
profession noted that there was a continuing discussion on the relevance of education 
and structured learning as opposed to the worth of experience in the financial advice 
sector. This suggested that there would be considerable opportunities for considering 
and researching from a phenomenological angle, with hermeneutic approaches being 
applied particularly with regard to the literature review. In undertaking the analysis 
of the work of the focus groups I intended to employ grounded theory techniques, 
but accepted that alternative approaches of a more quantitative nature might be 
required to assist that resolve. 
I was also aware that in my role as a practitioner and an academic, intertwined with 
my belief that the fees based approach was to be favoured, I ran the risk of 
influencing the nature of group discussions. Therefore, I intended inviting a 
colleague with a social science background to comment upon the discussion topics 
offered to members of focus groups and those individuals offering responses through 
one-to-one meetings. 
The second aim was to ascertain whether an existing activity-based fees & cost 
model could assist in the change from a selling to a full-service paradigm.  
Quite apart from the level of importance I believed this model represented, the 
relevance of this second aim with regards to supporting the project’s purpose was to 
act as a triangulation tool. Because it is already in use and has been tested under 
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circumstances of both economic expansion and decline, it was thought that it could 
be used as an alternative benchmark and set of criteria when observing, correlating 
and analysing data acquired during the satisfaction of the first aim. In this respect it 
should have been able to provide a challenge to the generally applied existing 
practice, whilst at the same time being challenged itself. 
However, in terms of its relevance to the aim of providing an alternative to the 
popular sales based approach, this activity-based fees and costs model was 
acknowledged to be hampered by the context in which it is presently situated, 
namely within one small financial planning organisation. Nevertheless, it was 
expected to provide an opportunity to consider whether those financial planning 
organisations which currently run on a fees-based model, have, in addition to all-
round experience, professional qualifications equivalent to a first degree. Where this 
was not the case I was interested to discover how such advisers would be able to 
charge fees without providing a holistic level of advice rooted in a broad knowledge 
of the Byzantine complexities of the financial sector. In other words, would that be 
ethical? 
The third aim, namely to construct an academic work worthy of the award of a 
Doctorate in Professional Studies,  recognised that whilst this is a work-based 
project, serving the twin demands of both a practical and academic nature must be 
key. To this end I expected to employ the experience gained in acquiring my MBA, 
which whilst being academically framed, applied many of the models, concepts and 
theories which it introduced, to the building of the activity-based fees and costs 
framework used in our own organisation. In turn, the wealth of data, information and 
knowledge which has been carefully catalogued since the MBA programme was 
commenced was expected to inform this current work-based project with pertinent 
feed-back and perspectives. 
Objectives 
At the outset I recognised that to satisfy the aims of this work I would need to 
accumulate and analyse data from IFA, consumer and product provider sources. To 
achieve this I would need methodologies capable of aiding the interpretation of the 
relevant data, information and knowledge gathered.  Effectively, this is the “how” 
element contained in Figure  above and represents the more specific and immediate 
purposes. 
 
Two major approaches to testing and evaluating strategies have been used recently of 
which the first examined them on the basis of their suitability, acceptability and 
feasibility (Johnson, Whittington et al. 2011). The second approach suggested that it 
is probably impossible to demonstrate conclusively that a particular business strategy 
can or will work, but that it could be tested for the presence of flaws (Rumelt 1998). 
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Rumelt’s work further considers whether an organisation can capture any advantage 
its strategies acquire for a long enough period to reap adequate rewards. 
In gathering data for the aforementioned assessment through the medium of focus 
groups and one-to-one meetings I posited that the basis for shaping the strategies 
most suited to the financial planners’ purpose and aims would emerge. Furthermore, 
those strategies would have been identified as consonant, feasible and acceptable by 
the very stakeholders wishing to enter the purely fees-charging arena. In effect those 
currently aware of the need for change will have provided the arguments in favour of 
the transition. The testing and evaluation of the results of our own fees and costs 
model could then be compared with the new research material for consonance and 
variation, with the outcomes being used as a basis for reflection and modification. 
For the financial adviser our own fees and costs model suggests there will be 
operational consequences, with adjustments required to processes, mind-sets and 
abilities to ensure that strategic objectives were capable of being met (Pettigrew and 
Whipp 1993).  Change management encompassing superior leadership attributes 
would be an essential requirement.  
 
To assist this process I decided to employ two marketing models relating to the 
marketing mix as devices to reveal various stakeholders’ attitudes to the mechanics 
of the market and their position within it. The older and much better known model is 
referred to as the Four P’s of Marketing and looks at the marketing mix from the 
perspective of the marketer (Borden 1964). In essence, it is considering the product, 
price, promotion methods and placing of the product in such a way as to maximise 
its selling potential. In short it is about the selling of the product. By comparison, the 
more recent model, the Four C’s, considers marketing from the consumers’ 
perspective, whilst following the framework produced by Borden (Lautenborn 
1990). It is about ascertaining the needs of the consumer and how they may be 
satisfied.  The comparisons can lead to some very distinct differences being 
disclosed of the mind-sets employed. The following table of comparisons serves to 
illustrate the essential differences of the two approaches. 
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Borden’s 4 P’s Product–centred Concept Lautenborn’s 4 C’s Consumer-oriented 
Concepts 
1 Product - this means the product's (or 
service's) quality, the functions, the 
features and benefits of its design plus 
packaging, guarantees and level of after-
sales service. Choices can be made 
about any of these aspects. 
1 Client’s needs, wants and expectations 
from the product or service 
2 Price includes recommended prices to 
end-user customers, distributor's trade 
prices, cash discounts, bulk discounts, 
terms of credit. 
2 Cost and savings/benefit to the client  
3 Promotion means the promotions mix or 
the communications mix. This mix 
includes advertising, sales promotions, 
publicity, direct mail, exhibitions, 
display, packaging, selling and even 
word-of-mouth. 
3 Communicating the identified benefits to 
the client in the context of the 
satisfaction of their needs.  
4 Place means where and when the 
customer buys and consumes the 
product or service. Place is sometimes 
referred to as marketing channels, 
physical distribution, logistics or 
location. 
4 Convenience of acquisition and 
application of the product or service and 
how this will enhance client’s 
experience. Continuity and regularity of 
support and advice beyond the initial 
contact  
Comparison of Attributes of the 4P’s and 4C’s Approach to the Marketing Mix 
With acknowledgements to the work of Kotler P et al (1999) 
Table 4 - Comparative Marketing Mix Attributes 
 
Perhaps one of the more interesting observations regarding the two approaches is 
that the one addressing client/customer perspectives appears in various existing 
research documents in relation to e-marketing. By extension, it focuses upon pull 
forms of channel distribution and assumes a pattern of disintermediation. Evans and 
Wurster, in their book “Blown to Bits” suggested that with the arrival of the internet 
and its ability to provide substantial information on product ranges, consumers 
would be inclined to transact directly with the supplier or manufacturer (Evans and 
Wurster 2000).  
 
However, they also suggested that whilst information can be sufficient to guide a 
potential purchaser in many areas, where the potential acquisition was one requiring 
additional knowledge and expertise, because of its perceived complexity and/or cost, 
the assistance of competent advisers would be essential. Therefore, if the role of an 
intermediary or broker is diminishing, the need for a reliable, competent professional 
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adviser and guide could be increasing. This is emphasised in an article in Money 
Marketing, “Government’s proposed pension guidance is missing one crucial 
ingredient: advice”  (Cicutti 2014) 
 
Critically these marketing-based concepts and many like them rely for their 
existence upon a comprehensive knowledge of customer/client behaviour 
(Armstrong, Kotler et al. 2012). My experience, and that of others, has determined 
that when it comes to financial services this is very difficult to unearth, at least in a 
conclusive way. In turn this has highlighted the need to seek alternative methods of 
knowledge-gathering to ensure concrete application of chosen methodologies.  
 
If one of the objectives was to ascertain whether financial advisers saw themselves 
as really addressing their clients’ needs or the distribution of a particular range of 
products would this inform the aims of this project and if so in what way or ways? 
By extension, the analysis of the data and perspectives of financial advisers might 
determine whether their aims were cost or sales focused. Where it was cost/benefit 
focused, according to Lautenborn, the adviser would be seen to be client focused, but 
where it appears that the adviser is concentrating upon achieving sales targets they 
would be seen to be product focused and primarily self-serving. 
 
In an increasingly competitive market it is necessary for smaller organisations not 
only to determine which particular elements of the market to concentrate upon, but to 
avoid attempting to compete with much larger distributors on the basis of price 
(Porter 1980). Therefore, it could be argued, a financial adviser who is aware of the 
nature, cause and extent of each cost within the business will be in a much stronger 
position to determine the fee to the client, by emphasising the differentiated service 
being offered. Furthermore, the argument goes, where this element of the 
relationship has been discussed at an early stage and agreement has been reached, 
not only on the level of fee but its validity, a long-term client relationship based 
upon client satisfaction can be established. Conversely, where the relationship with a 
client or customer is rooted in the sale of a product to the customer with very little 
after sales service being available, the relationship with the customer is likely to be 
short-term, which is consistent with the aims of the adviser being similarly myopic. 
The former serves the aim of this project, whilst the latter does not. 
 
Planning for the gathering of data, together with its analysing and interpreting is one 
thing; the reality is quite often another so it is important that a synergy and flexibility 
is maintained between these factors. In constructing a framework designed to support 
the aims of this project I compiled a menu of the possible tools which appeared to be 
available to me and Figure 2 set these out. The components of that diagram were 
drawn from both my personal experience of past research and from wider reading of 
the literature available on the subject (Holliday 2007). 
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In the past I have used questionnaires and focus groups as methods of extracting 
opinions. As both a student of an academic and professional nature I have also been 
engaged in the process of dissecting case studies to determine what it is they 
illustrate in terms of what is required for this project. The guiding principle has to be 
whether chosen methodologies are suitable in terms of satisfying the project’s 
purpose and its underlying aims. 
 
Returning to Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke’s observation that “No plan of 
operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main 
strength”, I am not suggesting that contributors were effectively enemies of mine or 
one another, neither am I suggesting that they were always allies. Consider the 
change of content in the boxes in Figure  below, compared with Figure 2; 
engagement with the main strength, in this case the cultures and paradigms of the 
selected groups of contributors, required some serious rethinking with regard to both 
methodology and method.  
 
 
Figure 4 - Depicting the Chosen Methodologies and Methods (KEC 2014) 
 
The raw materials for this research are the opinions expressed by the contributors. 
The planned method of acquiring most of this was by using one-to-one interviews as 
well as, for financial advisers, focus groups. Literature reviews and case studies were 
also to be employed. 
 
Upon being advised of the purpose of my research almost every independent 
financial adviser approached agreed, and in many cases were very keen to 
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participate. Given that it was with this group that I commenced my active enquiries a 
positive glow shone upon the probable future robustness of my arrangements.   
The process took the form of an initial contact by telephone, using a list drawn from 
the public membership records of accredited financial advisers of the Personal 
Finance Society. (To appear in this list members had to be and remain authorised by 
the regulator to provide financial services). Where advisers agreed to contribute a 
letter of confirmation was sent to them, confirming the appointment date, venue and 
the menu of possible discussion topics. The letter also confirmed that the entire 
meeting would be recorded using audio equipment and reminded the contributor that 
their right to withdraw from making the contribution existed up to the point that 
publication was commenced. A copy of the verbatim transcript would also be 
available should they request it.  
 
At the same time as I was making contact with individual IFAs I commenced putting 
into effect my plans for arranging focus groups of IFAs, starting with those listed as 
holding chartered status and operating in the area around Exeter. In this case the 
majority of potential contributors declined to be involved, but six accepted with two 
more saying they could be interested nearer the time. Each one was sent a 
confirming letter containing the menu of discussion topics referred to earlier. A 
meeting room was booked at the Friends Meeting House in Exeter and a fortnight 
before the date of the meeting a further letter was sent confirming the arrangements. 
I travelled to Exeter for the meeting on what proved to be a fool’s errand – not one 
person attended and none apologised. In terms of ethics, professional or otherwise, 
this proved to be a low point. In terms of cost/benefit the clear message was to 
abandon focus groups as a method of information gathering and concentrate my 
efforts in the more fruitful direction of one-to-one meetings, which was the decision 
I made.  
 
Given the successful outcome of the focus group arranged in connection with the 
development of the BSc Finance degree referred to in the remarks concerning my 
journey towards undertaking this project in Chapter 1, this was a particular 
disappointment. 
 
In respect of arranging meetings with financial services consumers the meetings held 
exhibited the same characteristics. These were that contributors had very few 
opinions to express, even with the aid of the discussion topics and often had little or 
no idea of what the financial advice and planning sector offered. So I resolved that 
the idea of offering a common set of topics as the basis for determining the opinions 
of the three different groups of stakeholders would have to be reconsidered and a 
period of reflection would be appropriate.  
 
This apparent impediment was frustrating, but paradoxically was the source of 
greater insight and led to my tackling the issue from another, but related, data source. 
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Whilst allowing the process of individual meetings with private individuals to lay 
fallow I read a letter in the “Financial Planner”, the organ of the Institute of Financial 
planning, written by a chartered financial planner, David Ferry. He was in the 
process of studying for his master’s degree in financial services. His office was in 
Birmingham and his letter indicated that his research sought to know what service it 
was that individuals expected to receive from an IFA and how much they were 
prepared to pay for it. I arranged to meet him at his office for a discussion. 
 
His adopted research method was that of distributing a questionnaire inviting three 
hundred and eighty-five respondents to give their written responses to his enquiries. 
He advised that the method of distribution was through a network of personal 
contacts, both business and social, requesting recipients to complete it themselves 
and also to pass a copy of the questionnaire to their colleagues and friends. To this 
extent there was a narrowing of the social grouping likely to respond, if they 
responded at all. I do not have access to the questionnaire, so am unaware of the 
extent to which his personal ontological characteristics might have been contained 
within the shaping of the questions.  
 
During our meeting Mr Ferry suggested that before distributing his questionnaires he 
had been expecting responses that would be expressed in terms of a clear payment 
level and service requirement trend. The reality was that on the basis of the seventy-
two responses he had failed to identify a discernible pattern of any sort. Employing a 
professional statistician to analyse the results for him had not advanced his cause at 
all, apparently. 
  
He confirmed that he was wedded to the quantitative approach, clearly having 
dismissed the possibility of a qualitative model being employed. It appeared to me 
that his research data might well have lent itself to the scrutiny of the Applied 
Thematic Analysis methodology, to which I refer later in this chapter, particularly as 
the data produced from the style of his triggering questions had sought written 
responses as opposed to tick boxes.  
 
During our conversation I introduced Argyris’ Theories of Action concept and 
suggested part of his problem might be that potential clients might not be aware of 
the full panoply of services available to them and were, therefore, not in a position to 
articulate their requirements or expectations (Argyris 1976). From this I deducted 
that a practical approach would be to determine why they had first come to discuss 
their issues with their IFA and then compare this with what they actually did. This 
approach is based upon the premise that following the completion of the initial fact-
find an adviser should be in a position to direct their client on their actual range of 
needs and that this direction may, but not necessarily will, coincide with the client’s 
espoused needs.   
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From my perspective, therefore, I decided that inverting the process of enquiry with 
consumers by analysing the answers first and then comparing these with the original 
espoused requirements could prove very fruitful and by determining to follow that 
course I achieved what I believe to be significant results.  
 
To this end the files of fifty of our own clients were interrogated. What this revealed 
was that the original reason for the initial contact rarely included more than two 
issues, but what clients had subsequently completed demonstrated the requirement to 
address some eight separate shortcomings. Within the fifty files twenty-five different 
needs were identified. These are discussed later along with the outcome of a further 
discussion with David Ferry and more research undertaken by the Personal Finance 
Society in a similar vein. 
 
The practical results of these deliberations about the methodologies and methods to 
be adopted were invigorating. However, my original thoughts concerning possible 
methodologies underwent considerable change. The underlying cause for this was 
that whilst concepts such as grounded theory analysis and ethnography were 
attractive from an academic perspective, this project concerns work-based practice 
and development and in the work place models, concepts and theories have a limited 
attraction, whereas action is recognised as an asset.  
 
From the 165 hours employed and nearly 86,000 words arising from meetings held 
with contributors the challenge was to discover a methodology which could be used 
to interrogate the underlying themes in such a fashion as to be helpful to those within 
the financial services community, whilst maintaining an academic framework.   
 
After enquiries were made, both within Middlesex University and with many others 
taking nearly a year, a conversation with Dr Mehmetali Dikerdem resulted in my 
purchasing a book entitled “Applied Thematic Analysis,” (Guest, MacQueen et al. 
2012) 
 
This offered the opportunity for analysing data generated from qualitative and mixed 
methods research projects in a pragmatic and straightforward way and facilitated the 
creation of a platform for exploring the influences of morality, ethics and 
remuneration on the existence, development and survival of the independent 
financial advice sector. It does this by suggesting that transcripts are interrogated for 
the existence of main themes and that these are then further dissected for the 
existence of sub-themes. The results can be used to compare the existence or absence 
of themes across different groups of contributors, whilst at the same time using these 
outcomes to determine patterns of thoughts, actions and outcomes within a sector 
(Ryan and Bernard 2003).  
 
According to the authors the Applied Thematic Analysis approach is a rigorous, yet 
inductive set of procedures designed to identify and examine themes from textual 
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data in a way that is transparent and credible. Their method is drawn from a broad 
range of several theoretical and methodological perspectives, but in the end its 
primary concern is with presenting the stories and experiences voiced by study 
participants as accurately and comprehensively as possible. It is the essence of this 
methodology which I have adopted for application to my project, blending it with an 
element of quantitative analysis where I believe it to be appropriate. 
 
Whilst the methodology comes in many forms, the word-based path chosen was that 
which is highlighted in yellow in the following diagram. The remaining boxes 
represent those options offered at each level of determination which were deemed as 
being less or unsuitable.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Chosen Methodological Research Route (with acknowledgements to 
Bernard & Ryan 1998) 
 
The method I employed commenced, as referred to earlier, with assembling a list of 
regulated Independent Financial Advisers from the membership list of the largest of 
the professional bodies, the Personal Finance Society. I expanded this list by adding 
to it the names of advisers and product providers’ representatives that I had met at 
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financial planning conferences and other meetings, with the aim of building a diverse 
set of contributors. That diversity included gender as well as geography, advisers 
holding just the benchmark qualification and those with post graduate degrees.  
 
The aim was to gather a body of thoughts, ideas and observations from the 
contributors by encouraging a perception of relaxed dialogue in which they could be 
frank, knowing that they enjoyed complete anonymity. I then converted into text the 
recorded transcripts to provide the raw material for subsequent identification and 
ordering of themes and patterns of themes contained within the texts. 
 
According to Saldana (2009) a theme may be defined as a phrase or sentence that 
identifies what a unit of data is about or what it means. That identification process 
can rely upon the intensity of the phrases repetition, its indigenous typography 
and/or its silence or absence.  
With this definition in mind a framework was designed with the aim of organising 
the data into general themes and to this end a Code Book was created.  
 
To develop this code book I relied upon the following procedure: 
 
 The establishment of a Code Label which takes the form of a short 
descriptive mnemonic (4-12 characters) that helps to distinguish it from any 
other code 
 A short definition descriptive phrase (20-80 characters) to capture the 
essence of the theme or its components 
 A full definition represented by a paragraph of 2-10 sentences highlighting 
the key features of the theme or its components 
 An explicit determination of when the code was to be used 
 A clear determination of when a code was not to be used 
(MacQueen, McLellan-Lemal, Bartholow & Milstein 2008) 
 
The framework took the form of the discussion topics offered to contributors.  
Following the sorting of the data into general theme codes the process was extended 
to sub-codes. These sub-codes drew out different sub-strands within the general code 
and formed the basis for the interpretation of the analysis by way of the diagrams 
provided towards the beginning of each chapter in Section 3. Sub-themes that 
occurred frequently have been highlighted in orange. An extract from my code book 
appears in  
 
However, this methodology could not be employed successfully when the thoughts 
of consumers were sought, because, as was explained earlier, they were unable to 
articulate such thoughts with the result that free-flowing text was not created. This is 
why the approach adopted for consumers was to consider their answers and then 
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compare them with their original questions, before analysing the results 
quantitatively. 
 
Whilst the employment of two different forms of analysis might be considered 
flawed, in reality this offered the opportunity to compare the thoughts of adviser and 
product providers on the role of financial advisers and compare them with the reality 
of what the consumer needed. It provides the foundation upon which to empower the 
management process responsible for identifying, anticipating and satisfying 
customer requirements profitably, usually better known as marketing. It also 
provided a practical replication of Table 4’s comparison of marketing mixes from the 
perspective of marketers and consumers and a basis for the assessment of the 
suitability, feasibility and acceptability of particular strategies at work within the 
sector, referred to in Tables 16 to 33.  
 
The next step, therefore, was to consider the contents and the themes arising from the 
transcripts compiled following the meetings with contributors and recorded in the 
following chapters.  
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Section 3 – The Research Programme 
 
Chapter 3 - The Analysis of the Themes 
Encountered in this Research Programme 
 
If it is the aim of the former and current regulator to transform the prevailing attitude 
in the financial services sector from a sales to an advice culture then determining the 
genesis of the present condition would be useful. That is because changing existing 
paradigms requires an understanding of from what it is intended to change and to 
what the appearance of altered state is intended to look like.  
It is said that the culture and structure of any organisation develops over time and in 
response to a complex set of factors. These include the reason for its formation and 
the manner in which it was created, its primary function including the range and 
quality of its products and/or services and whether its goals and objectives include 
long-term survival or growth and development (Mullins 2007). It was also noted that 
organisations of different sizes will develop different cultures, many of which will 
result from the need to coordinate activities in a more or less structured fashion. 
Furthermore differences in location, management styles and the corporate 
environment can have significant influences upon business cultures.  
In this context having an insight into what various stakeholders in the sector might 
be thinking and doing and how any inter-relationship between them might influence 
how that transformation can be achieved could be germane in the context of this 
project’s purpose. Given that the aims of product providers, financial planners and 
advisers and consumers, whilst being active in the same field, could be different 
discovering what it is that consumers need and want should be paramount, but 
determining how and from whom they could obtain it, if at all is also very important. 
Can the interests of all three elements be satisfied without conflicts of interest 
undermining that aim? 
The themes encountered during my research contained two main characteristics, 
namely sales based intentions and advice-facing intentions. Because these two 
business methods are not mutually exclusive Kant’s view that what matters is the 
intent behind an action, not its outcome, it is the underlying direction of the intention 
that may provide some assistance in establishing whether substantial or minimal 
cultural changes would be required to attain both the regulator’s aim and the 
survival, development and future success of the independent advice sector.  
It is with this in mind that I have proceeded with this work, commencing with the 
perceived function of a financial planning organisation.  
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3.1 - What is the purpose of a financial 
planning organisation? 
 
Summary of main themes discussed in this chapter: 
 The purpose of a firm both at a general level and at the specific level of a 
financial planning firm 
 Promotion and communication  
 The existence and desirability of ethical standards in the financial planning 
sector 
 Structure issues within a financial planning firm 
 Attitudes and approaches to training  
 Problems of scalability both within the existing framework and under other 
possible options  
Purpose 
The economist Ronald Coase asked the question, “Why do firms exist?” He posited 
that people begin to organise their production in-house when the transaction cost of 
coordinating production through the market exchange, given imperfect information, 
appears greater than when undertaken within the firm (Coase 1937). By extension it 
may be accepted that when the internal transaction costs appear to exceed the costs 
of those transactions when provided by an outside source the reverse applies. 
Product providers in financial services appear to have followed the latter course in 
recent years when addressing the costs of selling their products by dismantling their 
direct sales forces, abandoning the provision of any form of advice and seeking to 
distribute their products through financial advice firms, “platforms”, or by direct 
advertising. 
Conversely, consumers appear to have decided that the transaction costs, expressed 
in both monetary and time forms, of addressing their financial planning requirements 
personally far exceed the perceived cost of engaging a firm of financial planners or 
advisers for that purpose. 
Firms of any size should ensure that certain functions are undertaken, at least they 
should if they have any expectation of survival. Much has been written and discussed 
since 1916 when Henri Fayol articulated his five functions of a manager, but given 
the apparent paucity of evidence of the application of his guidance amongst financial 
planning organisations going very far beyond his original seminal work would seem 
disproportionate. As you read through this chapter on the purpose of a financial 
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planning organisation it may be prescient to consider whether any of the following 
functions are apparent within the thinking of the contributors: 
Planning the organisation’s future over the short, medium and long-term   
Organising the assembling of the resource requirements identified during the 
planning process   
Determining who and how the identified resources and systems are to be acquired 
and employed    
Controlling actual performance by regularly comparing with the planning framework   
Co-ordinating the efforts and outcomes to ensure that the plans become reality                              
Table 5 - Roles of a Financial Planning Organisation 
 
That they should all be present is the requirement, but you must judge for yourself 
whether this appears to be the case. 
In considering the themes emerging from the topic on the purposes of a financial 
planning organisation, operating within the community of financial services, 
perceived intentions in these responses help to determine whether they are reflecting 
a set of moral principles located in a sales or professional guidance culture, or indeed 
at all.  This is important if consideration is to be given to determining how a shift 
from the former to the latter is to be achieved and the role that the firm can play in 
this (Knights, 1994).  
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The themes and sub-themes identified were as follows, with once again frequently 
mentioned areas boxed in orange:
 
 
Figure 6 - Emerging Themes on Organisational Purpose and Function 
Making a profit was the only one appearing frequently that was outside references 
relating to structural issues, but is something of an imposter given that with one 
exception it was mentioned only after being prompted. Clearly organisational 
purposes involving structure dominated the responses, representing seven of the 
eleven present; ethical issues were in the main ignored. So firstly, I will address the 
aspect to which no-one contributed in a way that suggested that they believed 
financial planning firms had any responsibility for setting the direction of its moral 
compass, the maintenance of ethical standards within the firm.  
Ensuring Ethical Standards are Maintained 
Immanuel Kant’s (cited in Law, 2007) primary moral principle is that what matters 
about an action, so far as moral worth is concerned, is the intention with which it is 
performed – the outcome is irrelevant. The term he used to describe this concept is 
the categorical imperative, that is, we have certain moral duties that are forced upon 
us by reason alone. According to him genuinely moral principles have this 
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categorical character – our moral duty is do not steal, not do not steal if you wish to 
avoid being caught. 
His second key moral principle is to act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether yourself or another, never simply as a means, but always at the 
same time as an end.   
Both you may argue are high-minded principles, but set in the context of the work 
“Leviathan” belonging to a (powerful) state or organisation brings huge benefits with 
regard to security and safety and as importantly creates an environment in which 
contracts can be kept and commerce can flourish. Thomas Hobbes’ arguments were 
that without such organisation chaos and anarchy would reign and animal instincts 
prevail. As such the need for the drafting of moral codes serving the majority of 
those embraced by that society or organisation become crucial for framing their 
required conduct, which in turn, through the power to enforce compliance, aims to 
ensure the satisfaction of that community’s aims (Hobbes 1928). Kant’s contribution 
to this is to offer a particular ethical framework for this – there are others such as the 
utilitarian viewpoints (Bentham 1879) (Mill 2007). 
It could be suggested that an organisation labelling itself as financial advisers or 
planners should either provide that advice and/or planning service over the broadest 
landscape, or be completely transparent by admitting that their main focus is on the 
selling of investment products. If the prefix, independent is added to that label then 
making clear what form that independence takes should also be an essential 
requirement in ensuring that room for misunderstanding the organisation’s role and 
capacity for undertaking it is absent.  
The Oxford English Dictionary’s definitions for the word independent are: 
1. Free from outside control; not subject to another’s authority: 
2. Not depending on another for livelihood or subsistence 
3. Capable of thinking or acting for oneself 
4. Not connected with another or with each other; separate 
For many working in the sector it means, “Not directly employed by an insurance 
company,” which is not the same thing at all, failing specifically on OED definitions 
2 and 3 and conceivably for some firms on 1 and 4 as well. 
They believed that the role of the financial planning firm includes acting as an 
interface, where required, between their client and an appropriately chosen supplier. 
Just how ethical then is the description, Independent Financial Adviser? 
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As one accountancy body put it, 
“Advice should not automatically be related to products, but could include 
the provision of cash flow and budgeting frameworks, both of an immediate 
nature and beyond retirement. The products of insurance companies and 
investment firms can be sourced to provide part of the solution, but should 
not simply be seen as the solution in itself,” (Baxter, 2012) 
One observation on the status of an independent financial adviser who works under 
the direction of one firm, but agrees with that firm to advise H M Revenue and 
Customs that he or she is self-employed, cuts straight to the heart of organisational 
ethical standards.  By encouraging this deception the firm avoids payment of the 
employer’s element of National Insurance Contributions, but in doing so has 
effectively separated the adviser from the enjoyment of various state benefits, 
including, until recently, the additional state pension. Given that the adviser usually 
derives their continuing regulated authority to conduct their business through the 
employing firm it questions whether the entire basis for claiming self-employed 
status is sustainable, when the fundamental tests for this are not completely satisfied 
(For example can they engage sub-contractors to undertake work on their behalf, or 
do they supply all of the equipment required for their work?) 
The point is, if a firm is prepared to engage in questionable activities of this nature, 
does this effectively undermine any claim it may wish to make regarding its integrity 
and if it does should that firm be allowed to continue operating in an area as sensitive 
as advising on other people’s finances when its fundamental ethos appears flawed?  
If it is, then how are key issues such as conflicts of interest ever to be settled? 
The Provision of Structure 
Setting aside the apparent belief that the purpose of a financial planning organisation 
is not deemed to include functioning in an ethical fashion, consideration of the most 
frequently raised comments appears to imply that providing a structure which 
maximises the effectiveness of advisers seems worthy of interpretation. Much of this 
element of structure was capable of being grouped together under the general 
description of ensuring consistency of procedures, whilst not necessarily ensuring 
that those procedures facilitated alignment of tasks with required objectives (Beer, 
Eisenstat et al. 1990). 
Some saw this as a continuation of the role of the broker/middleman, bringing 
together a buyer and a seller and being remunerated for the service. Others preferred 
to see it in the role of creating an environment to facilitate the delivery of added 
value to clients on the basis of an agreed service for an agreed price. One IFA went 
even further by saying, 
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“The function of the advisory firm is to give structure to the adviser process 
to ensure that the client's best interests are served, to ensure that your 
advisers are meeting all the regulatory requirements in training and 
competence and also from a process point of view you should ensure that 
your firm is working in the same way in every department. So I think that for 
me it's about process, it’s about policies, it’s about compliance, governance 
and structure around the adviser process and to ensure that at the heart of 
that is the client and I think that is the most important aspect. As a by-
product of that you should also, if you’ve got your structure and your process 
and everything else right, you should also hopefully be ensuring that you are 
a profitable organisation.” (IFA5) 
This contributor clearly makes reference to Kant’s principle, albeit indirectly, by 
holding that the firm’s clients should be at the heart of the adviser process.  
It was noticeable, however, that in the majority of responses scant mention was made 
to the dependent relationship with the product provider, despite the fact that, as we 
will see later, this is the main mechanism in the firm’s method of operation.  
Where specific mention is made on the relationship between product provider and 
IFA firm it is by an IFA contributor railing against the practice of providers 
contacting clients directly to undertake what they refer to as cross-selling of 
products. 
 He put it in this way,  
“In the last couple or three years the life offices have been doing some 
naughty things that we don't like such as writing direct to our customers, not 
keeping us in the loop, dealing with things direct and not telling us, so that 
when we come back to the customer we find that it's already been done.  
Our relationship’s with our clients – the client relationship isn’t with the life 
office, it's with me and that's the attitude that we've taken over the last two or 
three years because it’s happening day in day out with us where the life 
offices do not understand that if we hadn't done their business in the first 
place 10 years ago they wouldn't have that policyholder and we look at it you 
know that they are the policyholder of the life company, but they are my 
client, not the life company’s.” (IFA7) 
In effect that IFA was challenging the concept of the way the value chain works as 
opposed to the way he believed the value chain ought to work. From the IFA’s 
perspective a much clearer relational structure should be in place to delineate and 
agree on the appropriate roles for the provider and IFA and how they inter-relate. 
(The relationship between an IFA and the client is already set in law in the form of 
the Financial Services & Markets Act 2000) 
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The trade press regularly confirms this questionable practice by product providers, 
but does it interfere with an IFA firm’s attainment of its purpose and if it does how 
do they propose to tackle it? No-one offered an answer – railing against it was as 
close as it came to challenging the practice. 
However, another adviser made clear how they saw the relationship between 
themselves and IFA firms: 
“I think, obviously from a provider's point of view they’re an integral part of 
the business model and we look to get our products out, distributed to the 
general public, so very much an integral part of how we see a provider's 
business working really. As well I would probably say it's quite a wide sort of 
remit, in terms of obviously financial advice and the role that firm takes so in 
many ways especially from a provider's point of view, obviously we are 
competing with other providers to try and get our products to the fore and 
products of choice, but I guess from a financial adviser’s perspective” (PP2) 
These remarks do not suggest that the IFA firm is seen as a customer, entitled to all 
the consideration usually available in a supplier/customer relationship, but as part of 
the provider organisation’s distribution model, a wholesaler as opposed to the 
consumer’s representative (Peppard, 2000). This last point is important because the 
Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) directs that the IFA is legally obliged to 
represent and act in the bests interests of the client, not simply to act as a middleman 
between supplier and consumer, which is a restatement of the position in English 
Common Law (HCCL, 2012).    
Nevertheless, the practice raises a question over the general and apparently emerged 
strategy of most financial advice firms which suggests that they operate as sellers of 
financial products and supplement the process with the provision of related advice. 
That they could and perhaps should operate on the basis of providing advice that is 
sometimes supplemented by the provision of financial products was not present 
amongst the observations of any of the contributors.  The former practice means that 
adviser firms attempt to compete in the same area of operation as much bigger and 
financially stronger players in the form of insurance companies, whilst the latter 
provides a platform for differentiation and the justification for charging a fee.  
The latter enjoys the benefits of a focused differentiation strategy separated from the 
control of their current suppliers and, as the comments above confirm, their major 
competitors, whilst the former bears the hallmarks of a David and Goliath clash 
unaccompanied by a biblical outcome (Porter 2008).  
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Training Responsibilities 
There was little dispute on the need for firms to be responsible for the arranging of 
training programmes. How that need was to be met and for what purpose was rather 
more diverse, however. One IFA considered that because there are a number of 
different roles within a firm, such as the client facing advice/direct sales role, support 
functions, potentially personnel functions and managerial functions each should 
expect to be part of that overall training programme. However, he felt that where the 
adviser gets eye-to-eye with the client, the employer has a duty and responsibility to 
monitor the advice and ensure the adviser has the correct skill sets, whether that be 
soft skill sets or technical knowledge, to deliver the level of service that is being 
promised to the client and to facilitate and to ensure that the adviser maintains them. 
In his pronouncements this adviser made clear that training was a vital tool in 
ensuring that client expectations could be met, whilst also being aware that other 
non-client facing functions within the organisation also needed to be incorporated 
within a training syllabus. 
Others referred to the need to demonstrate the existence of continuous professional 
development with an eye to the demands of their professional bodies, who in turn are 
trying to justify their role as agents of the regulator in matters of training 
programmes.  
The difference between the two approaches is that the former concentrates on the 
benefit to clients, whilst the latter are focused upon rules-based requirements and the 
need to survive regulatory tests. The Chartered Insurance Institute’s paper on Ethical 
Culture (2013) recommends that staff, not just advisers, be trained in ethics at both 
the organisational and wider levels because, 
“Working for an organisation with a good ethical culture is motivating both 
at the level of day-to-day (it feels good to work for an organisation which you 
know will treat you and your colleagues fairly and will not pressure you to 
act unethically) and at the level of the wider context within which your work 
sits (it feels good to work for an organisations whose aims and values you 
endorse)” 
As the professional body the CII is highlighting the benefits of imbuing an ethical 
culture within the firm in such a way as to be of advantage to the clients and in the 
satisfaction of compliance requirements. It is suggesting that establishing the ethos 
comes before establishing the programme, as the former will drive the latter. 
More precisely there was support for the notion that organisations should provide the 
structure for the advice process, more prosaically articulated as creating the 
environment to facilitate delivery of added value to clients within the architecture of 
an agreed service for an agreed price.  
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In essence there were frequent references to the need for firms to create and oversee 
the application of training programmes. These references were, however, very 
general and highlighted one of the key themes emerging from these meetings; what 
is meant by training and how broad should the programme be? Are they thinking in 
terms of full-blown German-style apprenticeships, typically lasting three years and 
involving at least one day a week in the class-room and rigorous assessment  
(Economist 2014) or expecting higher and more academically demanding 
achievements based upon reformed entry levels? The role of education, experience 
and education is discussed later in Chapter 3.6 of this section. 
Scalability 
The final structural issue revolved around the perceived change in approaches arising 
from an increase or decrease in the scale of the organisation. IFA4 declared that 
whilst there are a number of very practical (but unnamed) models being applied to 
the financial planning process by small firms, scaling up those models to meet the 
needs of a greater magnitude appeared to be a challenge of insurmountable 
difficulty. He felt that many models only work at one level and cannot be 
superimposed upon another scale of activity. 
Another declared that, 
“Certainly if the employer has set up appropriate processes facilitating good 
quality advice and the adviser is working within those processes which 
logically, they must be if the processes have been set up correctly, then the 
adviser should be free to focus on the needs of the client.” (IFA3) 
IFA7 addressed the issue of scalability in terms of reshaping the range of activities 
that were undertaken by individuals with the organisation.  
Whilst none came even close to suggesting how the scalability issue might be 
addressed in terms of the future shape of IFA organisations, these latter remarks 
chime with much that is to be found in the cost-based fees model referred to later. 
Given the propensity for most financial advisers and their employers to think in 
terms of turnover, that is sales of financial products, discussions regarding scale tend 
to reflect this attitude. The difficulty from an organisational perspective is that the 
greater the number of sales personnel they have and the more geographically diverse 
they become the more remote the senior managers become from the process and its 
regulatory oversight and, therefore, the more exposed the firm becomes to the 
possibility of financial penalties being imposed in respect of mis-selling and 
unethical practices.   
Of course larger sales forces mean more product sales, and to this extent bigger firms 
of financial advisers are attractive to product providers who now relieve themselves 
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of some of the more expensive impositions of regulation by supplying the product, 
but refusing to provide advice. Furthermore, financial advice firms rooted in sales 
remain umbilically attached to suppliers for their source of income, that is turnover, 
which suits the suppliers. 
What would not suit a supplier is a structure based upon fees charged to clients on 
the basis of activities undertaken and services provided, because at that point the 
financial planning firm looks to the client for its remuneration/turnover, terminating 
its reliance upon any product provider. Such is the core principal underpinning our 
own business model, which leads me on to financial aspects and the responsibilities 
of a financial planning firm. 
Financial Oversight 
All of the IFA contributors recognised that the fundamental role of any organisation 
is to ensure its future by making regular profits, although often only after prompting. 
Indeed one pointed out that it would not serve clients well if the organisation failed 
and in doing so denied those clients the opportunity to receive further advice, thereby 
frustrating the aim of maintaining an environment for long-term relationships with 
the clients. The interests of other, unnamed stakeholders were also acknowledged.  
This IFA approach concerning the generating of profit contrasted considerably with 
that of provider representatives. One did not offer an opinion at all, whilst two others 
did, after prompting, but in a guarded manner. The first of these said, 
“Just like any other business so they need to make a reasonable profit in 
order to ensure that they’re a going concern.” (PP2) 
Although what was considered “reasonable” was not articulated. 
Consider this even more cautious response in response to the directly placed 
question, “do you think that the organisation should have a goal of making a profit? 
“Eh – well yes I think that's probably fair – well I think that – that's an 
interesting question actually because everybody has to live, everybody has to 
earn money and whether you are the provider of services or expecting to get 
service everybody understands that, so yes I think there is no issue with a 
firm- and actually firms have to be there in a commercial manner they have 
to make money - that's people's livelihoods. Having said that, there is 
obviously a need for those people who perhaps may not be able to afford 
advice, to get some help. Now whether that should be provided by charities 
or the government or volunteer groups I think is a different question, but in 
the purest sense of the word somebody's providing services they should be 
able to earn a livelihood in doing so.”(PP3) 
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There is not any sense of this publically quoted company, with shareholders 
demanding ever-increasing profits and dividends, recognising the right of one of 
their main distribution channel organisations to enjoy similar benefits, nor of the 
provider acknowledging that they might have a role in the provision of the pro bono 
services alongside their colleagues in distribution.  
What was often emphasised by IFAs was that financial planning organisations are 
not charities. Whilst none couched this point in such terms, this should be something 
that governments and their agencies should recognise, instead of talking about the 
duty of the sector to provide pro bono publico support, whilst ignoring the cost of 
this to the adviser and the financial undermining of their organisation that this can 
cause. (Although you can choose to absorb all costs associated with donated 
services, "pro bono services" does not exclusively mean "free services." Pro bono 
services can also include services provided at-cost, and you can take certain 
deductions for tangibles absorbed, according to the American Bar Association.)  
Aside from doing something for nothing, which for a commercial venture is a 
contradiction of its assumed purpose, the Buddhist mantra is that you should look 
after yourself first, to ensure that you are then fit enough to look after the interests of 
others. Making a profit should not be an issue, it was thought, but how that profit 
was made could be. 
 You may consider it a paradox therefore, that only one of those so keen to support 
the idea of ensuring the creation of profits mentioned the need to set a cost base for 
the provision of advice to clients. He felt that  
“If you’ve got your structure and your process and everything else right, you 
should also hopefully be ensuring that you are a profitable organisation, but 
that one of the things with the advisory firms is that not enough focus is being 
put on the cost base that constitutes the true cost of advice, the effect of 
economies of the scale of the business and considering cash flow forecasting 
techniques” (IFA3) 
Reflections and Observations 
So, overall two main themes emerged from consideration of a financial planning 
organisation’s purpose, namely providing a structure within which it operates and 
maintaining a financial oversight aimed at making a profit. Whilst overt mention of 
matters ethical were virtually absent, given the nature of the topic this may not be 
considered as critical to survival and development as its absence might be were it to 
continue to be ignored during later conversations. 
Whilst it is not disputed that part of an organisation’s purpose may include providing 
a structure within which to operate, the structures referred to by most  IFA 
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contributors related to those necessary to support IFAs in their role of, as we shall 
see later, sellers of products capable of generating an income, or both an immediate 
and continuing nature. What if those structures incorporated a basis for making 
advice the product, instead of the narrower financial instrument of a product 
provider?  
Not one contributor recognised that a prime requirement for any organisation 
wishing to survive in the long term is the development of a strategic plan. Indeed 
mention of its short-term planning cousin, the budget was also absent so the 
requirement to collect together any idea of the costs of running the business was also 
missing. 
What form might an appropriate strategy take? If the label of independent financial 
planner is to mean anything then it is to mean the imparting of guidance derived 
from the adviser’s knowledge concerning financial planning, not just products within 
the field. Thus the appropriate basis would be one to be found in a resource-based 
strategy, with knowledge creation being one of its most important resources. With 
suitably skilled advisers, in the true sense of the word, independent advice could then 
become the product and fees calculated and generated without recourse to financial 
products (Hitt, 2001).  
In achieving such a position the intention to ensure the client’s needs are put first 
coincides with Kant’s first principle and that also ensures that the means to do this 
fulfil the second principle that the client is also at the centre of the intended end 
position.  
Finally, by now your may be screaming “what about the firm’s role in marketing?” 
The communicating of what the firm has to offer to existing and potential consumers 
was not mentioned by one IFA, which you may feel is astonishing.   
A product provider representative referred to this in the following way, 
“I say the barriers (to development) for me are the cost of advice and getting 
the next generation through the door and getting them to understand what 
the value of having a strong grip on your finances can be” (PP2). 
For him communicating what the advantages were and how cost effective engaging 
with an IFA could be were of paramount importance, yet it does not warrant a 
mention from the IFAs quarter in the context of what an IFA firm should be doing.  
The reason may be the lack of management capability. The need to plan ahead is 
referred to in the CII’s paper on Ethical Culture: A practical guide for small firms, 
published in 2013. That they saw a need to draw the attention of firms to the need of 
this fundamental requirement of business is in itself telling. However, this theme is 
expanded upon in an article in the Economist magazine in 2014 (Schumpeter – 
“Measuring Management”) in which they refer to the ongoing work of Nicholas 
Bloom of Stanford University and John van Reenen of LSE. They state that good 
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management employs three main techniques, namely setting targets, rewarding 
performance and measuring results. The work studies 10,000 organisations in twenty 
countries and suggests 
“that good management is indeed tightly linked to improved corporate 
performance, measured in terms of productivity, profitability, growth and 
survival.” (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010)  
This work is effectively a development of Fayol’s original theme, but on a much 
grander scale; its absence from the contributions of both the IFAs and product 
providers interviewed on the topic of the purpose of a financial planning firm is 
therefore disappointing. However, recognising a need is often the starting point for 
satisfying it and strangely the answer is not rocket science, but simply involves the 
resetting of a firm’s moral compass and incorporating an extended range of 
competences. Put simply, this comes in the form of charging real fees for real 
activities and benefits to real clients (not customers), as our own existing Activity 
Based Costs and Fees Model has been demonstrating for the past fourteen years.  
The issue is can this be developed using the existing human capital working within 
the IFA sector? Consideration of the themes emerging from the opinions contained 
in the next chapter may provide the reader with some feel for the answer.  
Nevertheless, the lesson to be learned is that the first step in the management of any 
organisation and in particular financial planning firms, regardless of size, is to create 
a plan.   
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3.2 - What is the role of a financial adviser? 
 
Summary of Main Themes Discussed in this Chapter 
 Whether the role of the financial adviser included or was solely that of  acting 
as a conduit for the distribution of providers’ products 
 Perceptions of how financial advisers fulfil their duty to their clients 
 The maintenance of the relationship between the financial adviser and the 
employing firm 
 The relevance and characteristics of work undertaken on a pro bono publico 
basis. 
Having determined to a greater or lesser degree the function of a financial planning 
organisation, discussions with contributors then turned to understanding perceptions 
regarding the role of a financial adviser/planner. Whilst a few saw no difference 
between the former and the latter, in part because they believed that having perhaps 
only one authorised adviser there could not be any difference, the majority were able 
to see how the two might exist to have different responsibilities.  The analogy is that 
of the one-person operated limited liability company, where the individual has a 
separate existence in law from the company. 
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Figure 7 - The Perceived Role of Financial Advisers 
Nevertheless, there was a greater homogeneity amongst contributors regarding this 
topic with the diagram above demonstrating regular inclusions of four particular 
themes, highlighted again in orange. 
If there was a box representing a complete absence of reference the one covering 
morals, ethics and/or integrity would be in deepest orange. As such boxes are not 
included in these diagrams I will content myself by saying that my main 
observations and those of others in respect of ethics and knowledge within financial 
services are contained in Chapter 3.8 on integrity. 
Broadly speaking, ideas and thoughts fell into one or more of three main themes, 
namely that of a financial adviser acting as a conduit between their firm, their 
suppliers and their clients, fulfilling their duties to their clients and fulfilling their 
duty to their firm. Contributions gathered together under a particular theme did not 
mean, however, that this represented conceptual agreement. Indeed, whilst some 
attitudes to ideas were entirely harmonious, others varied considerably, sometimes to 
the point of being in complete contradiction and so it was with the contributions 
concerning conduits.  
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The Conduit 
A great deal of thinking was devoted to this general area of discussion. Whilst some 
might agree with Basil Fawlty’s observation that this was blooming obvious, most 
IFAs denied that they acted as a channel for product distribution and supply. The 
denials took the form of suggesting that such activities tended to be the preserve of 
larger organisations, that product selling should not be the primary role and that 
clients should feel that the IFA has resolved an issue, not sold them a product, (even 
though they probably have.)  
Only one IFA (IFA7) referred to the fact that some very useful products, bearing 
substantiated guarantees concerning performance outcome, were available only 
through IFAs and in that respect the IFA was acting as the distribution arm of the 
product provider. He made the point that he would sell such a product only after 
educating the client on the range of options available to resolve their need and 
providing the technical advice on why this particular option could be appropriate. 
Whether or not he fully understood the mechanics of the product was not revealed, 
but he was clear on the role of the Independent Financial Adviser being in part to do 
just that, advise.  
The plethora of denials concerning channel distribution bore some of the hallmarks 
of protesting too much, insofar as an acceptance that product providers facilitated a 
major source of income to the IFA could be construed as denting the claim that the 
word “independent” in the title was robust.   
It was almost, but not quite, universally agreed that creating and maintaining 
trustworthy relationships was an important function of an IFA. This was supported in 
terms of not only a relationship between the IFA and the client, but also in respect of 
a duty of care owed to their employer, the regulator and, curiously, the product 
provider.  
In a lecture presented by Jon Everill, a past president of the Personal Finance 
Society, (Will clients pay fees in the post RDR world? January 2013) he suggested 
that, 
“There is a direct correlation between the trust that advice businesses 
engender with their clients…. and success ultimately measured by 
profitability. Trusted advisers are better qualified, focus upon solutions not 
sales, run efficient businesses and look to the longer term.” 
Gaining the trust and confidence of the client were frequently mentioned, but not the 
probity or integrity of the adviser. Since building trust is the primary tool of the 
confidence trickster, differentiating oneself from that description should be, it might 
be thought, of overriding importance, but a remark acknowledging that trust is not 
the same thing as integrity was not identified until the theme of integrity was 
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introduced towards the end of a meeting with just one of the IFAs contributing to 
this research. 
Nevertheless, overturning the public’s distrust of the sector remains one of its 
biggest challenges, given that the financial services sector was identified recently as 
one of the least trusted (Edelman 2014). 
If acting as the conduit between the IFA’s firm and the IFA’s client was seen as 
being part of his or her duty to the client, albeit by a minority of IFA contributors, 
then what else was seen as part of that function?  
Fulfilling a Duty to Clients 
The diagram confirms that there was major support for two themes within this 
category, firstly identifying issues and recommending solutions and secondly, 
educating clients. 
In the case of the former how thorough this identifying process could be is rather 
dependent upon how experienced, qualified and educated the adviser is. This is a 
recurring theme; the “what” is far more readily recognised than the “how.” For some 
it took the form of, 
“I’m seeing clients, and know them personally- we are not shoehorning them 
into a solution– we’re getting them in - we’ve no idea what it is that they 
want when they walk in the door normally; they come in the door – you then 
sort out the financial planning aspect that they need, in other words what 
they are there for.”(IFA2) 
In such cases the client determines the need and the IFA responds by providing a 
menu of possible solutions, often involving the sale of a financial product. That is 
not to say that the outcome is inappropriate, but the foundation for reaching it is 
likely to have been set within a very narrow context, with that setting being provided 
by the client. 
That same IFA, a mature individual with long experience of the sector, holding the 
benchmark qualification (QCA Level 4) went on to challenge the value of the 
contextually wider concept of holistic financial planning, saying, 
“Sometimes, we tried it many years ago which was the full financial planning 
– let’s do lifestyle planning –doesn’t work; for most people that just doesn’t 
work – I think it does for some people and there are organisations that are 
filling that gap nicely and I think that’s fine – you know you have to have the 
right sort of client – we found that all we did was find spare money for the 
client to use for all the solutions. He’d tell you he’s got an overdraft so could 
not understand the source of this spare money. We found that in probably 99 
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out of a 100 cases - but then I think it depends on the client you’re seeing, 
because not everybody’s suitable for full financial planning - it doesn't work 
the way identikit works.”  
His use of the word “identikit” is revealing, because it suggests that to undertake a 
full financial planning analysis it is necessary to obtain some form of framework 
capable of converting qualitative data into suitable quantitative outcomes. Such 
software programs are available in the marketplace and can cost upwards of £4,000 a 
year to use. Where there is a lack of broader understanding of the financial services 
market in terms of models, theories, concepts and the practical solutions which result 
from them, recourse to such identikit programs is the only option. The weakness 
with any such software is that at some point interpretation of the information is 
required, which brings us back to experience, education and qualifications again, 
because such understanding may require learning up to and beyond QCA Level 6 
(Bloom, 1979) (McLean and Looker 2006). 
Chapter 3.6 considers whether such competences are available in sufficient 
magnitude and indeed whether the will exists amongst the current community of 
practice to acquire such skills.   
However, the term education when used in the context of educating clients takes on a 
wholly different mantle, namely that of informing the client with regard to the role of 
the adviser and setting down the nature of the possible solutions in plain English. 
Communicating the role of financial services to a much wider and even younger 
audience was not mentioned as a part of this topic, although it did inform the work 
later in another guise. Many simply used the word in the sense of Lautenborn’s 
(1990) application of communication, in which hackneyed expressions were 
interpreted, the practicalities of a product explained and the role of an IFA conveyed, 
however that latter word was seen by the conveyor. 
In their paper “UK Wealth Management at Tipping Point?”  (2012) KPMG drew to 
the attention of those it considered part of the wealth management sector (as opposed 
to the financial advice sector) that they needed to change their business model. In 
their view,  
“It was no longer going to be sufficient for wealth management 
organisations to simply pay lip-service towards achieving client centricity; in 
future it would be necessary to reshape value propositions around the 
evolving needs of clients. They also recognised that new competitors using 
relationship-led models threatened to take share from incumbent product-led 
firms by providing holistic financial planning advice as a gateway to 
orchestrating other wealth management services. They couched it in terms of 
targeting a share of the client wallet rather than pure asset gathering.”  
The new competitors to whom they refer in the paper are IFAs and the nature of the 
relationship is a long-term one (Sayer and Brown 2012). 
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The need to build long-term relationships with clients effectively mirrored its 
counterpart in the previous chapter, but as in that chapter suffered the same lack of 
frequency of support from IFA contributors. It seemed irrational not to consider this 
as important when most IFAs had provided ardent support for the notion that they 
are there to create and maintain trustworthy relationships. Whilst most would not 
suggest that trust is a phenomenon that can be created in a short space of time, 
neither did they appear to recognise that a failure to build long-term relationships 
inhibits the emergence of the space for that to happen.  
The building of the long-term relationship will be greatly assisted when recurring 
financial issues are demonstrated to fall within the ambit of the competent financial 
adviser. Such recurring matters include taxation, with particular emphasis on income 
tax which is subject to annual changes in its application, and reassurance that income 
in retirement will be sufficient to meet needs. Such cyclical needs create what the 
marketers describe as “Customer Franchise” whose nature is to bind the client to the 
adviser in all things requiring guidance in financial planning (Levitt 1960, Mercer 
1998). It is a result of the client recognising the adviser’s abilities to address their 
needs and the development of a bond of trust.  
The starting point for the building of trust was identified by some as helping people 
through the maze that is the financial services sector and then providing honest, 
impartial advice. Whether that advice was to be limited by the implied competence 
limitations referred to earlier or was provided in the form of a holistic financial plan 
rather depended upon the extent of the contributor’s abilities. The risk in allowing 
this undifferentiated level of advice capability to exist under one umbrella title is that 
as soon as shortfalls are revealed, probably in a tabloid exclusive, all pretence to the 
existence of integrity at any level evaporates.  
Some might say that the Pension Review of the late 1990’s and onwards represented 
the equivalent disaster for the financial advice sector of the banking crisis which 
commenced in 2008. It certainly cost the sector multi-millions of pounds and led to 
widespread bankruptcies amongst advisers and the mass-merging of insurance 
companies. Unfortunately the sector did not appear to take the opportunity to 
examine its fundamental models in the same way that UBS did after the banking 
crisis (Broom 2013). Survivors continued in the main to carry on as before, adjusting 
to any new legislative requirements set down by yet another regulator put in place to 
save the world. (The same one that was in place when the banking crisis broke, 
namely The Financial Services Authority). 
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Pro Bono Publico 
Whilst some IFAs agreed that helping consumers through the maze and complexity 
of the world of financial services was important only one referred to the possibility 
of undertaking what is termed, “pro bono” work, a term that regulators and those in 
UK governments interpret as providing a service as a labour of love. Vague hints at 
the advantages that are offered by such generosity along the lines of profile raising 
and the feel-good factor abound, but little is mentioned of the need to ensure the 
survival of the organisations being urged to engage in this form of support. 
Furthermore, how that organisation would reimburse its advisers for the time spent 
undertaking the execution of such a policy is ignored, which suggests that any feel-
good factor would be short-lived. 
The term pro bono emanates from the Latin “pro bono publico” and is in use in the 
USA in determining the extent to which lawyers are obliged to carry out work “for 
the public good”. Such work can and often is charged for, but at marginal rates. It is 
not usual to provide services free of charge, at least not as a requirement of the 
American Bar Association (Christensen 1981).  
It may be pertinent to observe that when organisations such as the Consumers 
Association focused their attention upon the costs and charges associated with 
insurance contracts and the probable consequent reduction in yield they were almost 
certainly unaware of the unintended consequences of their campaign. Up until that 
point “Industrial Branch” insurance companies and friendly societies established in 
the late nineteenth century had focused upon providing modest savings, life 
assurance and disability compensation policies. Premiums were collected in cash 
from the policy-holders on a weekly or perhaps fortnightly basis. It was expensive 
administratively because there were thousands of company agents involved in the 
collection process (“the man from the Pru” was the well-known example, although 
he could have been from the United Friendly, or Britannic, or The Refuge, or dozens 
of others) and they worked on a commission basis. Nevertheless, poorer and less 
privileged members of society were afforded the basic protection that ensured that in 
the event of disaster they had access to some savings or income to meet it. The focus 
upon costs and charges attaching to the financial products offered ensured that the 
entire Industrial Branch operation collapsed leaving a vast section of the population 
without protection and bereft of the opportunity to seek alternatives. 
What is needed to correct this is new legislation allowing for exemptions from EU 
capital adequacy requirements for such industrial branch operations along with 
marketing focusing upon service and benefits, not yields. Pro Bono is too whimsical 
a notion to address this vast problem on its own and in fact seeks support from a 
sector, which for once, is overqualified for the purpose.  
Notwithstanding this, perhaps if there was a greater awareness of how such pro bono 
work could be undertaken by IFAs there would be a greater support for the notion 
68 
 
and less emphasis by certain IFAs on the need for a minimum charge to support the 
quest to ensure profit in every case for every potential client.   
Fulfilling a Duty to the Firm 
This is the area with the greatest potential for the existence of tension. Clearly as the 
employer the employee has a moral duty to act in the best interest of that body, 
ensuring that functions are executed within the boundaries set to ensure statutory 
compliance, organisational procedure and the organisation’s profitability. If the 
relationship is to prove successful then there would be an expectation that the 
employee is in step with the cultural practices as well as the formal contractual 
obligations of the organisation.  
In their paper “Ethical Culture: A practical guide for small firms” (2013) the 
Chartered Insurance Institute suggests that a firm’s ethical culture is directly 
connected to its founder and, 
“It has been those beliefs, values and assumptions about how work should be 
done and how people should behave that have been most influential and, 
therefore, if those beliefs and values had been wrong for the market the 
business was launched into it wouldn’t have succeeded.”  
Laudable, but not if it is at the expense of the client’s best interests and also 
questionable when seen in the context of something as damaging as the pension 
review, when activities not judged to be illegal or unacceptable at the time of 
transaction were, with the imposition of hindsight regulation, extremely damaging.  
The difficulty here and one that is repeatedly raised throughout this work, rests in the 
need for the firm’s profitability to be maintained where satisfaction of that aim relies 
mainly upon the sale of a financial product. If the correct solution does not involve 
such a sale then from where is the income stream to come? If the culture of the firm 
does not embrace the opportunity for the adviser to earn a living other than by the 
sale of financial products then real tensions must develop and not necessarily to the 
advantage of the consumer. 
In the view of a supplier representative PP2 one of the guiding principles that 
emerged with regard to the employment of an adviser’s time was that there should be 
a minimum asset value requirement in respect of the consumer’s potential to 
generate income. The phrase used at present is “the acquisition of high net worth 
clients.” Whilst there is a lack of a clear definition of what constitutes high net worth 
it is agreed that this is a finite group and that with evermore IFAs chasing it the 
number available to each would be declining. Furthermore, it suggests that the 
consumer is seen merely as a means to achieve the adviser’s end, but not as an end in 
themselves, contrary to Kant’s premise.   
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Some assistance in resolving this dilemma could come from the firm and indeed 
according to the following observations will ultimately be imposed: 
“I think that we're seeing with the FSA in the notes on incentives (FSA 
January 2013), that the FSA would rather see people locked into the longer-
term profitability of the business without short-term incentives - so people 
locked into a longer term relationship, whereas I think in the past some 
organisations were much more focused on the short-term and we've seen in 
organisations that just focus on one-year production, one-year targets – the 
problem with that is that people don't think about the business long-term”. 
(IFA5) 
Of course, as in earlier examples this is another identification of “what” but not 
“how.” If the unnamed incentive is to be converted into a long-term related one, 
what form is that incentive to take and what is meant by long-term. How would that 
incentive be linked to ensure that the interests of the clients are protected, let alone 
enhanced? Again questions aplenty and answers few, so far, but consideration of 
recent research, referred to in Chapter 3.6 might be helpful (Akerlund, 2014). 
Reflections 
The first consideration and a lesson to be taken very seriously is that the IFA role is 
separate from the organisational role, but that both must be present and actively 
employed for the firm to survive and thrive.  
What is vehemently denied by IFAs is that their role is one of acting as a distribution 
channel for products, although the providers themselves are quoted as saying that 
they see the IFA sector as a vital part of their business model. Acting purely as 
product providers’ channels of distribution places an IFA within a strictly sales-
oriented category. In reality few small firms of IFAs see themselves in the image of 
product distributors, although the results of later discussions on fees and 
commissions suggest that many effectively rely on this alliance to sustain 
themselves. However, when discussing product and service ranges offered, in 
Chapter 3.7 contradictory activities were in evidence.  
Notwithstanding this there was an underlying hint that many IFAs wished to move 
away from this relationship (even as they denied its existence), without their having 
an idea of how this might be achieved. They are keen to retain the image of being 
independent, but are frustrated by their inability to determine how this might be 
achieved within the confines of the definition of the word. Their professional bodies 
are not helpful in this respect, being vague to the point of diffidence on this point, 
which is something that will receive greater attention in later chapters.  
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All IFA contributors implied a desire to ensure that their clients received a good 
quality service that would be in the interests of both parties and would sustain a 
long-term relationship. There was much talk about existing practices, but almost 
none about a framework capable of absorbing change and stimulating development. 
As will be recounted later, there is a desire to change, but only if it involves retaining 
existing modes and practices. Any likelihood of change involving new models and 
practices goes unconsidered, possibly because as an article in Financial Planner 
observed, there is insufficient capability within the community to think outside the 
box (Smith 2014).  
However, in the belief that holistic financial planning was vaguely within the box 
some suggested that it might be the way forward, whilst others were very much 
opposed. Of concern should be the fact that competitors in banking and wealth 
management saw it as essential in providing a sustainable relationship with their 
customers. Wealth managers see the IFA sector as a main threat because, in their 
eyes, that sector is already functioning in a way that is building long-term 
relationships (Sayer and Brown 2012). This is a competitive advantage which IFAs 
should be grasping with all their energy, because they already have access to the 
relevant client base and with the number of chartered and post graduate degree 
holders rising rapidly they should be more than capable of doing this. 
Long-term relationships can be built upon a platform of repetitive needs, such as 
identifying relevant updates on tax changes and referring clients to the appropriate 
experts, thereby building a client franchise. At the 2013 PFS Conference a Law 
Society speaker reminded IFAs that they are the only body of professionals that see 
their clients on a regular basis, or should be, and are therefore the only ones to be 
able to assist clients in dealing with changed circumstances at an early stage, either 
personally or by referral to other professionals as part of the process of regular 
reviews. Having this regular relationship with an IFA leads to the establishment of 
trust and long-term trust tends to reflect the presence of integrity. Speed is not of the 
essence, but competence and reliability are. 
On the subject of Pro Bono activity it was noted that this appears to be most 
enthusiastically supported by those not having to meet the cost, such as governments 
and professional bodies. The claimed advantages are somewhat specious and in no 
way address the problem of the non-advised members of the abandoned Industrial 
Branch Insurance sector, created as a result of government legislation and well-
intentioned, but misguided, campaigning from consumer bodies. Personal experience 
confirms that many IFAs make considerable contributions to society through 
membership of Rotary clubs, serving as school governors and trustees of charities. It 
is a function of government to protect underprivileged members of their society, not 
IFAs. 
When reflecting upon the issues arising from an IFA’s duty to the firm employing 
them gaps appeared in the interconnectedness of that relationship. It was clear that 
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where a firm arranges its sources of revenue through mechanisms mainly involving 
the sale of financial products, as most do, a conflict of interest often arises (Baxter, 
Megone et al. 2012). This is manifested in the way in which a client’s needs are 
addressed, as opposed to how they might best be addressed, the IFAs remuneration 
interest and his/her wish to support their employer in terms of ensuring a flow of 
income.  
Until there is a cultural shift leading to a different income generating model this 
conflict will be perpetuated or, should the regulator become more aggressive in the 
application of its rules banning the payment of commission in any sense, the firm 
will fail. UBS, (Broom 2013) and KPMG (Sayer and Brown 2012) have indicated 
the way forward and the better qualified IFAs have recognised it. All that remains is 
for the adoption of the relevant process and that requires understanding the nature of 
fees, which follows in the next chapter.  
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3.3 - The Characteristics of Fees 
 
Summary of Main Themes Discussed in this Chapter 
 The nature and characteristics of fees 
 How fees can be related to activities, performance or cost 
 The nature of fees which are not associated with activities undertaken, 
performance achieved or cost expended 
 Ethical aspects and issues of the fees discussion 
 Fees and bad debts 
Introduction 
What do we mean when we talk about the term fees? It is a question that should be 
exercising the minds of those connected with the independent financial advice sector, 
because the term formed a central plank in the legislation introduced as a result of 
the Financial Services Authority’s Retail Distribution Review. It may be considered 
odd, therefore, that there was such a broad diversity of outcomes in terms of themes 
developed amongst IFAs when the question was put to them, as is manifested in the 
diagram below.  
So let me start by providing the Compact Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of 
the word fee: “A payment made to a professional person or to a professional or 
public body in exchange for advice or services.” 
In a recent thematic review paper “TR14/6 Supervising retail investment firms: being 
clear about adviser charges and services,” the Financial Conduct Authority said that 
it had introduced the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) to improve outcomes for 
consumers, by enhancing professional standards, removing key biases and ensuring 
that the costs of advice are clear and central to this was the banning of commission 
for advice. In their review paper they sought to discover how much progress had 
been made since their first review in July 2013 and were disappointed to note that up 
to 73% of those firms included failed to meet the requirements in one way or another 
(2014).  
Whilst that paper was very concerned with the clarity of the mechanisms used by 
advisers to calculate their charges, it did not appear to suggest that there could be a 
link between those charges and the specific service or cost base. Furthermore it was 
quite happy to use the terms adviser charges and fees interchangeably, which some 
might argue is an unnecessary confusion and not entirely consistent with the Oxford 
English Dictionary definition quoted above.   
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Now consider the responses from a range of experienced IFAs, from both genders, 
and generally qualified to at least QCA Level 6 standards. What is at first apparent 
from the diagram below is the range of beliefs, ideas and themes that emerged, 
sixteen in all. Those highlighted in orange were mentioned frequently, whilst the 
remainder received limited consideration in terms of the number of IFAs 
contributing to that area of discussion.  
 
 
 
Figure 8 – The Characteristics of Fees in the Context of the Financial Planning 
Sector 
What was startling, given that all IFA contributors were provided with the menu of 
topics at least a week before the meeting, was that in some cases there was very little 
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sense of understanding the nature of the topic and further expansion and prompting 
was often required.  
The themes that emerged have been organised in to three groups, namely fees which 
are related to specific, transparent activities or cost centres, those which appear to be 
unrelated and those giving rise to ethical issues. 
Fees Unrelated to Activity, Performance or Cost  
It is important to emphasise at this point that the payment of commission on the sale 
of financial products to retail customers, with the exception of life assurance policies 
and some elements of pension plan provisioning is now banned and that there is a 
requirement for transparency when charging fees to clients.  
One product provider contributor, PP1, observed that:   
“we're seeing a lot of firms even now that think, well we were doing a 3% 
plus 1% before RDR, we're still doing 3+1, but what we've done is written to 
our customers saying we're doing all these things to justify it. So they take on 
the old model, putting it in the new mould and saying to the client we're 
doing all this stuff now and that's why it's 3% plus one per cent. Presumably 
they were doing all that stuff beforehand – it’s just that - so I don't think yet 
the new regulator and the new regulator will take a few prisoners and ensure 
that their intentions are well understood, the new regulator, the FCA, just 
won't tolerate that unless they are seeing genuine value exchange. They just 
won't tolerate it, they simply, they absolutely won't tolerate a firm that is 
doing nothing different now to what it was doing five years ago, just dressing 
it up and saying it's called RDR now and this is what we do for it. So a lot of 
firms I think have got quite an awakening in front of them in terms of how 
they move into a world where they can genuinely in a repeatable and 
scalable way demonstrate an exchange of value.” 
These comments suggest that it could be germane to consider IFAs’ comments on 
the charging of fees which do not appear to have characteristics relating them to the 
provision of an activity, performance or cost of a service, something which is given 
greater consideration in Chapter 4.    
Numerous contributors commented on the theme of charging a fee based upon the 
value of the product or investment. What was surprising was that not everybody did, 
despite this method being employed on an almost universal basis.  
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One IFA contributor noted that  
“I’m part of  the Paradigm Network, so we’ve got 300/400 firms, and we 
attend regular meetings and see what is being charged across the board and 
it still varies quite dramatically – most people are settling for the 3% upfront 
as the sort of maximum and then charging anything from 0.5% to 1% going 
forward. I think probably a better model would be charging 1% and then ¾% 
going ahead.” (IFA2) 
This percentage approach is referred to by another IFA, who is also a representative 
of one professional body, as the ad valorem method. No mention is made here of any 
other method of charging being used or considered by Paradigm members. 
The discussion is about the level of percentage applied, not the method of charging 
the fee.  
Linked to this form of “fee-charging” is the recurring or ongoing fee which again is 
met from the investments on an ad valorem basis. This is the Paradigm member’s 
reference to “anything from 0.5% to 1% going forward,” although how the fee in 
itself relates specifically to a service is not clear, leading perhaps to the FCA’s view, 
contained in its recent thematic review TR14/6 referred to above, that existing 
failings within the advice sector suggest, 
“That some consumers could be unaware of, or even mis-led, in relation to 
the cost of advice (both initial and ongoing), the type of service being 
offered…. Or the service they can expect to receive in return for the ongoing 
fee,”  
In a briefing paper dated May, 2014, The Economist suggested that investment funds 
that paid an ongoing fee gave rise to a conflict of interest in the mind of the adviser, 
given that low-cost tracker funds might suit the investor risk profile better, but could 
not support a payment to the adviser. They believed that the RDR introduced in 2013 
requiring advisers to explain the true cost of advice would ensure the availability and 
supply of low-cost investment products to the benefit of consumers. What the 
Economist believes and what is actually happening is something which received 
comment from the supplier contributor at the beginning of the section on unrelated 
fees (Economist 2014). 
Nevertheless, the Economist beliefs and the regulator’s requirement will ultimately 
become symmetrical and it is clearly imperative that IFAs attend to this issue of 
ensuring that a clear link exists between the fee charged, initial or ongoing, and the 
service provided for it, because as things stand this is not the brave new world of 
banned commissions and transparent fees envisioned by the regulators and consumer 
groups. 
It is worth considering the view of one long-standing financial adviser on this 
phenomenon,  
76 
 
“I do think that at the moment there are a whole load of people out there 
charging too much for what they do, but that’s always been in our industry, 
I’m afraid. And since the regulator has decided to go down a different route, 
it’s not worried about how much you earn. It’s not controlling that side of 
things at all, at the moment - people (advisers) are taking 3, 4, 5% upfront 
and 1% ongoing and then pushing it out to discretionary fund managers to 
manage. Well I don’t think that is sustainable, but at the moment there’s no 
control over the cost side and the transparency side is just so confusing that I 
really think that this will pass us by for another few years until the Financial 
Conduct Authority sets its sights on that.”  (IFA2) 
The unspoken suggestion contained in these remarks is one that is often used in the 
media, namely that the percentage-based approach to charging a client or consumer 
will always result in huge profits being amassed by the seller. However, the reality is 
that neither the majority of IFAs nor anybody else connected to the sector has any 
real idea of the costs involved in various activities and, therefore, whether any 
income, however generated is sufficient to cover that cost is unknown, as suggested 
in Chapter 5. Coming to grips with the key requirements of the new regulations 
would almost certainly ensure greater efficiency and profitability, whilst at the same 
time avoiding media sniping, however ill-informed it might be. 
Perhaps at this stage consideration of a possible alternative group of themes, beliefs 
and ideas would be appropriate. 
Fees Related to Activities, Performance and/or Cost 
There was much support for the idea that a fee should represent payment for an 
activity or job. There was rather less certainty about rating techniques and the 
practicalities of applying the general principle. 
A provider contributor representative suggested that, 
“Fees are the consideration of an exchange of values, aren't they? You know 
offer, acceptance, consideration or whatever you want to call it in legal 
terms – fees are consideration aren't they? – You offer me services that really 
appealed to me, that appeared tangible to me, that I can absolutely associate 
value with – I accept those services and assuming they’re kept will continue 
to buy them and the consideration is the fee – that’s it’s worth me paying you 
£50 a month for that peace of mind, that knowledge that I trust you and that 
you got my interests at heart, is well worth the £50 a month or £80 a month, 
or whatever it is. Fees are the consideration I think for that trusting 
relationship, that's what it's worth to me as a customer to know that I've got 
someone at the helm whom I trust and who I know’s got my interests at 
heart.”(PP1) 
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That contributor’s reference to “continue to buy them” is also a reference to the 
stickiness of the model, referred to in the previous chapter covering a financial 
adviser’s role, and is justifying the charging of a transparent fee covering an ongoing 
service capable of addressing changing circumstances. 
In contrast it appeared that broad agreement exists amongst IFAs on the acceptability 
of charging a fixed fee for a particular project or job, at least conceptually. The devil 
is in the detail, the how much to charge and on what basis detail. It also avoided any 
consideration of continuity of service, inferring the bespoke, not holistic approach.  
On the one hand an IFA specialising in divorce work said: 
“I always give my estimate in advance and I've always generally say it will 
be between this figure and this figure so it does give me some margin - it’s 
very rare that I over-estimate but I can go back and cut it down if I have 
taken less time so I think it's quite – I always work out how long it's going to 
take me – I completely disagree with the “oh well I charge 1% or I charge 
3% as the initial fee for doing some work” because I think that doesn't 
represent anything in my view. I know the people out there who would 
disagree with me because sometimes if you charge 1% and it's not enough – 
if you charge 3% it’s way too much so I disagree with charging a percentage 
fee – I really disagree with that. I think every piece of work has to be bespoke 
– so that's my view of it.”(IFA6) 
This is a time-based fee approach with reference to “how long it is going to take 
me,” but relates to a fee for a specific job, not unnaturally in the case of divorce-
related work, it might be said, although others might argue that financial planning is 
even more vital for individuals in the period beyond such a massive traumatic 
experience. 
Other responses immediately fell back on the percentage-of-investment technique, 
referred to in the previous section, asserting that the researching, processing and 
reporting requirements to facilitate the investment represented the job. Pinpointing 
how much time has been spent on these and by whom and at what rate was ignored, 
meaning that an opportunity to recognise the cost to the firm and the benefit to the 
client is missed. The essence of this approach was that if the client accepts the fee 
quoted then the relationship between the work and the fee is established, the 
transparency rules are met and any apparent similarity with the now outlawed 
commission payment is entirely coincidental.  
Amongst provider contributors there was a certain recognition, referred to earlier, 
given to the idea of fees representing a possible exchange of values, but even after 
some prompting the recognition of the cost of providing the service was either not 
understood or ignored. Unfortunately none of these contributors could inter-relate 
these values with the service they referred to, which probably accounted for their 
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inability to link cost to service provision, given that the values contained in that 
service were not recognised.   
Notwithstanding this, most IFA contributors made reference to the desirability of 
fees being cost-related: Comments such as: 
“A focus on the cost base is required” (IFA2) 
“There is a need to explain to the client the costs faced by an IFA in respect 
of the Financial Conduct Authority, Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme, The Financial Ombudsman Service, and Professional Indemnity 
Insurance premiums” (IFA6) 
and 
“IFAs should be aware of cost” (IFA7) 
were common, but lacking in substance. As a practitioner has already been recorded 
as saying, most IFAs don’t know or understand their cost base, perhaps because their 
original training was delivered  within a sales environment and not, despite the title, 
financial management. Whatever the cause we are back to the “what and how” 
conundrum again (Sutton, 2012). 
It may be that this lack of awareness of business cost is the reason that IFAs arrive at 
the hourly rate, which they are obliged to provide to clients and the FCA, in such an 
arbitrary fashion. It may also account for the fact that not one referred to the specific 
cost of risk to the business, expressed both in terms of potential claims, compliance 
failings and the administrative costs of compliance oversight. It is somewhat 
paradoxical that when observing on the barriers to the future development of their 
businesses, considered later, the majority of IFAs saw the cost of regulation as being 
a major impediment; if they do not know that cost how do they know it is a major 
impediment?   
A number did, however, state that they had a minimum net-worth sum, below which 
they would not conduct business with an enquirer, which might suggest a sales-
oriented bias and introduces the platform for consideration of ethical issues. (In a 
lecture entitled Will Clients Pay Fees in a post RDR World?, presented to members 
of the Personal Finance Society in 2013 Jon Everill, a member nominated director of 
the PFS, suggested that a major issue was “Lower value clients” where 
investments/requirements don’t generate enough fees to be valuable to both parties. 
He posited that the level of inadequacy might commence at £50,000, or £100,000, or 
£150,000 or perhaps even higher.) Setting aside other issues, Everill’s inference is 
that the fees to which he is alluding are the percentage-based ones referred to already 
(Everill 2013). 
Such attitudes reveal a complete lack of understanding of marginal costing, familiar 
to management accountants as being a very useful method for short-term decision-
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making. In essence if the cost of all fixed overheads have already been absorbed into 
the rate, however calculated, then charging the consumer a fee at least equal to the 
variable cost of the product (advice?) will ensure that the work undertaken cannot be 
at a loss; charging at a figure above cost, although not necessarily at the full rate, will 
add to the overall profitability of the organisation.  For a more detailed explanation 
of the concept read “Accounting and Finance for the Non-Specialist”(Atrill and 
McLaney 2006), but for the argument in favour of acquiring an understanding look at 
Chapter 5 of this work.  
Let me emphasise what I said in the previous paragraph, “if the cost of all fixed 
overheads have already been absorbed into the rate,” which cannot be the case where 
a fee calculated on an ad valorem basis is anticipated, because that is a reflection of 
income, not cost. Furthermore, in recognising the cost of providing the service an 
automatic link is established to the activity for which the fee is charged and in turn 
the client and adviser are in a position to determine, whether, in their opinion, the fee 
represents sound value for the advice provided. That ensures that the process is both 
transparent and ethically robust, assuming, of course, that the sums have been done 
to provide those fee rates. 
Ethical Elements 
Clients will not pay fees – that is the received wisdom amongst the IFA and product 
provider community, but as one fee-charging IFA (IFA6) commented, “has anyone 
asked them (the clients)?” Is the mantra a representation of reality or another 
example of a deliberate stratagem to avoid engaging with what might be an entirely 
alien scenario for people historically locked into a sales and marketing community of 
practice and, therefore, a manifestation of an unwillingness to change direction?  
If it was true that clients would not pay fees then this would suggest that clients 
would be prepared to accept advice and guidance without remunerating the provider. 
These same consumers, in the main, would never dream of walking into a shop 
asking the proprietor to hand them a product and then leave without any intention of 
making payment. Why should they act any differently when dealing with their 
financial adviser? Well, they will not once the adviser has explained to them what 
the product is, how much it will cost and how payment can be made.    
So to reiterate, whilst there is now evidence challenging that claim, (our own fees 
model has been running for fourteen years, for example) it is a question of scale as to 
whether sufficient numbers of consumers understand and have the desire to commit 
to the payment of fees. Rationally, if we are told that commission payments on the 
sale of financial products is now outlawed, but at the same time informed that those 
customers will not pay fees we must ask does this mean that the wholesale investing 
into such products has now ceased because advisers cannot earn any money. Nothing 
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in either anecdotal or media form suggests the collapse of that sector so may we 
conclude that the fees advisers are receiving are not the same fees that those 
recipients are assuring the world consumers will not pay?  
Leaving aside my own firm’s fourteen years’ experience of fee-charging for the 
present, it is clear that the IFA specialising in divorce can and does charge fees allied 
to the scale and complexity of the work undertaken. It is a fee which all parties to the 
process accept as fair and transparent, but it is undertaken by an individual who is an 
expert in her field, equipped academically and technically to meet the requirements 
of her clients and their legal representatives. When she is tasked with providing 
guidance on a financial planning matter falling outside her expertise she seeks the 
support of another colleague specialising in that area – a benefit of operating within a 
firm composed of a range of niche experts who together can provide a broad 
spectrum of advice and guidance on matters of financial planning.  
Bad Debts 
But how is that fee charged and collected? So far the discussion has been simply 
about fees, the “what” but not the “how” scenario and not one contributor thought to 
include this in their response. Under the ad valorem method the “fee” is either paid 
to the adviser by the product provider, or the sum is deducted from the investment 
sum before it is placed with that provider and the ongoing “fees” are distributed by 
the product provider directly to the IFA thereafter.  
Solicitors and accountants, whose professional standing in the eyes of the public 
many IFAs aspire to, are obliged to raise an invoice itemising the services for which 
they are billing. The invoice is sent to the client with a request for payment. In 
raising this invoice the firm is requesting payment for the services transparently 
identified in the invoice; it is clearly delineated from the process of settlement. Most 
clients do settle their accounts, sooner or later, but some never pay, the bad debt. In 
the following box are recorded my thoughts on this conundrum, prior to attending 
the Personal Finance Society’s Annual Conference in November 2013 
“With regard to the claim that fees are charged to clients by IFAs it would be 
interesting to ascertain how the level of bad debts in IFA firms compared 
with those which persist within the legal and accountancy sectors. The 
hypothesis is that where bad debts are very low or non-existent it would 
suggest that the “fee” is not treated as being collectable from the client in 
the first place and therefore cannot be viewed as ever being a bad debt.” 
Cawdell K E – 29/9/2013 
Where fees are invoiced directly to clients there will be bad and doubtful debts. 
Where that phenomenon does not appear in the accounts it is almost certain that 
invoiced fees do not form part of the process in that organisation, for it is a fact of 
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life that in business bad debts occur and guidelines to the professional accounting 
bodies require evidence of prudency that produces provisions for doubtful debts in 
the accounts. (To fail to do so would mean that the expectation that all trade debtors 
appearing in the balance sheet would shortly convert into cash would not be true and 
would, therefore, overstate the value of the organisation’s working capital position) 
That November 2013 conference included a break-out session attended by some 
eighty IFAs, all of whom had to be remunerated by fees, because that is the law, but 
not one of whom suffered from bad debts amongst their clientele. Would that be 
because that year’s fee was collected in the same way as pre-2013’s (and therefore 
pre-RDR) commission, albeit in a slightly more transparent wrapper and if it is, is it 
ethical to pretend that there has been any change in substance. During the two-day 
event I took the opportunity to put the question of bad debts to a further fourteen 
IFAs, each one of whom confirmed that they never suffered from bad debts amongst 
their clients. 
Consideration of IFAs views on the features of commissions in the following chapter 
may assist in providing an answer. 
Reflections and Observations 
The OED’s definition of the word fee is “A payment made to a professional person 
or to a professional or public body in exchange for advice or services.” 
At present there are two types of fee being applied in the IFA sector, namely the 
“fee” paid by the supplier of an investment product upon its being arranged by the 
IFA for a client; this is referred to as the initial fee, but might sometimes be replaced 
by some other euphemism such as an adviser charge. The second type is the ongoing 
fee paid by the same product provider from the same investment to the same IFA. 
The link between the payment of these fees and the former transaction is relatively 
clear at a general level, although whilst the percentage charge tends not to be varied 
by the IFA there is a very strong likelihood that the service required must. In the case 
of the second type of “fee” the link is virtually invisible, probably because it does not 
exist.   
In the executive summary of the FCA’s paper referred to at the beginning of this 
chapter, they stated, 
“We found that a high proportion of firms are failing to correctly disclose to 
clients the costs of their advice, the type of service they offer and the nature 
of the ongoing service they provide. In particular 73% of firms failed to 
provide the required generic information on how they charge for advice 
and/or failed to clearly confirm the specific cost of advice to their individual 
clients in a timely manner. For example, fewer than half (42%) of firms 
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surveyed gave their clients clear upfront generic information on how much 
advice might cost and only half of the firms surveyed clearly explained how 
much advice would cost clients as individuals. 
In our view the level of non-compliance we identified and the failure of firms 
to meet their regulatory requirements is unacceptable.”   
To an extent the regulator does not help itself in this respect. When requesting 
completion of its half-yearly return from IFA firms on operational factors its enquiry 
concerning fees relates only to asking for the average optional hourly rate, as if this 
is the only method other than ad valorem.  What is clear is that it does not accept that 
the current method employed and interpretation of what is a fee by IFAs is 
acceptable. 
The appreciation amongst contributing IFAs of what the term “fee” represented 
oscillated between a claim that changing a single word in an agreement from 
commission to fee completely addressed the change demanded by the regulator 
following the implementation of the findings of the Retail Distribution Review 
(IFA7) and, at the other end of the spectrum, the categorical statement that,  
“For me, the key is, we’ll charge for advice.” (IFA3) 
The practical issues ranged from a claim that clients will not pay fees to 
demonstrations that they already were, but the major difficulty in the minds of the 
majority of contributors was not the acceptance of the concept, but how to 
implement it and this appeared to be the result of a very narrow experience in the 
management of a business and in particular the development of a financial strategy 
that this requires. 
Nevertheless, what has emerged from discussions with IFAs is their 
acknowledgement that charging fees on the basis of cost, activity and performance is 
both desirable and necessary. Some recognised that the opportunity to discuss with 
clients and potential clients the range of services to be provided, the estimated cost 
and how these payments could be made created a solid foundation for the 
establishment of a long-term relationship, the essence of the “client franchise” 
referred to in the text. 
A clearer understanding of the relationship between cost, volume and profit is 
required, but should not in itself provide a major obstacle to progress. Indeed, once a 
basic understanding has been achieved the entire foundation of the firm’s existence 
will have been enhanced beyond current recognition and the development of a 
sustainable business commenced.  
What is paramount is that there is an understanding of the difference between a cost 
recharged to a client as a fee and the payment for that fee. Determining that a 
payment made directly from an investment product provider to an IFA by means of a 
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deduction from the investment can only really represent the latter; it does not have a 
connection or attribute identifying it with the former. 
It was generally recognised and desired that employing ethical standards based upon 
Emmanuel Kant’s categorical imperative was the aim, even though it was never 
couched in those terms by the contributors. Whilst most parties accept that 
professional ethics are an important factor in raising standards there is a tendency for 
them to be selective in their setting. Thus, when the PFS member-appointed director 
talked about the possibility of clients paying fees, or not, he discussed this in terms 
of percentage-calculated fees involving investment products, which is entirely within 
the ethics rules set by his professional body, but not the same thing at all as the 
definition provided by the OED or desired by contributing IFAs. 
Fundamentally, this chapter has been about the nature and characteristics of fees as 
they exist within the financial planning sector and how they might have to be 
employed in the future. That is, should fees be a payment for service and cost as 
opposed to commission being connected to a reward for sales. Management 
accounting techniques that address, amongst other issues, the nature of cost and how 
they would help are discussed in Chapter 5.  
Our next chapter considers commissions in the financial services sector, past and 
present and offers, I hope, an opportunity for you to compare and contrast with what 
has been discussed in this chapter. 
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3.4 - The features of commission as applied 
within a financial planning firm 
 
Summary of main themes discussed in this chapter 
 The features and characteristics of commissions 
 Incentive schemes and conflicts of interest 
 The resurrection of commission 
 Opacity and transparency – the shaping of the business model   
Introduction 
The Oxford Compact English Dictionary’s definition of commission,  
“A sum, typically a set percentage of the value involved, paid to an agent in a 
commercial transaction”  
is almost identical to  
“Denotes the remuneration received by the adviser as the result of a 
financial transaction implemented by him/her, when the same is calculated as 
a percentage of the value of the transaction,”  
which is the Institute of Financial Planning’s version, incorporated into its Code of 
Ethics. Almost, but not quite; the former refers to an “agent” and the latter to an 
“adviser” 
The diagram below maps out the various themes and ideas emerging during recorded 
conversations with IFAs and product providers and confirms that there is general 
recognition that commissions are percentage-based and set by the product provider. 
It was not disputed that product providers set the commission levels and in the 
previous chapter we have already considered the existence of ongoing payments, 
now referred to as fees, but previously known as trail commission, and the absence 
of a credible argument for their continuation. All of this is reflected in the section of 
the diagram grouped together as Characteristics. 
The only difference discerned between the two opening definitions, then, gives rise 
to a moral dilemma. In law, as incorporated into the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000, the independent financial adviser must act as the agent of the client, but 
agreements with product providers refer to the term agency in their Terms of 
Business Agreements, that is an arrangement involving the provider as principal and 
the IFA as agent to the principal.  
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The moral dilemma, therefore, was one of attempting to serve two masters, one 
being statutorily required and the other providing the main source of remuneration. It 
was a classic example of a conflict of interest, agent and principal or client and 
principle. 
 
 
Figure 9 - Responses concerning the Features of Commission as applied within 
a Financial Planning Firm 
The Characteristics of Commission 
The Institute of Financial Planning’s definition of commission, referred to above, is 
the definition most IFA contributors to this work accepted. Within financial services 
the level of commission payable was set by the product providers, although in more 
recent years this was subject to limitations encouraged by various financial 
regulators, the value of which was often disputed. Such arrangements were swept 
away by the implementation of the Retail Distribution Review, at least in theory 
(2012).  
86 
 
It was accepted that the payment of commission for business conducted by financial 
advisers was now banned. However, in the period leading towards these changes, 
that is prior to 31st December 2012, providers began suggesting that arrangements 
could be made whereby the level of initial commission could be reduced from as 
much as 7%, but more usually 5%, to somewhere around 3%. At the same time they 
suggested that they would be open to arrangements whereby the ongoing 
commission could become more flexible, ranging from perhaps 0.25% to 1% or 
higher. In encouraging this and convincing the regulator that the outcome of such 
manoeuvrings could fit a description of income to be known as adviser charging they 
appeared to be perpetuating the prevailing mind-set by tweaking the existing model.  
Yet again we have an example of attempting the stay with an ages-old model that 
appears to have outlived its purpose, which was to serve the product provider and its 
agents, but excluded consideration for the consumer other than in the capacity of a 
source of remuneration. Is this not further proof, if any were needed, that Kant’s 
principle of avoiding using people as just a means to an end is being circumvented?   
Before moving on to consider the wide range of ethical issues which resulted from 
these meetings, it may be enlightening to consider the words of the divorce-focused 
IFA concerning the payment of these ongoing commission/fees –  
“I don't normally take trail, because if I keep taking trail that means that I 
have to keep reviewing those clients. In 70% of cases they probably don't 
need reviewing every year, in the nicest possible way, because we set up their 
pension so that it doesn’t need reviewing, so that they had the opportunity to 
not have money stripped out of their plan and also if I have to keep doing 
reviews it means that the amount of new work that I can take on is limited.” 
(IFA6) 
In saying this she is questioning the ethical basis for the continuing Adviser Charge 
when there is the lack of a link between the inflow of cash and the provision of a 
service to justify it. Whether she is correct in her assessment that clients do not 
require ongoing advice is another matter, particularly when she belongs to a firm of 
IFAs demonstrating competences across a broad horizon of financial planning skills.  
The Ethical Issues 
A major concern amongst consumers, referred to later, is that remuneration linked to 
the volume or magnitude of sales can distort the shaping of business plans (FSA 
2013). Amongst the IFAs who contributed, there was less discussion on this. In 
response to my asking “do you think there is a driver within some organisations with 
regard to commissions”, this adviser’s response was as follows: 
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“You mean somebody might recommend Product A rather than Product B 
because somebody might pay more commission for product A? So might 
advisers be influenced by commission - I haven't seen any hard evidence that 
supports that, but I’ve heard sufficient scuttlebutt, anecdotal evidence and 
I've seen enough clients come in with a bond structure investment (attracting 
initial commission of up to 7%) where actually, a general account would do. 
A direct investment into a unit trust paid a commission of 3%, whereas a 
bond investment could pay anything up to 7 or 8% - sometimes higher – you 
have to draw your own conclusions, but I would be very surprised if there 
was no evidence of commission playing a role in influencing the outcome to 
the client” (IFA3) 
The point here is that the contributor is discussing whether recommending one 
product over another might be influenced by the level of remuneration that each 
generated. He is not taking into account that the better outcome for the client might 
be to recommend an action which does not include purchasing a remuneration-
producing product or indeed any other product, other than advice.   
However, the evidence referred to by this IFA was provided by the outgoing 
regulator. In their paper “Final Guidance: Risks to customers from financial 
incentives, January 2013”, the Financial Services Authority wrote of their 2011 
review, 
“We know that the way sales staff are paid influences how and what they sell 
to consumers. Equally, we recognise that firms may want to incentivise their 
staff to sell. We do not have a problem with incentive schemes, but they must 
never be at the customer’s expense and the risks need to be managed 
properly. Consumers must be confident they are being sold a product for the 
right reasons. 
Our review found that most incentive schemes were likely to drive people to 
mis-sell and these risks were not being properly managed.  
Later in the same paper the FSA recorded their latest findings saying,  
“The (2012) review shows that most firms have incentive schemes that can 
drive mis-selling and do not have effective systems and controls in place to 
adequately manage the risks. We are concerned that 20 out of the 22 (large) 
firms we assessed had features in the incentive schemes that increased the 
risk of mis-selling – in six cases the risks were significant and one of those 
six was referred to the FSA’s Enforcement and Financial Crime Division. 
IFA3 further explored the topic in a way that considered, amongst other issues 
mentioned, that the way in which commission was, and in the case of protection 
policies and some pension schemes, still is paid, shaped the overall framing of 
organisations’ business plans. The practice of paying commissions as an immediate 
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lump sum representing the annual premiums payable, perhaps over a forty-eight 
month period, is known as “indemnity commission”. Ethically, however, how that 
“income” is recorded in the accounts of the firm raises considerable concerns.  
The requirement for IFA firms’ accounts to undergo a full audit process has been 
long since abandoned, so accountants are required only to prepare accounts based 
upon the information provided to them by the firm. Therefore, the income figure 
provided to accountants by the firm is taken at face value and whether that sum 
should be discounted by a sum representing the unearned element is not revealed. 
You may consider that these are accounting technicalities and of little importance. 
However, if some of that unearned commission, (it cannot be described as a fee by 
the very nature of its lack of permanence and attribution to an activity) is clawed 
back in a later year, perhaps because the client has decide not to continue with the 
contract, or has reduced their contribution, then the reality would be that the original 
profit was overstated (because the income recorded was not the income resulting 
from that business in that year.) Furthermore, the working capital recorded in the 
balance sheet for the firm, that is the difference between what the firm can 
reasonably expect to receive soon from those who owe it money, plus cash to hand 
and those to whom it must pay money shortly, is overstated, because the sums that 
might have to be repaid at short notice to the product provider are not recorded.  
Working capital is a way of determining whether a firm can meet its short-term 
liabilities; if it appears that it can it is described as being solvent, but if it cannot it is 
cash insolvent. Hiding the latter can at best be described as unethical and at worst 
wanton criminal deception. It could also simply be confirmation that the majority of 
IFAs, despite their title, cannot understand a set of accounts and/or the relevance of 
those accounts as an important tool in the management of their own businesses. 
In the past advisers have considered that the practice of indemnity commission was a 
suitable way of overcoming the need for IFA firms to provide their own start-up 
capital. A quick look at a sample of their balance sheets would have revealed that the 
majority had ordinary share capital of £1. The more recent regulators have insisted 
upon firms maintaining a minimum level of £10,000 of capital, which most IFAs 
appear to translate into a need to retain £10,000 in cash. What if the cash to hand is 
partly or substantially sourced from indemnity commission. In times of economic 
difficulty claw-backs of commission begin to devour that cash, and more, as product 
providers demand the repayment of portions of unearned commission, the result of 
clients re-evaluating their insurance, pensions and saving needs. Would that 
development have the effect of shaping the business plans of the firm by selling 
more products carrying indemnity commission as it attempts to survive a cash-flow 
crisis, one whose potential should have been identified in their balance sheet, but 
was not?  
Cash flow crises have the potential to inculcate panic, at both an individual and 
corporate level, leading to thought processes diverting towards claims that the end 
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justifies the means. This can and often has led to products being sold to consumers 
which satisfy the need of the adviser, but not the client – Kant’s first and second 
ethical principles swept aside in the name of survival – and at the heart of the 
problem lies the payment of commission, in whatever guise.  
What is more it was intimated that in terms of commission a lot of clients didn't 
really understand what was happening to them.  
“Advisers disclosed commission and I don't think it was an issue – but then I 
don’t think they (the client) understood what was happening, especially when 
you think about it in the investment market - someone writes out a cheque for 
£100,000 and they see £108,000 invested in their policy document and at the 
same time the adviser’s walked away with 6% or 7% and clients think, “well 
look I’ve got £108,000 in this product”, and I don't think people 
understood.” (IFA5) 
If you find the numbers in that extract confusing or complicated you will not be 
alone. Indeed, one of the outcomes of these forms of commission payments was the 
sheer complexity of the charging structures built into the policy documents, with 
rules about what would happen if withdrawals above a certain percentage were 
undertaken within different time-spans and the rights of policyholders over what had 
originally been their investment.  Add to this the language used at the insistence of 
regulators with regard to estimates of values over particular time-spans under certain 
conditions of growth , charging and total exiting requirements and to say that the 
investor needed a considerable amount of faith in the robustness of the process was 
more than an understatement.  
Transparency is the aim of the present regulator and a lack of it is considered 
unacceptable, but is it unethical per se or is it the result of a series of processes, all 
commission-related, which have led to unintended consequences, with some having 
the appearance of being unethical and others simply self-interested deception?  
Summary and Observations 
Whilst some IFA contributors were prepared to admit that in the minds of consumers 
the payment of commissions might be seen as skewing the nature of the advice 
provided by advisers, not one referred to the idea that this might also infuse the 
process with conflicts of interests, that is the attempt to serve two masters referred to 
at the beginning of this chapter. They did concede that it was generally seen as a 
“bad thing,” but did not acknowledge that commissions were never paid for advice, 
per se, but only upon the sale of a product – that is commissions and phenomena 
bearing similar characteristics exist within the domain of selling, as opposed to 
advice or professional guidance being the primary motivation.  
90 
 
Very little was admitted with regard to the probability that commissions skew advice 
given to consumers, although further interrogation of the transcripts confirmed the 
potential for the need to survive driving the less scrupulous or desperate advisers 
towards the sale of income-bearing products as a matter of self-interest as opposed to 
client need.  The FSA’s “Final Guidance” suggests as much.  
An argument in favour of commissions was made on the basis that some clients 
could not afford fees, but given the inability of most IFAs to assess the basis for an 
appropriate fee, this was lacking in robustness. Indeed knowledge of marginal 
costing techniques, referred to in Chapter 3.3, and a fundamental of an Accounting 
and Finance course, would contradict such an assertion and pave the way for suitably 
priced pro bono publico strategies. 
Changes in the amounts which might be subtracted or deducted from investments 
initially and, as a new innovation, regularly thereafter were recognised. Did that 
mean that in reality there has been a wholesale move away from commission 
payments?  In other words to what extent has there been a change from commission 
to fees and is the term Adviser Charging merely a grammatical subterfuge leading its 
adherents towards oblivion. Are IFAs the authors of their own impending malaise? 
What is clear is that remuneration by commission avoids the accumulation of 
manifest bad debts or any discussion with clients regarding bills and their method of 
payment. Conversely it fails to identify where the cost of the work undertaken 
exceeds the remuneration, thereby failing to offer the adviser the opportunity to 
ensure profitability or at the very worst avoid loss.  It is effectively a manifesto for 
muteness, not dialogue, opacity not transparency, with the lack of transparency 
pertinent to both the IFA and the client. 
Overall, there was consistent evidence that commission-based remuneration was 
fundamentally a sales-oriented business, which may not be a surprise, but does fly in 
the face of the term “Adviser.” What has changed or needs to be changed? 
What should be evident from all of this is that a business model that links its future 
income streams to the fluctuating fortunes of stock markets driven by forces far 
beyond the control and, for the most part, beyond the understanding of the sector is 
flawed. The table overleaf, sourced from the Office for National Statistics records 
two FTSE indices standings at the end of each year listed, with year-on-year falls 
indicated in red. 
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Year 
  
FTSE 100 Index 
FTSE-All-Share Index 
  Index % Change   Index % Change 
1985 1413 14.7   682 15.0 
1986 1679 18.9   833 22.1 
1987 1713 2.0   870 4.5 
1988 1793 4.7   927 6.5 
1989 2423 35.1   1205 30.0 
1990 2144 -11.5   1032 -14.3 
1991 2493 16.3   1188 15.1 
1992 2847 14.2   1364 14.8 
1993 3418 20.1   1682 23.3 
1994 3066 -10.3   1521 -9.6 
1995 3689 20.3   1803 18.5 
1996 4119 11.6   2014 11.7 
1997 5136 24.7   2411 19.7 
1998 5883 14.5   2674 10.9 
1999 6930 17.8   3242 21.2 
2000 6223 -10.2   2984 -8.0 
2001 5217 -16.2   2524 -15.4 
2002 3940 -24.5   1894 -25.0 
2003 4477 13.6   2207 16.6 
2004 4814 7.5   2411 9.2 
2005 5619 16.7   2847 18.1 
2006 6221 10.7   3221 13.2 
2007 6457 3.8   3287 2.0 
2008 4434 -31.3   2209 -32.8 
2009 5413 22.1   2761 25.0 
2010 5900 9.0   3063 10.9 
2011 5572 -5.6   2858 -6.7 
2012 5898 5.8   3093 8.2 
2013 6749 14.4   3610 16.7 
 
Table 6 - FTSE 100 Year-end Closing Values  
The effect in years where there is a fall is a serious reduction in cash inflow. Where 
subsequent years do not return the ongoing income to its pre-fall levels that reduced 
cash inflow could force the firm to contract or cease trading altogether. 
Furthermore that income model ticks few of the boxes required in the modern world 
of financial planning and offers little opportunity for ensuring that financial planning 
businesses have a long-term future, which is bizarre because according to the 
Economist’s Fund Management Briefing (3/5/2014), 
“Whilst most other industries have been commoditised so quickly it has been 
easy to eliminate intermediaries…in the financial sector, by contrast, 
intermediaries are remarkably persistent with, according to The Investment 
Company Institute, 80% of American retail investors paying for advice 
(Economist 2014).  
Note that the article refers to the acquiring of Exchange Tracker Funds (ETFs) which 
do not pay commission to advisers, but do demonstrate attractive yields and low 
costs.   
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So what is stopping IFAs in this country from moving away from sourcing their 
regular income streams from products’ performance and essentially commissions, 
even if another euphemism is engaged? In the next chapter we look at IFAs’ views 
on what they consider to be the barriers to the future existence and/or development 
of their sector, wherein we might discover the answer to the question.  
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3.5 - Perceived Barriers to Future Financial 
Success and Development in the Independent 
Financial Advice Sector 
 
Summary of main themes discussed in this chapter 
 Regulatory costs as a barrier 
 Competence and culture within the financial planning sector 
 Product provider factors seen as impediments 
 The need for a professionally structured independent financial adviser 
organisation 
Introduction 
Before continuing this review of IFAs’ comments, observations and thoughts 
determining the point we have reached on the journey to completing this work’s 
purpose may be useful. So with this in mind a copy of the diagram appearing in 
Methodology and Methods (Chapter 2) is shown overleaf.  
The objectives stage (highlighted in blue) is the point being addressed in this Part 
(3) and the next. So far we have considered IFAs’ thoughts and ideas in relation 
to their organisational structure and roles and whether attitudes to the nature of 
fees and commissions have a particular bearing upon the future success, 
development  or, indeed, survival of IFAs. 
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The following diagram structures the themes contributors generated relating to 
perceived barriers to that future. 
 
 
Figure 10 - Perceived Barriers to Future Financial Success & Development in 
the Independent Financial Advice Sector 
 
95 
 
Regulatory Costs 
In its Position Statement on Professional Regulation the UK Inter-Professional 
Group, to which the Chartered Insurance Institute was a signatory, but the Institute 
of Bankers or its successors were not, stated that it is important to understand the 
role of regulatory or similar bodies and to see that role in the context of a spectrum 
of regulatory mechanisms. Those roles were recorded as including assuring the 
quality of professional services in the public interest and the investigation of 
complaints and disciplinary sanctions for professional misconduct (UK Inter-
Professional Group, 2002). However, it emphasised that professional regulation 
cannot be a substitute for systems of civil redress. So there was some confusion 
about how various professional body regimes would work together on the ground, 
with particular reference to the wide-ranging powers granted to the Financial 
Services Authority in relation to financial regulation and its ability to judge and 
exact penalties. 
The costs of regulation were one of two main general causes identified by IFAs as a 
barrier to the future success and development of the IFA sector and as the diagram 
shows directly related requirements of regulation, as opposed to interpretations, were 
divided between professional indemnity insurance availability and cost, the increased 
qualification threshold requirements, the increased capital adequacy levels and the 
cost of funding the Financial Services Compensation Scheme together with the 
Financial Ombudsman Service. 
In this those contributors were supported by at least one representative of a product 
provider who observed, 
“I'm not saying that the regulations are wrong or that they've gone too far, 
necessarily, but I think it's the way that it's being rolled out and the rate of 
roll-out is probably a bit too extreme and I would probably say there's too 
much of a financial burden put on financial advisers firms – again I think 
there's more the government could do, maybe if we weren't in such austere 
times, to kind of support financial services and the regulations and the 
qualifications, etc that are needed. I think I'm right in saying that financial 
services in the UK is one of the biggest service industries, it's hugely 
important to the economy and not only to that but it's hugely important to 
those people who live in that economy and yet the government in the past 
have turned a blind eye to certain things because they know the value that the 
financial services adds to the economy; maybe they should concentrate on 
doing less of that and more of supporting from a regulatory perspective, so 
that the costs of advice, the costs that are incurred by firms, providers etc are 
more balanced and supported – that's one way that they could potentially 
reduce the barriers to advice.” (PP2) 
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Professional Indemnity Insurance 
As IFA7 emphasised, professional indemnity insurance cover is a legal requirement 
for IFAs, but whilst the regulator cannot force any insurer to offer cover if they 
choose not to do so, a change in the regulatory requirement for cover to be provided 
can have the effect of driving insurance companies out of the market, or at the very 
least raising the underwriting thresholds for acceptance.  
A particular example of such difficult changes to requirements is retrospective 
regulation, that is deciding that what was not formerly proscribed could now be so 
and determined for business already written. 
The point being made here is that by the time a regulator identifies a problem it has 
often been festering for some years. In identifying the perceived problem they do not 
necessarily quantify the extent in monetary terms, because the practice may have 
been widespread and that makes it difficult for professional indemnity insurers to 
assess the appropriate premium to charge.  
This was what occurred with the lifting of restrictions on the ability of members of 
employer sponsored pension schemes to transfer the funds in those schemes to the 
employees’ own individual personal pension plans. This relaxation of the rules was 
hailed, at the time, as giving individuals the freedom to make their own choices. 
(Readers may now hear an echo in relation to the recently mooted idea to allow plan 
holders to take all of their pension funds when retiring and not have to use them to 
buy an annuity.) 
Insurance companies at the time had their own large sales forces, in addition to 
running an agency system of brokers and advisers. They saw an opportunity to 
maximise the opportunity to acquire access to vast but previously unavailable 
pension funds holdings and comparatively excessive commissions were paid out to 
encourage their salespeople to persuade investors to transfer their funds, often, but 
not always, to the considerable disadvantage of those members of employer-
sponsored pension schemes.  By the time a regulator had identified the problem, 
egged on by an excited but ill-informed press, the problem had become enormous 
and professional indemnity insurers exited the market in droves.  
Compensation for losses was demanded by press, government and consumers, but 
under what terms; a test case in the High Court to determine the position in law 
regarding fault, compensation levels and process for past perceived misdemeanours, 
perhaps? Well not if a previous government’s responsibility for providing the 
opportunity was to be avoided, despite the fact that at the time no professional 
regulatory issues were involved. 
So the regulator of the time was empowered to introduce retrospective legislation 
and oversee a very expensive review process, which provided substantial income for 
actuaries and drove even more professional indemnity insurers from the market. 
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Surely a test case could have cut out the middle section of this process and created 
the compensation framework needed in a way that reflected the law of the land, 
which this review did not and still does not (see Sir William Garrow, 1760-1840 – a 
man is innocent until proven guilty (Hostettler and Braby 2010).)  
Indeed, the Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) scandal was addressed by the courts  
and the main perpetrators, banks and insurance companies were obliged to pay 
compensation from their own coffers rather than through a system of collecting a 
general charge placed upon every member of the financial services sector. 
With the benefit of hindsight it could be argued that had a professional class of 
adviser been predominant, one capable of exercising ethical as well as technical 
influence upon the market, the negative consequences arising from the legislation 
and activities of pensions misselling could have been identified and avoided. It is 
notable that IFA involvement with PPI selling was negligible and such a negative 
correlation may provide some support for this notion. 
A characteristic of a professional indemnity policy is that it only covers the insured 
organisation during the currency of the particular year, so refusing to renew a policy 
enables the insurer to walk away from any problems which were germinated during 
that year, or previous ones. That is why if a potential crisis is perceived the 
temptation is for insurers to walk away from the market, the belief being that they 
cannot possibly turn a profit during such times. The nadir of the market was reached 
with the unintended consequence of the implementation of the aforementioned 
government inspired review of pensions being that  a very large number of IFAs 
were unable to obtain a renewal of their policies and were effectively barred from 
trading. Such was the magnitude of the problem that the regulators were obliged to 
allow continuation of trading by permitting the exclusion of certain types of 
previously required cover in the policies to encourage insurers to remain in the 
market, which was the very opposite of the aim to protect consumers from the effects 
of inappropriate selling.  
Despite these comments most contributors did not make an observation on the 
impact of professional indemnity insurance costs and availability, which may mean 
that they do not see, or perhaps recognise it as an impediment or simply that their 
renewal date was some way away at the time of our meeting.  
Qualifications Thresholds 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “qualified” as, officially recognized as being 
trained to perform a particular job. The UK Inter-Professional Group determines 
that their definition of the word “professional” is,  
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“An occupation in which an individual uses an intellectual skill based on an 
established body of knowledge and practice to provide a specialised service 
in a defined area, exercising independent judgement in accordance with a 
code of ethics and in the public interest.” 
In the latter’s view, therefore professional status is conferred by more than simply 
being trained to perform a particular job, which whilst being useful in itself is not a 
complete fulfilment of the requirement. 
What was noticeable in reviewing the contributions provided by IFAs to this work 
was that they all limited themselves to remarks regarding the sector’s qualification 
requirements, but did not extend beyond that. 
In considering regulation costs in impedimentary terms it was noticeable that 
remarks concerning the raising of the qualifications threshold came only from those 
IFAs (IFA2 and IFA7) who held the minimum qualifications, that is at QCA Level 4. 
However, both agreed that raising standards was a necessity. The remainder of 
contributors had attained qualifications equivalent to at least QCA Level 6, with 
many having gone even further, so perhaps for them they did not recognise as a 
barrier any increase in qualification thresholds, because they believed they would 
already exceed any such raised threshold requirements. Neither, though, did they 
suggest that it was a positive advantage to have gained degrees, both at first and 
post-graduate levels.   
Yet, in an article written by Ian Smith, an IFA holding a Master degree in Financial 
Services (Financial Planner, May 2014), the suggestion was made that professional 
qualifications were not enough – he advocated the inclusion of academic 
qualifications to assist development of the sector through an ability to think outside 
the box, that is education on a broader spectrum, an issue considered further in the 
following chapter (Smith 2014). 
Capital Adequacy Requirements 
Recognition that proposed revised capital adequacy requirements, demanding that 
firms of IFAs have a minimum of £20,000 of assets available in the business, was 
only mentioned in passing by the same two IFAs who, as recorded in the previous 
paragraph, provided feedback regarding increased professional qualifications. 
Neither saw it in particularly negative terms, with one saying it was an issue at 
organisation level, whilst the other said that as it stands at the moment,  
“I really do not understand why the regulators even worried about five 
grand, ten grand, twenty grand because the claims you’re going to get, if 
they’re five, ten, twenty thousand, most firms can raise that sort of money - a 
lot of IFAs would just have to sell their car of course, the Porsche would 
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have to go – so I don’t see the relevance of that; I don’t see how that is going 
to make any difference.” (IFA2) 
It is doubtful if such comments would go unchallenged in most business 
organisations, where the Return on Capital Employed could be seriously undermined 
by a policy which saw £20,000 or more allowed to lie fallow to satisfy the apparent 
whim of an EU inspired piece of regulation. That such comments within the IFA 
community are made might suggest that whatever consideration is given to this 
requirement highlights a lack of management technique and curiously, once again, 
relates to a financial metric, which, if the title is to be believed, should fall within the 
boundaries of their expertise.  
One of the underlying purposes for this increased financial requirement was an 
attempt to ensure that firms were in a position to meet compensation demands where 
they fell due. With excess clauses of £5,000+ in respect of each and every claim 
written into professional indemnity policies the regulators’ concerns might be 
considered over-cautious where the average compensation awarded by the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme is approximately £5,800 (FSC Scheme, 2013).  
Compensation Schemes Funding 
The issue of being obliged to underwrite the costs of the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme and fund the costs of running the Financial Ombudsman 
Scheme attracted robust observation on fairness and financial impact. It was thought 
that it needed serious reworking, because in its present form it was considered 
absolutely unfair with compliant firms picking up the bill for poor advice from 
previous less scrupulous and often subsequently liquidated firms.  
The scale of the frustration is exemplified in this quotation,  
“We, in our firm, none of us recommended KeyData, none of us 
recommended Archcru (a scheme encouraging consumers to invest in wine), 
none of us recommended structured products, very few, and we have very 
strict compliance regimes about what we did and what we didn't do and yet 
our financial services compensation scheme bill this year has been 
phenomenal, it's been many thousands, tens of thousands of pounds and yet 
we are a firm of IFA's all of whom are practically, nearly all of us are 
chartered. Most of us are specialists in our field and it's just so unfair that we 
have to cover the costs of people who have left the industry and couldn't give 
a flying whatnot” (IFA6) 
What is not recounted in this outburst is how that cost, which is in essence a 
premium for an insurance scheme to ensure that consumers who are adjudged to 
have been mis-sold products are suitably recompensed, is passed amongst that pool 
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of beneficiaries, namely the consumer. Such a mention would provide a link between 
cost and fee charged, it might be argued, with the IFA resorting to being the broker 
in the scheme and the pool beneficiary (consumers) the premium payers.  
What is mentioned is the degree of qualification and expertise present in that IFA’s 
firm and the inference that that ensured that “fringe” schemes and products were 
avoided to the benefit of clients and the firm’s reputation. 
As mentioned earlier, it might also be argued again that speed of response by 
regulators to the possibility that unacceptable practices were in play would limit the 
scale of the pool of compensation required, driving the unscrupulous out before too 
many consumers are drawn into their webs and thereby reducing the heavy burden 
placed upon firms who have sought to maintain robust practices. Perhaps an area that 
would be suitable for a representative independent professional body to address?    
Competence and Culture 
If Smith’s views (Smith 2014), referred to at the conclusion of the section covering 
regulatory costs, were given greater attention it might address the concerns of IFA3, 
an existing professional body representative. He referred to the IFA sector as a 
cottage industry where the standard of business management within it is so low that 
he and his colleagues joke that most businesses don't know the difference between 
profit and turnover. In his view,  
“Most financial services firms aren't businesses at all, but a bloke in his 
bedroom and the difference between self-employed and unemployed or 
unemployable is just a question of debate.” (IFA3) 
He felt that the quality of the people in the business was a critical impediment to, not 
simply the success and development of the IFA sector, but to its entire survival. 
He extended his thoughts on the scalability of advice by saying,  
“If I was one of the “Dragons” with £1 million or £2 million or £10 million 
or £50 million to invest in a business, would I invest that in a business that 
was trying to develop or deliver independent financial advice to a market. My 
answer would be “no” because I might be better making plastic widgets with 
the return of capital versus the risk within that market; I think that is the 
single biggest barrier, is the challenge of scalability to attract high-quality 
business capital, both in terms of the money and the intellectual property. 
When Richard Branson invests in independent financial advice we'll know it's 
an accessible and scalable market, but until he does it's not and so a big firm 
will be five advisers.  
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Of course, these comments ignore the fact that plastic widgets of whatever type will 
have a limited life-cycle, but the demand for advice and guidance would appear to be 
perpetual and offering a manufacturing analogy is interesting in itself when some 
believe they are working in a professional sector, not an industrial one. It is also 
certain that the cost of capital employed in widget production, with substantial assets 
recorded in the non-current assets section of the balance sheet, is substantially higher 
than that applicable to financial planning operations, which tend to exhibit very little 
in that part of their financial records.  
The challenge, reflected throughout this work, is not just how to charge for advice in 
such a way that businesses are permeated with a long-term future, but how to 
encourage financial planning firms to employ that method. This is despite general 
agreement amongst contributors that the pervading culture of an industry committed 
to selling tends to beget short-term relationships, whereas advice provides the basis 
for a long-term continuum. 
Whilst that contributor’s thoughts appeared to suggest that the future for the IFA 
sector was bleak,  IFA2 felt that with adjustment the Promised Land could be 
reached. In his view the current context does not favour small IFAs so more banding 
together, perhaps in the form of cooperatives, might be the answer.  
Organisationally operating in collectives would mirror the way that solicitors first 
merged where lots of one-man bands or partnerships would just take on another 
partner or another office, but came together so that they could share common costs 
and expertise, he felt.  
“I think there’s scope for us to do it, a bit like a barristers’ chambers – I 
think that initially that would work – I think that’s probably the old-
fashioned, now, way of looking at it and the way I was looking at it certainly 
was that – I think the more modern approach will be the truly getting 
together as a limited company to limit the liability, then to have shareholders 
or whatever within that company to share based upon turnover or whatever 
and perhaps a fluctuating thing, so that each year as your turnover changes, 
therefore your profit share changes so your shareholding may change. The 
way of redistributing income within it based upon what your turnover is.” 
The two IFA perspectives, whilst considering the same material, arrive at very 
different conclusions regarding the possibility of survival and development in the 
sector. In their report, “UK Wealth Management at Tipping Point?” KPMG (Sayer 
and Brown 2012) said that the wealth management sector must move towards greater 
client engagement through the use of teams and technology to build relationships 
between the client and the firm, not just the relationship manager. A failure to do so 
would allow new competitors using relationship-led models to threaten to take share 
from the incumbent product-led firms by providing holistic financial planning advice 
as a gateway to orchestrating other wealth management services, thereby targeting a 
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share of the client wallet rather than pure asset gathering. That KPMG felt that the 
financial planning sector was already beginning to benefit from reorganising along 
cooperative lines and saw this as the only way forward for the wealth management 
sector says much by way of support for the second of the two contributors’ remarks 
(Sayer & Brown 2012). 
Would assistance from academic sources help in providing answers – well this writer 
certainly hopes so, but would that assistance have a genesis in existing models or 
present a completely new landscape? The former offers opportunities for evolution, 
whilst the latter might involve revolution.  
However, if the former attempt at change is invoked too slowly it will suffer from 
strategic drift, which inevitably leads to the latter, but in an uncontrolled way 
(Johnson, Whittington et al. 2011). Academics versed in the dark arts of change 
management will recognise the challenges presented in both respects, but if the 
absence of a practical model for scalability is considered a barrier then change is 
essential, although, if the KPMG observations are correct then the IFA sector is 
closer to the answer than it currently understands.  Furthermore, scalability should 
not present the problems which appear to exist in the minds of the adviser 
contributors if a report published by WRAP is to be accepted (Cox, Hawke et al. 
2011).  
If KPMG are overstating the position within the financial planning sector and the 
concept of poor management competence is the more accurate then the latter will 
include an inability to understand how to bring new thinking to the sector, or to build 
upon existing but little-used models. This IFA and professional association 
representative serves as confirmation of the depth of the difficulties, from his 
perspective.  
“The barrier for me the barrier is us restricting ourselves, is our thinking – 
because if you were starting again and you came to this sector and there 
were no advisers at all and no one ever took advice, you would look at your 
consumer and work out what your consumer wants and base it upon that. 
Well what we keep on doing is trying to take historic models and make them 
work in this new world.” (IFA5) 
Other equally supportive IFAs, in the sense that they express a desire and need for 
major change within the sector, have emphasised that in their view thinking outside 
the box means thinking outside of the “sales mentality” box, which is Smith’s point. 
Can such a culture change be achieved within the existing members of this 
community of practice or will it require the recruitment of better educated people 
focusing upon a profession as opposed to a career in selling? Furthermore, should 
such consideration be undertaken by those who are already members of the existing 
regime and who might have an interest in maintaining the status quo, or by others 
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with a wider view, which description sounds like a recipe for a more cerebral 
regulator and a truly representative and independent professional body?  
The majority of IFA contributors see the lack of a professionally structured 
organisation as a major barrier to the continued existence, development and future 
success of the IFA sector. As one contributor noted,  
“You can’t transition salesmen to a professional fees-charging environment 
just by giving them qualifications – it just doesn’t work.”  (IFA2) 
Another concurred saying,  
“We’re trying to become a profession – we will need to be – we will need to 
be properly educated – we can't be old-fashioned commission hungry 
salesmen any more – you just can't operate like that.” (IFA6) 
The recognition of the need for change, which infers culture change, was couched in 
cautious terms, because it was noted that it is difficult to teach an “old dog new 
tricks.”  There was a general awareness that the average age of advisers is in excess 
of 55 and that there will be a critical need to attract new entrants. The creation of a 
professional cadre of IFAs, would, it was thought, provide the framework for the 
promotion of a professional career path which would receive the attention of 
academically qualified younger people, whose educational abilities could form the 
basis for the development of that profession in a way which addressed the needs of 
consumers.  
KPMG’s observations (Sayer and Brown 2012) suggesting to members of the 
Wealth Management sector that holistic financial planning and advice models are the 
way forward should be compared with a provider contributor’s comment that, 
“I think that by 2015 we'll see about 2000, maybe 2 to 2 1/2 thousand only 
remaining as independent financial advisers - The majority, seven or 8000 
will evolve to the restrictive advice model because the rigours of RDR will be 
a lot less if you are  a restricted firm. Those that do get it right, those that do 
work out the proposition to find the right clients segments, find out how to 
deliver that proposition to those customers effectively and to maintain the 
relationship and build that trust, I think there's a real opportunity for those 
that get it right so I think we will see a fragmentation in the marketplace.” 
(PP1) 
KPMG’s remarks tend to gel with what is being expressed by younger, better 
qualified IFAs, whilst the provider’s take reflects the belief that nothing much will 
change and that the existing sales-based model will continue to be delivered by 
sales-motivated advisers. Couched in marketing concepts the new breed of IFA is 
willing to think in terms of client needs if a practical way to do this can be found, 
whereas the existing model supports the needs of the providers.  
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The issues here are those of education, experience, qualification and continuing 
professional development, to which we turn in the next chapter, and the perceived 
and apparent needs of those consumers which follow in Chapter 3.8   
Practices of Suppliers 
In her submission on this topic, a member of a multi-member IFA firm expressed her 
disappointment concerning the interpretation of rules arising out of the 
implementation of post-RDR discussions. She thought that it was the 
misinterpretation of legislation by individual providers which was slowing them 
down. Why, she mused, is there not one common, transparent determination of what 
the requirements were so that they could be understood and applied universally? She 
was particularly unhappy and questioned the morality of providers who were 
planning to cease making trail payments to IFAs, quoting RDR as a basis for this, 
but not passing that saving on to the investor, saying,  
 I'm normally not normally that cynical, but I think there's a lot of that 
happening too. I don't mind if the money is going back into the client’s pot so 
they’re saying well we're not going to pay you, the IFA, that £1.30 per month 
– we’re going to put £1.30 back in your client's pension (which isn’t 
happening) - well I'd be very happy with that and I think most people would 
be, but I just think that RDR is just an opportunity for some providers to 
increase their margins and also put their charges up, their fees up.” (IFA6) 
Does this amount to a barrier to the future success and development of the IFA 
sector, or is it more a question of integrity and honesty, which may impact upon the 
future relationship between suppliers of products and independent financial advisers? 
Perhaps it is simply a matter of a cost to the IFA sector arising out of a regulatory 
change and an indication that in future IFAs should sup with a longer-handled spoon 
when dining with providers. 
Reflections upon the perceived barriers to future financial success and 
development in the IFA Sector 
In Chapter 3.3 I referred to the absence of any mention of the cost of regulation 
informing the calculation of fees. Included in IFAs’ observations on the barriers to 
their future success or avoidance of failure, none made any mention of the extent to 
which the cost of regulation might impede upon that success. Much was said at a 
general level, but there was little sense of whether they actually understood the 
relationship between this cost and how its acknowledgement and incorporation into 
the new fee structures might shape, for better or worse, that future. 
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That the costs of regulation should be cited by many contributors as a barrier to 
future development and success is not surprising. It is hard-wired into the culture of 
the IFA community that compliance requirements equate to restrictions on selling 
practices and therefore income, whilst any suggestion that sound compliant practices 
might provide a rigorous platform for the development of long-term relationships 
with clients went without a great deal of comment. What was surprising, given this 
strength of feeling, was the lack of the provision of specific costs examples to 
support these claims. Even where the quoted impediment was in the form of a time 
requirement, nobody, IFA or product provider, linked the time spent by staff in 
addressing issues related to compliance, such as file checking, editing of draft reports 
and suitability letters and half-yearly (GABRIEL) returns to the regulator as part of 
that cost and as such part of the fee which should be recharged to clients.    
The expression of a need to create a body of truly professional financial planners and 
guides was more consistent with most IFAs’ desires to ensure their place in the 
future of the financial services sector. How to convert that wish into the desired 
outcome was not articulated by those contributing directly to this work, but 
conversations with individual IFAs who have taken their master’s degree in financial 
services suggested that there exists a proto movement within some academic circles 
to encourage the formation of such a body.  
Given that one of my contributors had spent the past two years attempting to create 
such a body, but had failed to gather a critical mass of supporting IFAs , it begs the 
question is the heavily referred to desire of most contributors for such a body merely 
lip-service. If it is not then is the lack of momentum a product of the 90% majority of 
remaining IFAs being qualified only to the minimum benchmark requirement and as 
such representative of the old cultures, more concerned with sales than ethics, short-
term gratification than long-term relationships. Does the lack of critical mass 
represent a permanent rejection or simply that the idea was ahead of its time. If it 
was ahead of its time then when will that time arrive and what will be the shape of 
that professional organisation?  
The United Kingdom Inter-Professional Group, in their position statement published 
in 2002 said that those holding recognised professional qualifications and practising 
as professionals are expected to act with integrity, skill, independence and 
knowledge in a defined area of expertise. The Chartered Insurance Institute is a 
member of the Group so understanding the extent of the word “independent” and 
how it sits with them, as well as the majority of their members could prove 
illuminating and will be the subject of more scrutiny later in this work.    
Perhaps just one final observation on the providers of frameworks of regulation 
would be germane before moving on. Since 1988 there have been four different 
regimes on regulation introduced by various governments of various political hues. 
For the financial adviser they have been the Financial Intermediaries, Managers and 
Brokers Regulatory Authority (FIMBRA), the Personal Investment Authority (PIA), 
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The Financial Services Authority (FSA) and since 2013, the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA.)  The average lifespan is eight years. The arrival of each one was 
heralded as the answer to all problems perceived to exist with the financial services 
sector, but was ultimately replaced on the grounds of not being equal to the task. 
With such guidance and changes to requirements it might be suggested that if the 
ability to tackle root causes and address them is apparently beyond the competence 
of such gifted and well-paid organisations, why should there be an expectation that 
amongst the less-gifted operators a better outcome could be expected? And why does 
there need to be a body, such as the Financial Conduct Authority, sitting between the 
legislation and the professional bodies charged and accredited with the task of 
ensuring compliance. Is it this extra layer which represents an unnecessary cost or 
the accredited body which it might be implied is not considered to be up to the job? 
Is it possible that IFAs could address their own problems by considering them from a 
moral and ethical stance and concomitantly remove the barriers which they believe 
currently exist? After all, if clients want the services of a IFA, but do not want to 
suffer hidden charges being deducted from their investments, then granting their 
wish by charging fees directly related to the service and which have been previously 
made clear before the relationship commences, provides not only transparency, but 
also the opportunity for the adviser to ensure that the cost of each service is 
recovered. At the same time the client is extended the ethical opportunity to 
recognise the worth of the adviser and pay commensurately. In other words the 
relationship is ethically founded and able to demonstrate that good ethics is good 
business for both parties. 
The caveat is that for a new client to be in contact they have to be aware of the 
services which an IFA can offer. So, returning to the chapter diagram it is significant 
that what is missing from the identified themes is the failure to communicate those 
advantages to consumers, a fundamental of Lautenborn’s 4C’s concept. Furthermore 
we are now aware as a result of my own research, that of Ferry’s (2013) and the 
CII’s 2014 paper, “The RDR and Consumers – the public’s views towards the retail 
investment advice market” that that failure is manifested in a very real way. This 
perhaps is one of the biggest barriers and a double one, insofar that, a) it fails to be 
recognised and b) consequently is not corrected.  
A missing theme was any idea, from a product provider perspective, that they might 
be part of the problem, even though this has been expressed to me by a number of 
IFAs, particularly with regard to the one-sidedness of the relationship between the 
two. A constant theme in this chapter is that education, qualification and experience 
have a strong role to play in ushering in change and this we move to in the next 
chapter. 
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3.6 - The Future Role of Experience, Education 
and Qualification 
 
Summary of main themes discussed in this chapter 
 The nature and usefulness of experience in the financial advice and/or 
planning process 
 Qualifications - how are they perceived and how are they employed in the 
development of experience 
 Aspects of education as a developmental resource 
Introduction 
Before the implementation of the Financial Services Act 1986 discussions about 
education and qualification in the insurance industry were seen in an entirely 
different context. Local Chartered Insurance Institutes all appointed an Education 
Officer whose role it was to oversee the arrangements for students to prepare for and 
then sit the examinations of the Institute. Those examinations were largely focused 
upon insurance aspects, with only a minimal acknowledgement of what we would 
now call financial services. Furthermore, these local institutes were mainly supported 
by the plethora of insurance companies’ branch offices which occupied and provided 
employment for towns around the UK. Insurance brokers, whilst accepted as 
members of these institutes, rarely held office as local institute presidents as these 
posts were reserved for local insurance company managers. In effect local insurance 
institutes were the domain of the insurance companies, whose employees were 
encouraged to sit the examinations of the Institute with a view to ensuring that the 
companies would continue to be provided with trained and qualified staff capable of 
running their branches in the future.  
Where staff left the company to set up as brokers they left with the benefit of the 
training and education provided by their former employers and, of course, the 
prevailing cultures of those organisations. 
When insurance companies discovered the power of computers and the internet local 
branch offices began to disappear, along with local jobs and the need for those 
companies to oversee the sitting of examinations for thousands of their employees; 
those employees no longer existed in their thousands. The impact on the local 
insurance institutes was profound – no longer were they the preserve of insurance 
company branch managers, because local insurance company branch managers no 
longer existed.  Many local institutes merged and support came in the main from 
insurance brokers and increasingly from financial advisers. Requirements for an 
108 
 
education programme slipped down the priority list, probably because as self-
employed business people surviving by concentrating upon sales was more 
important.  
When as a result of the Act a minimum standard of qualification for financial 
advisers was imposed the Chartered Insurance Institute found itself with a revived 
opportunity to profit from the sale of examination preparation kits and entry fees. 
This was provided directly to candidates, as opposed to being supported through 
local institutes, thereby avoiding any necessity for the institutes to refresh an active 
role of Education Officer. Where training was and still is provided it is done through 
the aegis of regional society or chapter meetings using case study discussion and 
presentations that are said to conform to Continuous Professional Development 
requirements, denoted in either total hours attended or points accumulated, according 
to the regulatory prerequisite of the day.  
From the perspective of providing specifically for the financial services sector these 
have been very positive moves, particularly as they have been achieved at a time of 
immense structural changes within the wider sector. However, some things have not 
changed; many of those working now as financial advisers do so because their 
former insurance company employers no longer exist, but the cultures they acquired 
as members of those organisations do and that extends to a belief that experience is 
of paramount importance and qualifications are a bit of a nuisance, especially if you 
do not possess them, but are obliged to obtain them.   
A prevailing problem is that the core constituent of the financial planning and advice 
community consists of men and women who have reached middle age and beyond 
and when they commenced their careers the concept of life-long learning had not 
been formulated. They had left school at sixteen, joined their companies and settled 
down to participate in careers which would eventually lead to retirement at 60 or 65, 
dependent upon gender and gradual movement up through the promotion ladder as 
opportunity allowed. Regular retraining and the taking of examinations in middle age 
did not enter anybody’s thinking. That the survivors of this cohort have managed to 
address such enormous change says much for their robustness and survival skills, but 
whilst experience has been part of their survival mechanism it does not necessarily 
follow that it provides a pattern for those who follow.  
In a discussion paper, “Time Preferences and Criminal Behaviour,” a link between 
the level of education and the ability to be patient has been observed at least at a 
correlational level. The suggestion is that those who are better academically educated 
recognise that a reward taken early may not be as satisfying as one that is taken later 
or over a longer period of time and this is discussed later in the context of the 
independent financial planning sector, both as it exists and its potential future 
construct (Akerlund, et al. 2014).   
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What follows are some of the thoughts of financial adviser contributors  on the 
subject of experience, education and qualification, intertwined with comments and 
observations from product providers and literature sources, contained within the 
framework of the following diagram. 
 
Figure 11 - The Perceived Future Role of Experience, Education and 
Qualification 
Experience 
So what is it that exercises the minds of IFAs most when they think about individual 
competence levels within the sector? The answer is experience. Almost every IFA 
contributor had something to say on the subject, more than any other within this 
topic of discussion. 
By that are they discussing existing experience or the development of future 
experience? Are they referring to existing or future occupants of the IFA sector and 
in a context of a sales or an advice environment? Furthermore, is the term experience 
being used interchangeably with accumulated service time as opposed to the 
accumulation and marshalling of academic, professional and experiential skills? 
In essence exactly what was meant by the term “experience” was not clear and 
contributors were relatively vague as to its precise meaning. However, it did seem 
that it was viewed as being an individual, as opposed to an organisational attribute.  
In that vein an IFA qualified to the QCA Level 4 benchmark regretted that his forty 
years of experience had not been completely acknowledged by the new 
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qualifications regime of the time, setting out a detailed explanation of what he 
perceives that experience to look like, whilst not mentioning that, in the past, all 
entrants to employment, including him, started without any experience.  
“Well, unfortunately experience has gone out of the window with 
qualification – I do think that was a mistake – I think the fact that I had to do 
exactly the same number of exams and points as a new person into the 
industry seems a bit ridiculous. They could have quite easily have said, right, 
a point for every year you have been in the industry – alright they would have 
given me forty points, but that would have been only two exams – I would 
have still had to take a fair number of exams and if they could have been 
more specific in the areas that they would allow – I mean that the bizarre 
thing is that I did G60 (Advanced Financial Planning Pension Paper), got 
G60, I was then able to take a (Level 4)  RO Pensions exam as well and get 
points for that – well how daft is that? So points for the sake of points – I’d 
already got exams, but had I been given some credits for the time I’d  had in 
the industry like the ethics side of things, or the regulation side of things, 
something, I think that would have helped a lot of people along and probably 
made them more enthusiastic about taking more exams. Unfortunately, 
experience goes out the window – nobody seems to want to pay for 
experience, they want to pay for qualification – they then want to mould the 
salesman into their mould – that’s the point, So I think going forward, I think 
experience will play less of a part, because everybody’s deemed to be 
qualified – its back to that link again, that once you can call yourself a 
lawyer, qualified adviser, or whatever we’re going to be called one day then 
everybody will be deemed to have the same ability. The fact that you may 
have been doing it for 40 years or 10 years doesn’t seem to matter. I also see 
a whole wodge of graduates coming into the industry with lots of 
qualifications and no experience. I think financial planning is a lot about 
experience – very difficult to teach the perception you need to have in front of 
a client – the collecting of information they may or may not deem important, 
they way to ask the question, the way to get the answer and then the decision 
you make which may be against the client if you feel that the client’s making 
a mistake. I’ve seen a lot of stuff coming out of the bigger boys where this is 
just – there’s no perception there – there’s the qualification – what they’ve 
done is absolutely technically correct from the point that they make the 
decision to do it. Unfortunately they make the wrong decision and I then get 
the client coming in and I’m saying “do you know this is this?” and they go 
”no”; is that what you wanted – “no”. What did you want – “something 
completely different” – so there’s something gone wrong with that perception 
and I think that the old training regime that you really had in the industry, 
you really started to call on IFAs, you got a good technical grounding and 
you also got that face to face – you know trying to find your way around an 
IFA trying to get business out of an IFA was always a very tricky occupation, 
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but it did hold you in good stead, I mean a client was easy meat compared to 
that – you go and see a client and it was easy to find out from a client what 
they wanted – you just asked them and they’d tell you, whereas IFAs you 
used to ask and they didn’t tell you – they’d say none of your business or I’m 
not telling you that. So that experience is starting to go – they’re aren’t those 
trainees coming through the system – there aren’t those inspectors out there 
– they’re becoming far more technical – there’s that perception of the 
industry –that will carry on and it will be the fact that the bigger boys will be 
taking those sort of people on, arming them with full compliance, arming 
them with the full paperwork and then shoehorning the client into that 
perception. The problem is that a lot of the time the perception will be wrong, 
because they just haven’t understood where the client sits in things like risk. I 
sat with the FSA on my beautiful Treating Customers Fairly interview and 
they said to me “how do you assess your client’s risk”  and I said the same 
as I’ve always done – with a huge amount of common sense, I said it’s just 
common sense – if you ask the client can you stand to see your money go 
down – yes or no –you get an answer and that answer will be well yes I 
understand how it works in that sometimes it can be up or down and you’re 
starting to get a perception of the client as opposed to “oh no,no,no,no – I 
couldn’t stand to see it go down” You start to know exactly where your client 
sits very easily – you don’t need a twenty-page questionnaire, which always 
come out medium anyway, because they do – they always come out balanced 
– that is just a waste of time and as for this perception of this loss – can any 
client actually stand to lose any money – well the answer is no so it means 
that everybody should be in deposits, but there we go, but I think that’s where 
experience comes in - asking the client the right questions. A lot of the newly 
qualified new guys going into bigger firms with a set procedure, with a set 
way of doing things will fill out a questionnaire and that will be just to cover 
their backs, whereas if they didn’t have a questionnaire they might actually 
ask the client a few questions, but because they’ve got a sort of an out on risk 
profiling tools they will use the tool, because they sit in front of a client with 
the computer, ask the client the questions, tick the boxes – you come out as a 
number 6, this fund is a number 6, therefore you need this fund – it’s not that 
simple. So I think that is where the experience and the qualification will start 
to drift a little – there is no-one coming through the industry at the lower 
level to move up the ladder and gain that experience in front of a client. 
Because you have to be qualified to sit in front of that client it’s too late 
because you are qualified to gain that experience, because you’re too 
expensive. That’s the problem, whereas if you’re a trainee accountant or a 
solicitor you’re allowed to work on that case and pretty well just get signed 
off. You gain that experience along the way. I don’t know where our 
experience is going to come from – we’re running out of people in the age 
group – you look at people of younger than 55 in the industry – where have 
they gained their experience – there’s a few of them been out on the road, but 
112 
 
the majority of them haven’t – they’re not coming through; so I think there’s 
going to be a lot of books sold to bigger firms and when that happens you’ll 
be getting the graduates coming through – ready-made client bank but no 
experience and very little perception and a lot of people these days are being 
sold things they just shouldn’t have and that will go on because of the way 
the industry is going on that so I think it’s the experience, qualification, 
education is going to be a problem. You can have the education and 
qualification, but how do you gain the experience?” (IFA2) 
Contrast this set of opinions with those expressed by another IFA with professional 
body connections, specifically commenting on the role of experience in the sector: 
“In response to your question, do you have a view on how experience might 
be inculcated into people entering the profession, I would say that for me it 
would be apprenticeships and internships – we've got to crack that, we've got 
to find some way of making sure we are successful in building the next 
generation – getting them qualified, getting them on that route to 
qualifications. We have a structure now where people can see that they can 
walk away with an equivalent of a degree qualification, chartered and 
beyond so I think we can see a structure now – if you're a young person 
joining you can see it's not purely one dimensional. I think we're starting to 
be seen on a par with other professions because of that, because of the 
consequence of our structure. We are moving in that right direction, but I do 
think it's the experience – you need the mentoring, you need the 
apprenticeships, you need the internships, you need all of that bit which I 
think we're probably weaker on, because for us in the past it was the big 
insurance companies’ sales forces that effectively did that, but that's gone. So 
we need some way of bringing that in in a different way.” (IFA5) 
Clearly this contributor also firmly believes that experience is very important and 
suggests that apprenticeships have a significant part to play in its development. 
Notably, his was the only mention made by any contributor to this work with regard 
to the appropriateness, or otherwise of financial services apprenticeships. Does this 
reflect an attitude of aiming too low in training terms, or too high?  
The Economist, challenged such apprenticeship schemes in an article entitled , 
“Apprenticeships – Keeping up with the Schmidts” pointing out that most new 
apprenticeships in the UK are conducted at QCA Level 2, not really the stuff of 
establishing a career path aimed at achieving a full degree equivalent qualification. 
(According to the article, one in ten new English apprenticeships in 2012 were 
created at a single supermarket chain, Morrison’s, who were using the government 
subsidy of £1,500 per apprentice to put 52,000 of its staff through six-month training 
courses in operating cash tills and other basic tasks, which the paper reflected was 
hardly the technical training that government ministers had in mind)  Furthermore, 
whilst the far more tightly prescribed apprenticeship schemes of Germany are for a 
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set period of three years, requiring the apprentice to remain with the sponsor for that 
period of time, in the UK flexibility of labour movement is held to be one of the 
main reasons for the country’s ability to maintain higher employment rates than their 
competitors. Fixed term apprenticeships, argues the Economist, are inconsistent with 
that flexibility (Economist 2014).  
Whilst the first IFA had a lot to say, on the topic of experience what he was saying in 
effect was that to undertake the role of IFA effectively and to the benefit of the 
consumer it is necessary to have the necessary tools. He saw experience as being a 
major source of that, whilst the second contributor was less concerned with output, 
but more focused upon inputs, namely in the shape of apprenticeships.  
As a service sector those tools should be heavily weighted towards the acquisition 
and maintenance of knowledge and that is often best achieved, at least initially, by 
studying at an appropriate academic and technical level within a well-constructed 
and appropriate framework, which is what an examinations programme should be 
(Becker 2009). There would not appear to be any reason why an apprenticeship 
programme should not deliver some of the required outcomes, but as someone 
recently involved in the delivery of that programme I found that flaws regarding 
content were manifest, making it unfit for the purpose of addressing client needs. 
However, it may be that it is suitable for the needs of insurance companies, whose 
employees may provide the main source of numerical support for such schemes and 
whose requirements may be narrower than that of the advice sector. 
Qualifications 
What do we mean when we talk about qualification? Far from being obvious the 
word seems to have many interpretations: “Officially recognized as being trained to 
perform a particular job,” according to the Oxford English Dictionary, but what job, 
or range of jobs and to what level and does qualified also automatically mean 
authorised? 
It would seem important that we do not confuse qualification with education, which 
we discuss shortly. In the case of the financial planning and services sector any form 
of qualificational requirement did not emerge until 1988 and then only at a level 
which was claimed to be similar to “A” Level standard. The next change in 
benchmark requirements for the IFA was not set until January 2013, with the 
requirement being increased to the approximate equivalent of that achieved by a 
university undergraduate completing their first year examinations. 
The attainment of success in these benchmark examinations entitles the successful 
candidate to seek to be authorised by the relevant regulator so that they can practice. 
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The Institute of Financial Planning acts as an agent for the examining of member 
candidates to be assessed at a higher level of understanding and where successful to 
grant the title “Certified Financial Planner.” For its part the Chartered Insurance 
Institute obtained permission from the Privy Council to grant chartered status to 
candidates successfully passing a wide range of examinations testing knowledge and 
understanding across a broad swathe of financial planning needs and it is thought, at 
least anecdotally, that this will eventually become the minimum requirement for the 
profession of financial planner. Quite when, or if, this may come to fruition is not 
known.  
What has emerged, at least within the auspices of the CII, is a career path written in 
terms of an examinations structure. This begins at the junior level, with examinations 
at Level 2 and Level 3 suitable for the development of new entrants to the sector and 
in particular apprenticeship holders.  
Included in this pathway is the development of a newly recognised role of Financial 
Paraplanner, literally one who assists and supports the Financial Adviser. In this role 
those aspiring to become IFAs can develop their skills without having the 
responsibility of advising the consumer, other than in a generic sense. Because both 
the CII and IFP are beginning to focus upon this expanding area there are discussions 
regarding the development of an entirely separate, but recognised body to represent 
these individuals, who have amongst their number numerous members who hold 
chartered status and master’s degrees. Indeed not all paraplanners wish to become 
advisers, preferring to act as overseers in the process of planning and researching, 
the latter being a particular skill in itself. 
What is interesting is that paraplanning probably provides the desperately sought 
response to IFAs’ concerns regarding the development of experience now that the 
insurance companies are no longer involved in the training process, at least as far as 
the IFA community is concerned.   
So far within the sector only professional qualifications have been considered, but as 
has been alluded to in earlier chapters, there is now a school of thought which 
supports the notion that on its own professional qualifications are not enough. Their 
argument goes that professional examinations tend to promote existing ideas and 
cultures, such as couching training language in terms of sales and marketing. 
Academic learning and qualification, the argument continues, provides the 
opportunity for benefiting from double-loop learning (Argyris 2002) and avoiding 
the pitfalls of “Groupthink”  (Janis 1972) 
Educational and Communications Aspects 
What is it we mean when we talk about education; are we talking about educating 
advisers, product providers, the media, the public, consumers or clients? Educating 
115 
 
them in respect of what, exactly? One IFA thought it was about informing clients 
about the reasoning and process relating to the sale of a product and his remarks 
were clearly focusing upon that, as the next box demonstrates. 
“I sometimes look at a file when I’ve done not even a relatively complex 
thing and by the time you’ve added key features documents, illustrations and 
all the rest I could have fifty/sixty pages going to a client – well that is just 
ridiculous. I can’t think of a lawyer or accountants where I’ve fifty/sixty 
pages. An accountant with a set of accounts – you don’t get that; you don’t 
get the justification because they’re professionals – you’re paying them to do 
a job – if you had all that knowledge you wouldn’t need them so why are we 
constantly trying to educate clients in financial services – it’s pointless – they 
don’t understand it, they don’t want to understand it –they just want to come 
to you and say “just do that for me – don’t talk to me, don’t want to know – 
the number that send their reports back, saying I don’t want that” and I’m 
sitting back saying you have to have it –they just don’t want it.” (IFA2) 
In contrast, IFA4 agreed that,  
“If advisers have not got that ability to deal with simple literacy and 
numeracy and communication skills then it's going to be very difficult to get 
anywhere in any field, but I do think that that is one of our challenges.” 
(IFA4) 
It was acknowledged by several contributors that whereas insurance companies had 
been the principal providers of training in the past, this was no longer the case. 
Having said that, ideas on future sources were ignored in the main. One IFA 
questioned whether it would be the regulators or the universities, although without 
any conviction. When I asked him, “do you see a role for the professional bodies?” 
he responded, 
“Yes I’d never thought of that – there's the Personal Finance Society, the 
Chartered Insurance Institute, the Institute for Financial Services, the 
Scottish equivalent up there. Yes I'd never thought of that - they must have a 
massive role, because otherwise we are all going to leave. The CII is full of 
insurance people mainly, I would think – the PFS is full of financial people 
so if we all fall off the end and become retired members getting a reduced 
rate, no doubt, what are they going to do? So yes they must have a big, big 
part to play, otherwise where will they be. They have a big self-interest in it.” 
(IFA7) 
Even then this contributor did not refer to the responsibility of professional bodies to 
set appropriate examination syllabi as part of their central role or to provide relevant 
training courses.  
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A sixth contributor noted,  
“there's no education for negotiation training or resolution or problem-
solving or – it's all, or a lot of it's for sales and what's a pension, but there 
isn’t any soft skills so I have to go and seek that out elsewhere - it’s fairly 
crucial how you communicate with people, but yet we have no, we don't 
really have any courses, or I have to do mine through the Family Law Society 
or through people that I know can help me educate myself. So how do you 
seek out education, qualification, because it’s not necessarily about exams, is 
it?”(IFA6) 
Her comments here are about the content are partly about the relevance of what is 
included and partly about what is missing from the overall examinations and training 
syllabus. In this she has an ally in the form of a contribution from a potential 
consumer, whose comments included these remarks when referring to professional 
bodies generally, 
“The degree or diploma or whatever it is needs to have a very close 
relationship, not only with the theory of the subject, but also with the 
practical side of it. And again this is where I felt that the CIPD sometimes 
falls down that somebody who gets a member diploma or whatever it is has 
passed the diploma and really and truly the examination itself hasn’t been 
tested in those areas which are important to an organisation in that moment 
in time……so I don’t think that always they focus on the reality, because the 
people setting them for whatever reason may not be close enough to reality.” 
It may not be the same professional body which is in his sights, but the observations 
may be considered  valid with regard to the need for all learning to be relevant to 
current and future needs as opposed to simply be an extension of what has been in 
the past. This is particularly true when the situation being faced is one of survival in 
a swiftly changing world.   
Perhaps when considering the direction of communication in respect of educational 
matters feeding back to the professional bodies the need to maintain relevance could 
be paramount. A failure on their part to take note could lead to their demise, in whole 
or part and their replacement by bodies more aligned to the needs of their member 
and the wider community.  
As can be observed very little was contributed with regard to the value of academic 
qualifications generally and the financial planning sector specifically (Boud and 
Solomon, 2001). This was disappointing, but perhaps not entirely unexpected given 
the career-path backgrounds of many contributors. 
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Reflections and Observations  
A constant theme encountered throughout discussions with various contributors from 
both the product provider and adviser communities was a concern for replacing the 
ageing adviser community with younger blood. Yet the type of potential recruit to 
this sector is likely to differ markedly from the youthful entrants to the world of 
insurance companies in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Now the potential might have to be 
sourced from cohorts of young people aged 21 and beyond, who have spent three 
years or more acquiring a university degree and the broader life experience that 
university education brings with it. The present occupiers of the mantle of financial 
advisers were recruited at 16 and 17 and had a very limited experience of life and 
were comparatively less well educated, because university places were less available.  
In an article entitled “Free Exchange: The great trailblazer” (May 10th 2014) The 
Economist in reporting the death of Gary Becker, recorded that, 
“Alongside his Columbia University colleague Jacob Mincer, he developed 
the concept of human capital, that is the investments individuals make in 
their own education. Mr Becker ventured that spending on education and 
training should be thought of as an economic choice, made in anticipation of 
perceived future gains, rather than a high-minded search for cultural 
enrichment. His view gave insight into labour-market oddities. By taking into 
account the differences between general knowledge (of maths, say) and firm-
specific skills (such as knowledge of in-house software) Mr Becker could 
explain why skilled workers are less likely to change firms, or why firms are 
more likely to promote from within.” 
If Becker and Mincer were correct then these individual investors will need to be 
attracted towards particular sectors and a major motivation in their decision-making 
will be their conviction that a clear career path exists, one which will provide them 
with an appropriate return on their capital, although according to Becker, this need 
not be expressed simply in terms of monetary gain.    
But what is that career to be grounded in? Is it to continue to be product sales 
focused with success measured in terms of the value of the investments made 
through an adviser by his or her clients, or is it to follow the route suggested by the 
group of advisers interviewed who saw financial planning as the way forward and 
from which success was to be measured in broader terms, including the successful 
creation of long-term relationships (Shirazi and Mortazavi 2009) (Bloom and Van 
Reenen 2010)?  
It should be recognised that selling, whilst important, is not marketing. The 
understanding of marketing can and is now often learned through the vehicle of a 
university degree, frequently enhanced by a master’s degree and sales is only a small 
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part of that learning. However, a career in marketing does not automatically mean a 
career in financial planning; in fact it suggests nothing of the sort.  
Accounting and finance degrees, conversely, suggest that one of the career options 
could be in financial planning with its natural affinity to budgeting, taxation and 
management accounting techniques and this observation is given greater attention in 
Chapter 5. 
It seems that whilst there is general agreement that increased standards of education 
and qualification are desirable, there is little homogeneity regarding how that might 
be achieved, consistent with the ultimate aim of transforming the sector from one 
locked into a sales culture to one focused upon providing professional advice and 
guidance to fee-paying clients. 
However, the paper by Akerlund, Golsteyn, Gronqvist and Lindahl, referred to 
earlier, provides not only a sound reason for following a path of academic 
educational enhancement, but may also offer the basis of a solution to the dilemma 
facing the financial planning sector.  Their paper claims to be the first empirical 
investigation of the link between time preferences and criminal behaviour (Akerlund, 
et al 2014).  Time preferences were measured through a question where the children 
were asked to rate the extent to which they prefer $140 today over receiving $1,400 
in five years’ time. The questions were put in 1966 and over the next eighteen years 
a positive correlation was detected between those seeking immediate gratification 
and becoming involved in criminal behaviour.  
My work is not concerned specifically with criminal behaviour, but with attempting 
to understand, in part, how different types of remuneration methods could affect the 
future structure of the financial planning sector.  
Therefore, Becker and Mulligan’s seminal study of 1997, which posits that people 
can learn to be more future-oriented and which was supported by the results obtained 
in Francisco Perez-Arce’s study provides a useful guide to the concept that delayed 
gratification can be learned as a result of receiving additional levels of academic 
education (Becker and Mulligan 1997), (Perez-Arce 2011). Remunerating by 
payment of commission on sales appears to reflect an attitude leaning towards instant 
gratification, with high, but short-term payments being the goal. Building a long-
term relationship requires thinking that employs patience and the argument is that 
patience is developed through academic learning.      
If the sector is experiencing any difficulty in recruiting and retaining suitable people 
then it could be because they are seeking to recruit inappropriately qualified 
individuals, that is it is maintaining its sales ethos rooted in models of the past as 
opposed to recruiting competences capable of meeting client’s current and future 
needs, both perceived and actual.    
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The following table lists the twenty-two actual needs identified from a range of our 
own financial planning clients. Whilst it is not claimed to be a complete 
representation of all financial planning requirements it nevertheless remains a 
substantial set of requirements, with most clients needing around eight of these needs 
to be addressed. 
 
Immediate Ret. Planning Future Retirement 
Planning/Affordability 
Low-Cost Endowment issues Expenditure Planning 
Business Guidance Long Term Care  
Wills & LPA Guidance Debt Management 
Investment Advice Suitability of Trusts advice 
Tax Returns & Guidance IHT guidance 
Annual Progress Review Children’s Savings 
Tertiary Education Divorce Separation Finances 
Death  Estate management 
Misselling or misinformation  Income protection 
State Benefits Entitlement Mortgage advice 
Table 7 - Identified Client Financial Planning Needs  
 
Superficially, at least, many of those needs appear to lend themselves to the skills 
and competences available from those with an understanding of accounting and 
finance. A financial product may provide some of the answers, but certainly not all. 
A chartered financial planner should be able to recognise wherein lie all the answers, 
but probably will not, at an individual level, be able to maintain the correct  level of 
skills and current knowledge required to address them all,  whilst the opportunity to 
sell a financial product represents a lesser priority. That, as I have suggested in 
Chapter 3.1 will almost certainly require input from specialists working 
cooperatively in a firm of financial planners and their remuneration will be through 
the charging of fees. 
If there is an argument for recruiting better educated and potentially better qualified 
people into financial planning then it still leaves the issue of how to develop 
experience unanswered. The recognition of the role of paraplanning in the 
development of a training and development programme may provide some of the 
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fundamentals of that answer. It offers firms the ability to employ individuals with 
appropriate educational skills a career path in either research and financial planning 
or authorised adviser. In either event the firm benefits from a combination of earning 
fees from the researching, planning and advising activities, whilst, under current 
methods for calculating fees charged by the regulator  to authorised firms, only 
having to meet the compliance costs for each regulated adviser. This provides a 
better ratio of income to expense, whilst also building a robust internal skills 
structure.    
Notwithstanding this, experience might be accepted by many contributors as the glue 
that could bind together the professional and academic qualification achievements 
for the improvement of standards within the sector and the establishing of the 
profession, referred to in Chapter 3.5 on barriers to the development of the IFA 
sector. 
How to create such a structure is the challenge, but given that a lack of an 
appropriate professional construct is referred to, in the previous chapter, as a barrier 
to future survival, let alone development and success, taking up that challenge would 
appear to be critical.  
Whilst within the sector most organisations are prepared to recognise their own 
designations of professional achievements they are far less enthusiastic about 
recognising the qualifications accredited by a rival. The Institute of Financial 
Planning never refers to any of its members as being Chartered Financial Planners, 
an award within the gift of the Personal Finance Society. The Personal Finance 
Society and its patron the Chartered Insurance Institute ignore the title Certified 
Financial Planner which is awarded by the Institute of Financial Planning. Both 
awards signify the greater achievement and professional competence of the holders, 
who number between them more than five thousand. (The existence, far less the 
qualifications, of the Institute for Financial Services, the successor to the Institute of 
Bankers, is completely ignored by both.) 
Whilst this internecine childishness may appear to be more irritating than damaging, 
when it is applied to academic qualification it exposes itself to rather more practical 
constraints. When the PFS writes to me it attaches the designation, “AFPS” to my 
name along with the title “Chartered Financial Planner”; the IFP attaches just the 
designation “AIFP”. Both routinely ignore my MBA and rather more damagingly 
my Associate Membership of the Higher Education Academy, or AHEA depicting 
my passing abilities in the deliveries of undergraduate and post-graduate courses in 
accounting, finance and financial planning, which also incorporate techniques for 
preparing and marking examinations.  
The ignoring of academic achievement is particularly strange in a world where the 
acquisition and application of knowledge is becoming the main resource requirement 
in virtually all sectors of the economy, both in the UK and worldwide (Lyotard 1984;  
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Paton, Cameron et al. 2000). Attitudes amongst older members of the financial 
planning sector have already revealed that they believe and robustly defend the 
notion that their success is the result of hard-won experience and that academic 
achievement cannot provide a substitute (Teubner 2007). However, that hard-won 
experience has been in the field of sales, with only a belated requirement for it to 
have a relationship with technically-based advice. 
The future demands more and recognising the latent abilities which may lie behind 
academic achievement will at the very least serve to assist the aim of recruiting 
candidates into the sector who are, or can become, equipped to meet the demands of 
the future, as opposed to only acquiring the habits of the past. Put succinctly, I am 
suggesting that the new culture within the sector should contain a desire to celebrate 
academic achievement, not to deride it.  
Whilst considering cultural aspects, it was interesting to record how often financial 
planning was referred to as being part of an industry, mainly by the product 
providers, but noticeably by the older generation of IFAs who had been trained by 
insurance companies. The middle-aged IFAs were more consistent in their use of the 
word “profession” and in their aspiration to differentiate themselves from notions of 
selling and/or industry. Whether usage of the former is merely habit or an attempt to 
avoid the separation of the advice sector from the product provider sector was not 
studied. What is certain is that the term “legal industry” or “accounting industry” is 
not part of current parlance and if the financial planning sector is to develop a 
professional image dropping the word industry from its language will be vital, both 
from a mind-set and public perception perspective (PFS 2014). 
Indeed the belief that the public will accept IFAs as members of a profession simply 
by continuing to emphasise that the sector is insisting upon the achievement of ever-
higher professional qualifications could be influencing the subliminal attitude of 
consumers towards the sector. Solicitors are recognised as professionals because 
they are solicitors, not because they have passed the examinations of the Law 
Society; they do not as a body claim to be a profession because the public recognises 
that without needing to be prompted. 
When William Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, was asked when it was 
that his movement was formally accepted within the minds of the public he said that 
it was when the newspapers ceased putting parentheses around the word General 
when referring to him. The term “industry” when applied to the financial planning 
sector, is in effect the cultural parenthesis placed around it. The existence of a robust 
amalgam of academic achievement with professional qualification and well-
structured pathways towards gaining appropriate experience may well deliver the 
change that ensures that in the minds of consumers a financial planner is a member 
of a profession, without the word ever having to be used. Once this has been 
established in the consumers’ minds the willingness and confidence to discuss their 
financial planning needs with a Financial Planner, whose status is endorsed by a 
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suitably independent professional body, should be as natural as going to a solicitor 
for legal guidance.  
What those needs may be is discussed in the next chapter, which considers what 
products and services are currently offered through IFAs and what would be required 
as part of the structuring of such a new professional realm.    
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3.7 – The Expected Range of Products and/or 
Services to be offered by a Financial Planning 
Organisation 
 
Summary of the main themes discussed in this chapter 
 The relationship between an organisation’s purpose and its product or service 
range 
 The  nature and characteristics of product-focused advice 
 Non-product-related advice 
 Hybrid approaches 
 Consumer needs  
Introduction 
A definition of marketing, provided by the Chartered Institute of Marketing (CIM) 
is, 
“The management process responsible for identifying, anticipating and 
satisfying customer requirements profitably.” 
As one would expect this topic provided the basis for a plethora of claims regarding 
the service and product range provided by IFAs. Some claims exemplified a limited 
understanding of what was meant by “everything”, but at the same time expressed a 
desire to provide comprehensive advice and the broadest range of products to clients. 
By extension this desire highlighted a competence gap with regard to the ability of a 
portion of IFAs to deliver the level of service identified by others. It might be said 
that the themes in the diagram below are in sharp contrast to the very limited range 
of requirements expressed by consumers in Table 8Error! Reference source not 
found., both potential and current and considered at a later stage.  
As the diagram shows, the service range is organised into three groups, some of 
which may lend themselves to be labelled income producing on an ad valorem basis 
and some either non-remunerative or reliant upon the charging of fees to clients. 
Interestingly, despite consumers’ pronouncements on their perceived needs the range 
illustrated is, nonetheless, closer to their actual requirements than those they 
espoused. Just how close to “closer” and whether that is close enough is what the 
marketer should be discovering. Few firms of IFAs have such an animal, but the 
need remains to align service provision with actual need and, as the Chartered 
Institute of Marketing is quoted as saying at the beginning of this introduction, 
profitably. 
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Figure 12 – The Expected Range of an IFAs Products and/or Services  
Product-related Advice 
The diagram above confirms that income-generating financial products were one of 
just two frequent themes discussed during meetings with contributors, the other 
being estate and inheritance tax planning, examined later. These are products capable 
of generating income based upon either a percentage of the value of the investment 
or commission. They have been identified by contributors as including the 
following: 
1. Pension plans, annuity purchase and associated advice 
2. Investment bonds and related advice 
3. Protection policies and related advice 
4. Mortgages and equity release plans 
5. Regular savings plans 
6. Long-term care (impaired life) annuities 
7. Long-term care insurance plans. 
 
It was to this list that the phrase, “we deal with everything” was applied by some 
IFAs.  
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The fact that the box in the diagram is blocked in orange testifies to the ease and 
congruity with which this element engaged IFAs attention. There was little attention 
or reference made to non-income producing products, such as Premium Bonds and 
Cash Individual Savings Accounts. 
The complete diagram suggests that there is more to “everything” than the 
aforementioned list infers, but the list does have the advantage of identifying clearly 
how many IFAs see their function and purpose. This, they perceive, is to sell 
financial products and to do this they identify and anticipate needs which can be 
addressed from within the stable of products available to them. In turn the products 
sold will provide a remuneration, once known as commission and now reframed as 
an adviser charge, with that remuneration possibly including an element with a 
recurring nature. 
That the income streams generated could include some of a repetitive nature suggest 
that the future of the sector, if it clings to this “commission” type model will be 
secure. That is the belief of a great number of IFAs, either because their original 
training was provided by insurance companies at a time when the payment of sales 
commission was in vogue as the main form of incentive, or because they have 
received their training from IFAs from that earlier generation. The weakness will be 
exposed when, not necessarily if, the new regulator determines that they intend to 
enforce regulations which ban the payment of commission on the sale of most 
financial products. 
The longer there is a failure by IFAs to recognise what is happening in the external 
environment the more dramatic the changes will have to be in an attempt to survive 
the change; beyond a certain point commercial collapse will inevitably result. This is 
because when it fails to respond to, or even recognise, market trends it is overtaken 
by what Johnson Whittington & Scholes (2011) describe as strategic drift.  
According to them, 
Strategic drift occurs when an organisation gradually loses touch with the 
incremental changes in the business environment and only realises that it has 
lost touch when it is too far removed to be able to retrieve the situation by 
incremental change.  The result is that it tries to apply radical methods, 
which result in wilder and wilder oscillations.  Eventually a point is reached 
where a turn-around specialist is required to carry out the actions necessary 
to put the organisation back on course.  Of course a successful turn-around 
cannot be guaranteed.  
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Figure 1: The risk of strategic drift  
 
Figure 13 - Strategic Drift (with acknowledgements to Johnson, Whittington & 
Scholes 2011) 
 
In effect this translates into the need to recognise that the world is changing and to 
survive financial advisers must change too. Incrementally would be preferable, but 
dramatically if this option is not taken.  
Of course change is more challenging when the institutions to whom you have 
always looked for guidance and support, namely the product providers, do not share 
your revised purpose or goals. It was clear from contributions provided by product 
providers that they believed that IFAs existed to provide advice on financial planning 
products and investment management, although how IFAs were qualified to do the 
latter was not articulated.  
One product provider, in response to being asked what range of services he would 
expect to be offered by a financial planning organisation observed, 
“So I would say everything –so what I mean by that is there is quite a wide 
spectrum out there in terms of firms – so some will do a bit of everything 
whilst others will specialise – oh yes, we specialise in certain areas, like 
savings, investments, that kind of thing. What I mean by everything is being 
able to go into an independent financial adviser and sort out your financial 
life in one go, so looking at things like mortgages, obviously, protection and 
savings, investments – they regularly occur – so just being able to look at 
everything.”(PP2) 
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When advised that some IFAs indicated that their only product was advice, for which 
they charged a fee, he responded, 
“I suppose working for a product provider you naturally think about 
products and try and break it down. I suppose it is advice in that sense but, I 
don't know, is that IFA being a bit smart though?”   
Prudence suggests that future guidance and direction ought to be sourced from 
elsewhere, perhaps from the IFAs’ professional bodies, but to what extent is it in the 
interest of some of those bodies to challenge the perceptions of providers, when 
significant financial contributions from product providers underpin their own 
survivals? 
Non- product related Advice 
 
Leaving that issue aside for the present the themes diagram then moves on to 
consideration of non-product related advice, which is significantly different from the 
service referred to in the previous section. It differs because it does not involve the 
sale of a product and it does not therefore benefit from the receipt of a commission 
for its delivery. Nevertheless, many IFA contributors avowed that it was an area of 
great importance in terms of providing the holistic service they felt their clients 
deserved.  
By studying that diagram you will observe that the services identified within this 
theme relate to issues which usually generate at the very least frustration, (cash-flow 
forecasting for example,) or considerable emotional stress, such as debt management 
or divorce. Ironing out the financial aspects is often complex, requiring inter-
personal abilities not taught within the financial planning courses, as one IFA has 
previously observed in Chapter 3.6. The service also requires an ability to articulate 
pathways to solutions, including delivering them in written form to provide clients 
with a reference to which they can refer in times of future uncertainty. To do this for 
a client without charging a fee suggests a level of altruism bordering on participation 
in a hobby. Bearing in mind what the CIM said about meeting client requirements, 
but profitably, a fee must be charged, not least because for the client to receive 
continuing support the IFA has to remain in business over the longer term. How to 
do it and, once the method has been agreed, when to implement the necessary 
structural changes is the challenge. Remember, procrastination is the thief of time 
(Young 1866) and it is also a major contributor to strategic drift.  
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Non-product and Product-related Advice – the Hybrid Service 
 
Many IFA contributors did not make a distinction between services which were 
solely product-based and those which were not and you may think that for a body of 
people describing themselves as independent-financial-advisers and/or planners that 
would be natural. Up to the point where the Retail Distribution Review was 
introduced in January 2013 discussions over the range of service to be provided by 
IFAs were muted, but when they did occur they reflected attitudes recorded in this 
work. That is many IFAs believed that they were doing good work in addressing 
consumers’ needs where they involved the purchase or investment in a financial 
product and that the advice provided by the IFA was broadly satisfactory insofar as it 
made clear how the product served a particular need and what its main 
characteristics were. 
Since the introduction of RDR more animated conversations have been taking place 
suggesting that it no longer remains necessary for financial advisers to remain 
independent and that they should and can be allowed to describe the advice they 
provide as “restricted”. In essence those so describing themselves will be able to 
limit their advice and product range in such a way as to exclude certain areas of 
financial planning and relationships with many product providers. The question is 
how does this best serve the interests of the consumer when for them seeking the 
guidance of an IFA, providing independent advice in the sense that it is free from 
outside influence (as defined in Chapter 3.1) and solely concerned with benefiting 
that client, should be motivated by the knowledge and confidence that that IFA has 
the experience, education and qualification to consider their needs in the widest 
setting. Going to a restricted advice financial consultant would surely undermine that 
confidence and cannot be interpreted as a basis for the long-term survival of the 
independent financial planning sector. 
What the new status of restricted adviser does do is provide a home for financial 
advisers of the old school, happy to continue on the basis of selling products, but 
also happy to avoid additional workloads associated with the maintaining of the 
“independent” label, such as conforming to the demands of a strict continuous 
professional development regime. There is a whiff of the tail wagging the dog in this, 
a suggestion that disruption of a distribution channel seen as key by product 
providers should be avoided, regardless of the espoused claim that the Retail 
Distribution Review is in the interests of consumers.  
What are those interests and how are they to be met then? It has already been noted 
that consumers interests fall into two distinct categories, namely those that they 
recognise and those that they do not. In Chapter 3.6 the main advice areas provided 
to private clients were tabulated, twenty-two in all. In an analysis of the reasons why 
clients first made contact with our firm 76% of them mentioned having no more than 
two needs to address, whereas the reality was that nearly the same proportion had 
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seven areas which actually required attention. The most frequently espoused and 
required needs were as follows: 
 
Table 8 - Analysis of Consumers' Financial Planning Wants 
 
Of the nine listed services most frequently identified by the adviser as requiring 
attention all may require the provision of an income-generating financial product, but 
none definitely does. All may be safely described as financial planning issues and 
therefore to be included as part of the brief of a suitably qualified IFA, but many, 
although not all, would fall outside of the range of services provided by a restricted 
adviser. The most desired service recorded in our own research was the Annual 
Progress Review Meeting and this was substantiated by research undertaken for the 
FCA (NMG Research, 2015).  
Given the frequency of the first two services appearing in the table above it is 
comforting to see that under the group theme “Product and non-product related 
advice” the area receiving frequent commentary from IFAs (and highlighted in 
orange) lay within the realm of the Grim Reaper, with half of those IFAs 
contributing mentioning the need to include consideration of wills, lasting powers of 
attorney and inheritance tax mitigation planning.  
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These products and services are integral ingredients in the provision of 
comprehensive financial planning and analysis, because they can involve not only 
advice and guidance in respect of the subject area, but also, if the client is following 
the advice, the purchase of products either through the IFA or, importantly direct 
from the product provider, along with meetings with a solicitor. Significantly, this 
group of services is also high on the list of actions taken by clients who have met 
with their IFA and followed their guidance. 
Contrast these activities with comments from a product provider, who said, 
 
“Then you’ve got that decumulation phase, which is either income drawdown 
products, or annuity products, or combinations of them both, or whatever 
you’ve got. So I think all of that, is by definition, any adviser firm, which is 
worth its salt will have to offer accomplished services in all of those areas. 
The extent to which long-term care would be in it, though, is I think that’s a 
fair challenge-I doubt that would be a core part of most adviser firms’ at the 
moment. I think a lot of them are thinking about it in terms of there's an 
opportunity there. If we could - but I just don't know whether there's enough 
clarity around and there's a huge risk involved and there is a brand risk 
involved as well with getting involved with essentially elderly people and 
their life savings. There might be a big prize there if you get it right, but 
there's a lot of things to be careful about, I suspect.” (PP1) 
The message here appears to be avoid providing advice to anyone capable of being 
described as elderly, which when a major source of business for insurance 
companies is annuity provision and investments and a major source of that business, 
by definition in the case of the former, is the elderly, is plainly  contradictory. 
Furthermore, given that the table shows that approximately half of all clients want 
advice on long-term care it does suggest that product providers, whilst being a part 
of the IFAs’ supply chain, should only be considered in that light in respect of 
products and should cease to be seen as a source of untainted information and 
knowledge. The table also confirms that almost all clients want regular reviews of 
their financial planning arrangements when given the opportunity, which by 
definition has to be comprehensive.    
Another IFA provides below, his interpretation of comprehensive financial planning 
– readers may wish to compare and contrast this with the earlier phrase, “we do 
everything.” 
 
“Our preferred offering is our comprehensive financial plan, which clearly 
states that it’s a process where we'll look at all aspects of the client’s 
financial circumstances in relation to their objectives and help them to 
develop strategies that would use their resources most effectively to meet 
their objectives. 
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So the services would be - they include mortgages which we don't do so we 
refer out- so they include estate planning, where we’ll develop strategies for 
estate planning, but the actual documentation is handled by a solicitor. 
They'll include tax planning strategies, where again, we'll develop strategies, 
but the actual implementation might be handled by a tax specialist or an 
accountant or a solicitor. They will include the investment strategies, which 
are broadly around retirement planning, school fees planning and shorter-
term savings strategies and they will include protection, which is the death, 
disability, critical illness and long-term care and again, long-term care 
really falls into the investment strategies now because there is no long-term 
care product other than immediate care annuity or deferred care annuity to 
deal with that. 
So they’re the type of product features that we get involved with - some 
directly, some by acting as gatekeepers, if you like. We’ll sit within the circle 
with the client, find out with them what they need and then  refer them to a 
provider, whether that be a lawyer, accountant, some other firm of tax 
specialists, a PMI specialist, discretionary fund manager, if our internal 
investment offering is not appropriate for whatever reason.” (IFA3) 
 
Clearly the range of services which this IFA’s firm offers, is consistent with the 
result of our own survey on client needs, encompassing a more thorough and 
comprehensive service than that implied by the service focused upon financial 
product sourcing and supply and the two product providers’ expressed perceptions of 
the IFA’s role. 
This general theme of advice and product sourcing also reminds the IFA of the 
reality that advice and research is time-consuming and worthy of financial reward, as 
is the case with the provision of guidance in respect of non-product advice. It is also 
a further reminder that an appropriate remuneration model has to be designed and 
applied. 
Reflections and Observations 
 
The essence of this topic lies in recognising that it seeks feedback on the expectation 
regarding the range of products and/or services that an IFA would offer. A 
comparison is then made with the reality of what the satisfaction of clients’ products 
and service needs actually requires.  
What emerged from this element of research was that generational gaps drove some 
of the attitudes in determining what should be offered by the IFAs expressing an 
opinion and that where the IFAs had received their original training from insurance 
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companies, usually before the 1988 introduction of the Financial Services Act (1986) 
the belief was that the service would be product focused, with remuneration taking 
the form of “ad valorem”. This form was previously known as commission, but has 
now donned the mantle of “adviser charge.”  The insurance companies’ contributors 
were still wedded to that notion, although there was some acknowledgment that IFAs 
did do more than simply distribute the financial products of the providers. 
Thus this group effectively confirmed that they functioned as part of the providers’ 
distribution channel, despite the denials recorded in Chapter 3.2  
Younger, that is, middle-aged IFA contributors were far more aware of the need to 
offer a wider service and in the main had gained the qualifications, both professional 
and academic, to support that ambition. However, they suffer from two gaps in their 
knowledge, which are: 
1. What is it that clients want and 
2. As a lot of the service required is non-product based how are the advisers to 
be remunerated in a fashion that will ensure their long-term survival? 
The first question is the one that dogged David Ferry in his attempt to complete his 
master’s degree, seeking to address similar issues, without success. 
Because the Financial Conduct Authority appears to be giving greater consideration 
to ensuring that fee-charging is accompanied by clear justification answering both of 
these questions is becoming increasingly urgent. An analysis of our own files 
provided an answer to the first question. This confirmed that most clients, upon 
approaching an IFA with a requirement have little idea of the service that is on offer 
and about the same level of understanding of what their real financial planning needs 
are. Hence the lack of result for Ferry; if as a client or consumer you do not know 
your need you can hardly articulate it to another party. 
Information of this kind should also encourage product providers to think about the 
suitability of their product range for providing solutions to some of these needs. 
The answer to the second question can be found in Chapter 4, although not applying 
its suggestions, or that of a suitable alternative, will lead unerringly down the path of 
strategic drift and possible oblivion (see Figure 13). 
An early decision to implement the required changes will bring with it the 
advantages of a better informed client bank, building upon the confidence which 
already exists, hopefully, between adviser and client. The establishment of a fee-
based profession built upon a platform of not just confidence, but transparency and 
integrity will serve not only the aims of survival, but the continuing development 
and success of the sector.  However, as with the development of any profession, the 
foundations will rest in the competence of its members and the integrity with which 
they undertake their duties and that will require more than simply adhering to a set of 
ethical rules assembled by a professional body, as the following chapter suggests.   
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3.8 – Opinions on how Integrity should shape 
the Financial Planning Process 
 
Summary of the main themes discussed in this chapter 
 Integrity in practice  
 Issues of ethics and trust in the building or undermining of integrity 
 Professional codes of ethics 
 Conflicts of interest 
Introduction 
What do we mean when we talk about integrity and what does the dictionary say it 
means. Taking the question in reverse order the Compact Oxford English Dictionary 
describes integrity as,  
“The quality of being honest and having strong moral principles.” 
The Institute of Financial Planning’s Code of Ethics was succinct and unequivocal in 
its description stating, 
“Members may be placed in positions of trust and confidence. The ultimate 
source of the public’s trust is the member’s personal integrity. Integrity 
demands honesty and candour which must not be subordinated to the 
member’s personal advantage. Within the characteristic of integrity, 
allowance can be made for innocent error and legitimate difference of 
opinion, but integrity cannot co-exist with deceit or subordination of one’s 
principles. Integrity requires members to use their best endeavours to 
observe not only the letter but the spirit of this Code.”  
 
Note the difference, namely that the dictionary expresses an interpretation for 
integrity, whilst the IFP offers a view on ethics.  
Is this a deliberate entangling of the two terms, or simply an unnecessary 
interchangeability? 
According to Harry Frankfurt’s account of integrity (Frankfurt 1988), in his paper 
“Identification and Wholeheartedness” one of its properties is self-integration 
wherein a fully integrated person identifies with certain desires and volitions and that 
these are motivated by principles, values and beliefs. Identifying with and holding to 
these principles, values and beliefs characterises a person of integrity.    
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However, Lynne McFall in her paper “Integrity” suggests that what is equally 
important is that integrity must have moral content, 
“It may be thought that (only) internal coherence is required for integrity, so 
there is no contradiction in speaking of the integrity of an Iago or a 
Machiavelli. On the other hand it seems odd to speak of a loss of integrity in 
the failure to lie, scheme, murder or, in general, the failure to be ruthless. 
But if internal coherence were sufficient for integrity, internal incoherence 
would be the only way it could be lost”(McFall 1987) 
A view that integrity is closely associated with personal identity is proffered by 
Bernard Williams advancing the idea that we can only retain our integrity and hence 
our personal identity if we remain loyal to a sense of ourselves and that sometimes 
ethical theory can serve to undermine this; in other words he alludes to Pinocchio’s 
metamorphosed conscience in the form of Jiminy Cricket (Williams 1973) .  
So far these views of what integrity might imply have been expressed as personal 
virtues, that it is inward-looking. Cheshire Calhoun has insisted that integrity should 
be seen as a social virtue. He has argued that it involves “standing for something” in 
a community of co-legislators, even when this might court unpopularity. 
“It is a matter of taking a stand for, and before, all deliberators who share 
the goal of determining what is worth doing.” (Calhoun 1995)   
Support for this perspective is provided in the following extract, 
This picture of an agent as a member of a “community of co-legislators” is 
also likely to capture part of what is particularly valuable about integrity to 
organisations and to professions. People of integrity will try to change 
organisational behaviour and culture even when doing so makes them 
personally unpopular (Baxter, Megone et al. 2012) 
In an article in the Financial Times it was suggested that, 
“The recent banking crisis could have been avoided if more bank employees 
had been able to see their actions in a wider context. The article claims that 
it is essential to restate and affirm the social purpose of financial institutions 
as well as affirming the personal vocation of those who work in the 
industry.” (Agius 2010) 
Whilst definitions of integrity, rather like definitions for strategy, are various and 
numerous the underlying theme is that it contains an ethos and that in most 
explanations this is built around and upon frameworks of morals and ethics, that it is 
both ethereal in nature and recognisable in practice. Possessing it at a business level 
is a non-tangible asset which does not appear in any balance sheet, but is invaluable; 
once lost it cannot be repurchased. 
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Although it is a recognisable and valuable asset this topic provided participating 
contributors to this work with the most difficulty from a conceptual standpoint. 
Bearing in mind that they had all been provided with the list of topics to be included 
in the discussion ahead of the meeting it was surprising that little consideration had 
been given to this one. Nevertheless, opinions emerged from and during the 
conversations which have been grouped as either representing integrity in practice or 
the underpinning ethics and these are illustrated in the diagram below.
 
 
Figure 14 - Integrity's place in the shaping of the Financial Planning Process 
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Ethics 
 
With the definitions of integrity in mind we can now move to consideration of IFAs’ 
thoughts and ideas on the concept, commencing with the theme which drew the most 
attention, ethics. From the diagram it is clear that emergent thoughts and ideas could 
generally be divided between philosophical and professional ethics. In fact not one 
IFA made any direct reference to the former, but one IFA did offer this observation: 
 
“I think the problem that we have with ethics is that we are so tightly 
regulated now that if the regulator allows it it's classed as ethical and I think 
that's dangerous, very dangerous because we're being told that as long as 
this paperwork is in place, as long as you do this, as long as this is a suitable 
solution, you can charge what you damn well like - I think that's wrong. I 
think there’s a price for the job.” (IFA2) 
 
There is some evidence to support the part of this observation that alludes to 
regulators allowing particular activities. The PFS Code of Conduct specifically states 
that whereas advisers must act in the best interests of clients, where a conflict of 
interest arises they should refuse to act “save where acting in these circumstances is 
expressly permitted by the regulator.” (Paragraph 3.8 of the Code of Conduct) This 
may, and probably will, be perceived as offering opportunities for acting contrary to 
the spirit of the code where convenience dictates and interpretation allows within 
organisations prepared to live on the edge. 
Generally, however, when we think of the ethical standards employed in business we 
consider issues such as is a person being paid a fair wage for the work he or she 
does, are goods being sold of a quality that the consumer expects, are the contract 
terms just, are the business arrangements to the benefit of all concerned or do they 
contain fundamental injustices, what are the firm’s obligations to their employees 
and what are the employees’ obligations to their employer. 
As an example, another IFA commented upon,  
“The situation now where many advisers are considered to be self-employed 
- I find that difficult on a number of bases - one of them is, is it a way of 
avoiding the payment of National Insurance and if it is, where’s the moral 
imperative of that organisation that is purporting to deliver an ethical service 
to clients when it is at the very least undermining those individuals advisers’ 
entitlements to an enhanced state pension?”(IFA3) 
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Another was much more exercised by the notion that in an effort to raise the ethical 
behaviour of advisers they should be examined on their understanding of a course set 
by a professional body. Her thoughts are contained in the following: 
 
“People who have integrity assume it and then it's a given and when you 
start saying well how and they get very affronted when you start having a 
discussion about levels of integrity – it's questioning – if you're a trustworthy 
policeman, then the fact that somebody questions whether you're a 
trustworthy policeman could be a matter to be affronted by. 
On the other hand you might say, well actually there have been quite a few 
people who have not had clients at the heart of their behaviour, who had not 
done the right thing, they’ve put their own gain, usually financial before 
anything else. They've played with other people's money, I was going to say, 
as if it's their own, but I don't think they have – I don’t think they would have 
played with it in the same way if it was.  
The struggle I had with this sort of compulsory study of ethics was that there 
is a body of people who are already in this business and then we’re all 
supposed to sit down and do Level 4 chapter thingy of the CII book on ethics 
and I know that some people say Christ it’s obvious isn't it, but it's clearly not 
that obvious. Otherwise some people wouldn't get it so cosmically wrong, so 
it isn't entirely obvious. It might be natural to an individual, but it's not 
natural universally but if people haven't got it I don't think you can sit down 
in a room and do a case study and make people have it.”  
I think to me that was part of the conflict about trying to do it with an existing 
set of people and either you accept that everybody in that room - the 24,000 
advisers all gathered in that one room, are all ethical in which case this is all 
a bit of a paper exercise just to say that we're doing it, or we accept that 
there are some people of that 24,000 who are not, but if they aren’t, if they 
haven't got it how can I make them see that, especially now as a long in the 
tooth seasoned adviser who's been doing that for donkeys years - if he really 
doesn’t see what's wrong with it and hasn't done for the last 40 years me 
sitting here simply telling him about it, it seems to me that I’m unlikely to 
change his mind because it's a mind-set, it's not a set of rules. It would be 
obvious to somebody with ethics and integrity to not sell somebody 
something, or to not to do it just to get the target, or to not do it because your 
sales manager’s on at you, or to whistleblow, but if it's not obvious to people 
to do that then me sitting there saying well here's a case that's a really good 
idea isn't actually going to make you – it might actually challenge you but it’s 
what's in your heart - I don't think is just going to change because I put it in a 
course note for you.” (IFA4) 
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That ethical standards should be at the heart of the business relationship between 
adviser and client is recognised here, because the business so often involves the 
application, protection or acquisition of client funds. How it is to be achieved whilst 
incorporating the complete avoidance of a conflict of interest is the challenge so 
often side-stepped, either inadvertently or deliberately. 
Consider the codes of four different types of professional bodies as recorded in the 
following table: 
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Table 9 - Professional Bodies' Codes of Ethics in Respect of Conflicts of Interest 
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The code of ethics adopted by the accountancy profession deals head-on with the 
issue of conflict of interest, making it a major part of its courses on ethics by 
providing copious examples of its manifestation and how to address it. Such ethical 
codes should assist in focusing upon the definition of integrity that it contains the 
quality of being honest and having strong moral principles. They are after all 
essentially extensions of John Stuart Mill’s Rule-based Utilitarianism and as such 
should not contain insurmountable obstructions. (Mill 2007) Professional 
accountants and lawyers do of course, start from a position of charging fees for the 
work they do, thereby clearing one of the main obstacles on the road to conflict of 
interest avoidance.  
That no-one offered comment on philosophical ethics, or cited such thinkers as 
Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham or Karl Marx might suggest that 
the ethics courses provided by the professional bodies to enhance the understanding 
of their members either omitted or failed to emphasise the importance of their 
contribution to the subject. 
Integrity in Practice 
When discussing the practical aspects of integrity it is often easy to overlook the fact 
that in business there are always at least two parties to the transaction. One of those 
is the consumer, frequently portrayed, by groups such as the Consumers Association, 
as the perpetual victim. That it is frequently overlooked was emphasised by the fact 
that only one IFA recognised the phenomenon of consumers making false or very 
doubtful claims for compensation in a variety of scenarios. She commented, 
 “We also have a compensation bandwagon issue I think – you only have to 
look at the Payment Protection Insurance claims, and low-endowment 
policies mis-selling, it’ll be contracting out of SERPS will be the next one.  
Divorce Lifeline who are trying – whether you agree with them or not – are 
trying to persuade people that maybe their pensions during their divorce 
process has been undervalued so come and see us and we'll get more money 
for you, completely undermining the court order, potentially, but in some 
cases possibly doing it and arguably a good job, but in the wrong way, going 
about it in completely the wrong way in my view. So integrity is not just down 
to the adviser it's down to the client as well. So if you've got somebody for 
example who you’ve been, you’ve really had a good working relationship 
with and then they decide, oh well I could put in a claim against you – oh this 
bloke rang up and said you could claim some money on that endowment that 
you sold me, not that I did, but you know, and so I’m just putting a claim in, 
all right? They have no idea of the impact of that on the adviser and you say 
– well hang on a minute, do you realise you're putting in a claim against me. 
“Yeh, yeh, but it’s not against you – it just like I get a bit of money,” but 
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actually it's the integrity of the client as well as the integrity of the adviser 
that is important. It's an issue of ethics – it works both ways.”(IFA6) 
 
Whilst little by way of themes emerged from the financial planning sector 
concerning the ethics of product providers, other than an IFA’s robust comment on 
the relationship existing between client, provider and adviser and the providers’ 
willingness to seek to deal directly with the consumer, ignoring the client/principal 
relationship with the IFA, it is important. This issue arises in part because of the 
commercial advantage being sought by the provider by ignoring the client/adviser 
relationship and also because the provider may be selling a product which is 
inappropriate in the particular circumstances and which only the client’s adviser is 
properly placed to understand.  
The issues to which this adviser refers are not isolated incidents; the trade press 
frequently carries letters from irate IFAs who have become aware of direct 
approaches being made to their clients by insurance companies that have been 
introduced by the IFA to that client. Insurance companies deal in the production and 
distribution of financial products, but they do not deal in financial planning and it is 
in this respect that IFAs feel their clients can be disadvantaged. Activities of this 
nature undermine the relationship between the adviser and provider and question the 
integrity of the latter. 
There is a suggestion that integrity might be a function of trust, that is in the form of 
promises kept or broken, with one contributor suggesting that it was all about 
honesty. Much of the content of the contributions reflected the view that integrity 
itself was shaped by a highly prescribed and costly process. Indeed as most recent 
regulators have taken the view that regulation is now principles-based as opposed to 
being strictly prescribed there was now difficulty in interpreting some of the 
intention.  
So it was interesting that where the idea of integrity was understood it was felt that it 
was guided by rules rather than it being a culture in which any or all of the actors 
should be performing including not just financial advisers, but product providers and 
consumers. Notwithstanding this, it became clear that in many cases the contribution 
was about the perception of trust rather than integrity.   
The existence of some form of prescription, or a framework covering integrity was 
not referred to by any of the provider contributors, despite each one of them being 
prompted by reference to the PFS and IFP Codes of Conduct.    
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Advisers’ Integrity in Practice 
Those who work do so in part to ensure that they earn sufficient income to meet the 
demands of their lives. That represents the “what”, but not the how. In the part of the 
financial services in which advisers work the tradition has been to create income by 
selling the products of insurance companies and fund managers.  
Remuneration has been provided, in the main, in the form of commission based upon 
a percentage of value and the rate of compensation has been set by the product 
provider, often, it appeared, agreed by them formally or informally in cartel style 
with their competitors.  
These salesmen or women, but mainly men were originally either directly employed 
by the product providers or acted as their self-employed agents, either for one 
company or multiple suppliers.  The more they sold the more they earned and before 
1988, when the Financial Services Act 1986 came into force, the practices employed 
to achieve sales volume were almost unrestricted. Caveat emptor was the cry, as 
though that covered everything. 
The aforementioned Act required these salespeople to re-identify themselves as 
either being directly employed by the providers, self-employed but restricted to 
selling the products of one supplier or independent. Twenty-seven years later we 
have a situation where the direct sales forces have all but disappeared in a cloud of 
mis-selling fines and compensation payments, to leave an environment of selling 
direct, but without advice, via the media or distributing products through financial 
advisers having unrestricted access to products or being limited to a narrower range. 
As a reminder, payment of commission by providers to advisers on the sale of their 
products is now banned, except in the cases of protection policies and group pension 
schemes. However, advisers primarily apply an ad valorem adviser charge in respect 
of the acquiring of products on behalf of clients, typically of 3% of the initial fund 
value and between 0.5% and 1% of its continuing value thereafter.  
In Chapter 3.3, when adviser fees were being considered, I referred to the way in 
which the adviser charges are collected and how that mirrors the way in which 
commission was once paid, that is via the provider. Given that the investor is not 
obliged to write a separate cheque for this “fee” at least one IFA contributor believed 
that this could be seen as sleight of hand and therefore unethical. 
“If I see a bird that walks like a duck and swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, I 
call that bird a duck” (Riley, Alfons et al. 2009).  Some might argue that the same 
principle could be applied to the adviser charge and that the incentive to continue 
selling products remains at the heart of the financial advice process. Indeed, so 
concerned is the current regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority, that it has 
already conducted a survey of firms to ascertain whether they are compliant in the 
charging of fees and found the majority, 73%, wonting (Thematic Review TR14/6 
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Supervising retail investment firms: being clear about adviser charges and services – 
April 2014). A subsequent survey, TR14/21, observed an improvement in these 
results, but noted continuing issues of concern in respect of process. 
Why the concern? Well, if the main source of your income derives from the sale of 
products, with different types of product offering different levels of reward it might 
appear to some that which product is recommended could be subject to a bias 
towards the most remunerative.  Any incentive to sell is prone to giving birth to a 
conflict of interest between what is best for the client and what is best for the 
adviser, as the next section seeks to demonstrate. 
The Ethics Test 
An example for consideration was provided to various IFAs, and indeed product 
providers as will be clear later. It involved a couple approaching an IFA for advice 
on how to invest the sum of £60,000, recently inherited. The couple advised that they 
did not want to take any risks with this money as it was really all they had. With the 
absence of Index-linked National Savings Certificates continuing it was suggested to 
the IFAs that Premium Bonds would fit the requirement, because they are Treasury 
Stock, guaranteed to be repaid virtually on demand, offer tax-free returns which are 
statistically robust, although not certain and carry only the risk of a loss of value 
through inflation; a low risk investment for a low-risk couple. They do not generate 
commission or an adviser charge to the introducer.  
Responses reflected the way in which each IFA charged their clients. In the case of 
those being paid their fees by cheque, they felt that by charging a fee they were able 
to concentrate upon their clients’ needs, as opposed to their own, which would be 
covered by their fee. However, an IFA using the ad valorem approach argued that it 
was unlikely that investors would want to commit all of the £60,000 into Premium 
Bonds, without offering a shred of evidence in support of this or offering alternatives 
which met their fundamental investment risk profiles. 
Another rather more nuanced observation is recorded in Chapter 3.3 concerning the 
characteristics of fees, but repeated below for ease of reference: 
To what extent then do I think commissions and fees are relevant to the 
potential for suitable advice for a low or no-risk profile client? 
I think they have a bearing, because if you're the adviser and you're sitting 
down and advising the client and your recommendation is that they invest in 
cash, Premium Bonds, National Savings and they do no insurance-related 
products that's fine and the client should be engaging you for your advice. In 
the past your relationship was I wouldn't charge you for the advice, I 
charged you on the transaction, but if the transaction doesn't remunerate in 
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anyway then clearly there is an issue because the adviser’s not going to earn 
any money.  
So I think the key to that situation is if you don't remunerate the adviser, you 
know it may be mandated by their advisory firm to recommend cash, 
recommend National Savings, but ultimately if there’s no income generated 
for the firm that adviser will not will not stay if there's no income coming in. 
So really if you're the client you need impartiality, therefore you need to be 
paying for the advice.  
The problem for the client is historically it’s not – it’s never been talked 
about paying for the advice or they’ve not wanted to pay for the advice – 
they’ve wanted it on the transaction, so what’s that’s led to is a whole chunk 
of solutions never being recommended. I find it difficult to believe that 
anyone in an advisory firm who never sells anything or has any income 
coming in for the firm will stay in that firm  - either they will go or the firm 
will get rid of them. So clearly it has to have a bias if you're not charging for 
your advice. For me the key is, we’ll charge for the advice. (IFA5) 
 
This contributor couched his response in terms of a firm of numerous advisers and 
drew in points about the firm’s methods for producing income, whilst retaining 
advisers. Scale it seems to him has a bearing on whether integrity is present (Baxter, 
Megone et al. 2012). The word integrity, it is believed, is an absolute term; it is not 
possible to have a small amount of integrity or a comparative level of integrity – it is 
either there or it is not, or so it is argued. 
Product providers’ responses to this Premium Bond scenario included only one that 
acknowledged that there could be a conflict of interest for the adviser, but in the 
main they did not appear to understand the presence of a conflict of interest, before 
having it drawn to their attention. Having been so prompted and provided with an 
example, one contributor said that the scenario was unlikely because sums of 
between £30,000 and £60,000 were too small for an adviser to be considering and 
another suggested that where non-commission-creating products enquirers kept 
calling at your office they should be sent away as they were not the type of client 
that you should be seeking as a financial adviser.  
Despite considerable prompting, not one contributor recognised that by charging fees 
for time and activity that conflict of interest could be avoided.    
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“My Word is my Bond,” isn’t it? 
As a final set of observations on the issue of integrity and its place in the world of 
financial services consider the offering from this financial adviser: 
 
“In the old days across stockbroking, of course, before financial planning 
was even a glimmer in the eye of the regulator, stockbroking and banking 
services were conducted on the basis of “my word is my bond”.  
Banking in particular seems to have lost that completely, so integrity has 
many connotations really; it can be “I’ll be transparent about my fees” or it 
can be “if you ask me to advise you on an area and I am not competent to 
advise you in that area then I will tell you and I will advise you that I know 
somebody else who is competent to advise you.” 
In an ideal world integrity should form the core of the financial planning 
offering and the related offerings. I think that big corporates have lost their 
way - banking has lost its way - will it come back - don't know.  
In terms of how do you monitor it and how do you manage it in a small 
organisation - it is easier to instil a culture of integrity, of fiduciary 
responsibility if you're walking the factory floor with your people - I think as 
you get further and further divorced from that, it becomes more difficult to do 
so - not impossible. That's one of the challenges around scalability - I think 
one of the biggest barriers is that the culture within retail financial services 
has for so long been - if we ignore the product providers - I started out with 
direct sales - the culture was sales, sales, sales, sales and a blind eye was 
turned to churning, or if not turned at certain levels of management it was, it 
was absolutely encouraged and I think in the direct sales force, does that still 
go on - as I said earlier, you'd be hard pushed to prove that it does, but 
something is not right in the state of Denmark - there would be a lot of 
financial advisers out there who wouldn't know integrity if it bit them in the 
backside. 
So the reality is that there is a lot of work to be done at the fundamental 
cultural level to demonstrate integrity - you’ve got to build the fences - I’ve 
often said when people talk about regulation, I don't enjoy working in fear of 
the regulator, but as an industry we get the regulation that we deserve.” 
(IFA3) 
Is this commentator looking back to a truly golden age, or is it more a case of rose-
tinted glasses with time papering over the cracks. Does it matter, when it is the future 
to which we should be looking, both in terms of survival and development? What 
may have worked in the past may or may not in the future and certainly his remarks 
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on the chicanery which accompanied the activities of some product salesmen should 
provide guidance on where that future should not be planning to go.   
Transparency Issues 
The overall aim of the latest legislation and guidance is to put the consumer in a 
position of having total clarity with regard to the service being offered and the fees 
being charged for that service. Therefore, if competence deficits are addressed, as 
raising the qualifications standards would suggest is happening and the mysteries of 
how fees are being charged is coming under the closer scrutiny of the regulator, then 
what remains is for the cultural log to be  removed from the conflict-of-interest jam. 
This will require changes to firms large and small, (although as suggested by 
numerous contributors, in different ways) but the outcome should be that the 
consumer will be provided with total transparency. They in turn will need to exhibit 
a willingness to pay for the services, of course, as integrity of the client would 
presuppose.    
Of course, in a world where there is absolute integrity these actions would not be 
required because the impediments would not be there in the first place. 
Reflection and Observations 
Few things in life are more frustrating than setting a topic, inviting a number of 
individuals to discuss it and then finding that they will do anything but that. The 
discussion on “integrity as a shaper of the financial planning process” was ultimately 
shape-less. Participants offered their thoughts upon the ethics of providers, or 
advisers and occasionally consumers. Any discussion of ethics was wrapped in a 
cloak of professional and business ethics, without any reference to the philosophical 
ethics upon which our society and that of most others has developed its thin veneer 
of civilisation. To maintain the pretence that they were keeping to the matter in hand 
an occasional mention of the word trust was made, but this seemed to take us further 
from providing an identity for integrity and was not remotely connected with how it 
might shape the future process of financial planning.  
From all of this it has to be assumed that the governing corpus of the financial 
services sector gives very little guidance on what it expects in terms of integrity or 
where it might be found in sufficient quantities to ensure the future security of the 
financial planning element of that sector.  
At a retail level financial planning ought to be the public and respected face of the 
sector, but over the past few decades hardly an opportunity has been missed to 
undermine the prospect of that image being acquired, let alone maintained. Product 
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providers have joined forces with the major retail outfits to sell whatever financial 
plans they have designed for the purpose of enhancing their profits, regardless of 
whether or not they were suitable for the purposes of the consumer. The result has 
been a series of large-scale reviews and investigations into alleged mis-selling, 
slavishly recorded by a media hungry for news and very willing to forget their part in 
it. Some chickens have come home to roost, forcing insurance companies to relieve 
themselves of the tiresome business of running their own sales forces and thereby 
avoiding future fines and compensation claims arising from the provision of 
unsuitable advice. The retail banks, having suffered one catastrophic investigation 
after another and being forced to set aside billions of pounds for compensation for 
payment to their misled customers are reassessing their relationship with the 
financial planning sector, with many closing their financial advice teams, whilst 
licking their wounds.  
Whilst selling is not a sin, and indeed without it most commerce would collapse, the 
methods employed within the financial services sector have come close to it on 
occasion. Forty years ago insurance companies sold savings plans, often linked with 
life cover, or simply life assurance on its own. It was sold to all levels of society 
allowing all to benefit to a greater or lesser degree. Banks then bought building 
societies and with it the opportunity to sell “low-cost” endowment polices 
“guaranteed”, they claimed, to repay the mortgages the banks were arranging and 
show a surplus as well. The profits rolled in and bank broadened their ambitions, 
moving in to the selling of pensions, transferring final salary pension funds into 
personal pension schemes, selling precipice investment bonds and payment 
protection plans to cover loan repayments in the event of illness. Every one of these 
very profitable ventures has led to banks being found culpable of mass mis-selling 
and required to lose all of that supposed profit and more to satisfy the regulators’ 
fines and customers’ compensation claims.  
There was a time, some fifty years ago, when a bank manager was to be considered a 
pillar of his community and of impeccable integrity. Contrast that with the general 
public’s view of “bankers” today. Greed, of an individual and corporate nature, has 
exhausted all of that respect and taken with it an entire sector.  
If the Institute of Bankers professional examinations had been more demanding in 
terms of ensuring that their members were conversant with the technicalities of 
financial services then that enhanced knowledge might have gone some way towards 
avoiding the catastrophe (Agius 2010). The same observation applies to the 
examinations of the Chartered Insurance Institute whose own examinations menu 
included very few relating to investments, pension and life assurance when the 
Financial Services Act came into being in 1988. Again had members had been better 
informed disasters might have been avoided.  
Now many years later we find ourselves in a situation where all financial advisers 
are qualified to a standard unrecognised so long ago, with many holding higher 
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degrees, yet having to work in an environment whose public image borders on 
contempt. Furthermore, the supply model with which they work, both in terms of 
financial products required and knowledge provision is hardly fit for the purpose of 
supporting a modern consumer and a regulator beginning to come to terms with the 
reality of what is wrong, if not quite having determined how it might be corrected. 
Having had long discussions with so many contributors I am convinced that many, 
both of the old school and the newly evolving one, have at heart the best interests of 
their clients and an intuitive sense of integrity, however interpreted. They are 
restricted in their desire to break free of this chrysalis of ambition by a failure to be 
encouraged to embrace the one tool which will allow them their wish, the 
introduction to their clients of fees based upon cost and activity. Surely the 
knowledge for this should have been provided many years ago by their professional 
bodies, or why else would these bodies exist. 
The problem is that the main professional body is one set up more than a century ago 
to represent those selling insurance products and naturally enough calls itself The 
Chartered Insurance Institute (CII). The mantra of the insurance industry is “caveat 
emptor,” or let the buyer beware. Legally that warning has served the insurance 
industry well during a time when the UK was and remains a leading provider 
throughout the world. However, financial services is not insurance per se. Financial 
planning almost certainly includes insurance protection, but that is not the main 
purpose, simply a component. So we must ask is the CII, through its surrogate the 
Personal Finance Society, the correct organisation to provide professional support 
and guidance to financial advisers, or indeed is it in a position to be impartial enough 
to fulfil that role.  
A quick look at its accounts demonstrate that its survival rests upon the receipt of 
large donations from interested parties, thought to be insurance companies and one 
must assume that as commercial enterprises they are not making such  payments out 
of a sense of altruism, but with an eye to influencing proceedings. Given that the CII 
is a body representing insurance interests, although not the only one, this does not 
seem unreasonable. However, when it comes to financial planning any undue 
influence from product providers, whose products only form part of the planning 
process, might be considered at best unnecessary and at worst perhaps unwarranted.  
However, it would be fair to observe that how the CII arrived at a point where they 
thought themselves obliged to set up a wholly-owned subsidiary, now known as the 
Personal Finance Society must be seen as entirely logical. Not to do so would have 
left the way open to other examinations-setting competitors such as the Institute of 
Bankers, who indeed renamed themselves the Institute of Financial Services.  
Can the same remarks apply to Institute of Financial Planning? Well, not exactly 
because it was set up with the primary aim of representing financial advisers and 
specifically to encourage them with the introduction of the fees concept. The fees 
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they appear to encourage, however, bear a striking resemblance to ad valorem, as 
they call it, which as I have already said look like commissions by another name. 
How can it be that a body with such high aims appears to have rowed back? A look 
at their accounts for 2011 and 2012 shows that without generous donations from 
third parties amounting to around half their income they would not survive (House 
2014). Indeed some five years ago their accounts showed a negative working capital 
figure, which for a limited company is not only disastrous, but without some form of 
robust guarantee of continuing support would legally lead to its winding-up.  
All of these professional bodies appear to take on more than they can manage 
financially and site themselves in areas which they cannot resource unaided. 
Whatever the reason for their reliance upon outside funding it is a well-known fact 
the there is no such thing as a free lunch and the frustration of IFAs in finding 
themselves without appropriate representation in areas which really matter should be 
unsurprising. That this matters is confirmed in a paper entitled, “Testing theories of 
American politics: elites, interest groups and average citizens” and expanded upon 
in Chapter 4 (Gilens and Page 2014).  
There is very little point in producing papers on “trust” as the CII did, when the issue 
is integrity. Trust can be used by a confidence trickster, but integrity is something 
which they do not have time to build. 
It is time which lies at the heart of assisting with the change of culture necessary to 
change and sustain the growth of the financial planning sector. A failure to move 
away from the quick sale, high earnings accompanied by little or no long-term 
service model will ensure that the business using it will emulate its underlying ethos, 
namely a short term existence. Businesses interested in the longer term future of their 
clients will find that their clients are interested in the longer term existence of their 
advisers and pay accordingly. Both parties act in their mutual interest and as a result 
benefit from the financial long-term rewards which they both desired at the out-set, 
but not as the first requirement of their relationship. 
The following diagram highlights the critical points in determining what sort of 
financial planning business will emerge from the pathways followed. 
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Figure 15 - The Roles of Ethics and Integrity in the Creation of Sustainable Financial 
Planning Practices 
 
This diagram determines that there are two critical issues, namely, 
1. the requirement to embrace not just professional ethics as provided by 
professional bodies but also the natural ethical guidance provided by 
philosophers such as Kant; 
2. Placing the interest of clients above those of your own and thereby having 
identified the potential for conflict of interest, avoiding it. 
In adopting these two principles not only will a long-term relationship develop with 
clients, but so will that with the firm’s employees whose focus will now be on client 
needs and the fees they generate, not product sales targets and the need to achieve 
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them to survive. As a consequence the firm’s capabilities will be strengthened by the 
development of working relationships built upon trust and respect, not self-
preservation and with staff becoming confident about their long-term future the 
firm’s future will also be more certain. 
In other words the existence or absence of integrity can and does shape the financial 
planning process and in so doing shapes its future, so to return to the duck analogy 
surely the time has arrived when playing ducks and drakes in financial planning 
should cease. 
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Section 4 – Destinations Past Present & Future 
Chapter 4 – From Broker to Adviser: An 
Overview of Contextual and Operational 
Developments in the Sector. 
 
Summary of the Main Themes discussed in this Chapter 
 Early Forms of Regulation Oversight 
 Categories of consumers and intermediaries and their wants and needs 
 
From broker to adviser, from salesman to professional guide – has this happened and 
if not how is it to happen and why. Up until the mid-1980s the role of the insurance 
broker, life or general, was not in question. The firms operated at a local level, knew 
and often lived amongst their retail customers and survived by being remunerated 
through a system of commissions paid upon the sales or resales that it generated on 
behalf of a stable of insurance companies. These stables were structured through a 
variety of agency agreements between the brokers and the insurance companies. 
Companies either sought to distribute a narrow or general range of insurance 
products. Some specialised, perhaps focusing upon just motor or the slightly wider 
personal lines insurance. Composite insurers sought to provide insurance products 
across the widest horizon, incorporating personal lines, commercial, marine, liability, 
life assurance, savings and investments. Some even offered long-term loans 
including mortgages.   
Have we moved on and if so have we done this in a number of steps or one; 
furthermore has every organisation moved or just some and if the latter will the 
remainder be able or willing to do so? 
The first of two events that altered the context within which these organisations seek 
to operate was the implementation of the Financial Services Act 1986. It contained a 
requirement to designate the type of broker and thereby created different classes with 
different legal responsibilities. Furthermore it determined that caveat emptor in 
financial services was no longer accepted as being sufficient. Life and Pensions 
Brokers had to decide between becoming tied to promoting and selling the products 
of one company, or describing themselves as Independent meaning that they were 
free to promote and sell the products of a wider range of product producers, 
assuming that the brokers adopting this stance could arrange agency agreements with 
those individual suppliers.  
The independent determination also confirmed the existing legal responsibility under 
common law of accepting that brokers, or independent financial advisers as they had 
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begun to style themselves, were acting upon behalf of their clients (note not 
customers) and as such had to place clients’ interests at the heart of their advice, 
whilst still retaining the right to receive commissions from the product providers as 
confirmed in Hobbins v Royal Skandia Life Assurance and Clearwater International 
(HCCL 2012). Indeed the Act spawned the term “best advice” with this requirement 
in mind. 
All of this was an early attempt at introducing transparency to the sector through 
awareness of the supposed motivations of the intermediary with whom the consumer 
was dealing.  
Early Forms of Regulation Oversight 
The first attempt to introduce a set of regulations to oversee the functioning of the 
financial services sector appears, with hindsight, to have reflected the various vested 
interests of the sector’s players. The overall approach was set in the context of self-
regulation with each sub-sector granted the powers to regulate through a Self-
Regulating Organisation, or SRO. As a result five SROs emerged, each constructing 
complex rule-books containing prescriptive directions on what a member 
organisation should and should not do. Failure to comply with the letter of the rule 
could result in severe penalties. The press was quick to decry the notion that self-
regulation was in the interests of the consumer and sought to undermine it from the 
start. (It has since undergone an almost Damascene conversion when faced with its 
own shortcomings) The reality was that the advisers’ SRO, the Financial 
Intermediaries and Brokers Regulatory Authority or FIMBRA, went about its 
business with an almost messianic enthusiasm, inculcating fear as well as enforcing 
some much-needed changes (Hamp 1994).  
Early evidence of the intention to impose upon these newly authorised advisers 
compensation costs for pre-legislation activities emerged almost immediately when 
it was agreed to include in the newly constructed compensation scheme the costs of a 
scam operated under the name of Barlow Clowes (Lever 1992). Retrospective action 
often leads to uncertainty being spawned in a sector and so it was in this case 
(Sampford, Louise et al. 2006). Firms that were entirely unconnected with this fraud, 
the vast majority, found themselves obliged to pay towards the compensation offered 
to gullible and/or greedy investors without any real justification being offered for 
this financial imposition (Lever 1992).  
A major shaper was both a child of the Big Bang effect of The Financial Services 
Act 1986 and the unintended consequences of the quest for a deregulated financial 
services market to which it gave birth. Activities undertaken in the financial advice 
sector within the framework and spirit of the legislation were subsequently re-
described as being unsuitable and unacceptable. Further retrospective compensation 
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payments were demanded, this time on a monumental scale, following the Pensions 
Review, referred to in Chapter 3.5. By that time it was decided that SROs were 
unable to demonstrate to the press that they were capable of regulating their 
members in an appropriate manner, although evidence to support this was scarce 
(High and Shah 1993).  
SROs were replaced by The Financial Services Authority, who decided that a more 
efficient and effective way to better regulatory oversight was the principles-based 
model (Black, Hoper et al. 2007). Commissions remained the normal way to 
compensate advisers, including the retail banks that had become the major customers 
of product providers as a result of the second direction-changing event, the Building 
Societies Act 1986.  
This act empowered the management of building societies in the UK to transfer 
ownership of the societies from members to shareholders. In doing so they stripped 
away the protection that the societies enjoyed from the predatory ambitions of their 
bigger potential competitors in the mortgage market by making acquisition relatively 
simple through the mechanism of the stock market. The commercial banks seized the 
opportunity and within a relatively short space of time most building societies in the 
UK had disappeared from the financial landscape (Cook, Deakin et al. 2002). The 
banks then sought to sell financial products such as low-cost endowment policies, 
payment protection plans and life assurance alongside mortgages, much of which led 
to catastrophic outcomes for them and their customers in later years. 
The lighter touch of the more widely stretched single regulatory authority enabled 
independent financial advisers the scope to continue to provide a service to their 
clients, based upon suitability, advice and regulated product sales. The banks’ ability 
to do the same was often questioned and a succession of investigations by both press 
and regulator revealed that mis-selling of products had been undertaken by them on a 
massive scale (Rawlings, Georgosouli et al. 2014). To add to the calamity for the 
FSA and their overseas opposite number, the USA’s Securities and Exchange 
Commission, their failure to properly oversee the activities of the investment banks 
catapulted the world into a financial meltdown.  
A replacement authority was clearly required and in 2013 The Financial Conduct 
Authority was born. By then most parties had agreed that the core driver of the 
financial collapses of bank and other institutions was greed. Greed was the motivator 
and commission-based sales of financial products the instruments for satisfying that 
greed, or so it was thought (Visser 2011). As a result both the outgoing regulator, the 
FSA, and the incoming regulator the FCA decided that the payment of commission 
for the selling or providing of financial products, with a few exceptions, was to be 
banned. That came to pass with effect from 1
st
 January 2013, although the definition 
for a commission was not made clear by them. In Chapter 3.4 such a definition is 
provided, although not to the regulator’s particular advantage. 
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From a position where just brokers and company salesman inhabited the financial 
services sector we now have four different types of intermediary, some with 
evolutionary geneses being detectable; some old survivors, some new species and 
some possibly facing extinction. The Service-Focus Quadrant serves to identify who 
and what they are and how each type addresses the different demand requirements of 
particular consumer categories.  
The Service-Focus Quadrant 
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Figure 16 - The Service-Focus Quadrant 
The Crocodile Type - Sales and Execution only 
So was there a need for the intermediary/broker sector to change? Well, yes and no. 
A changing environment in the form of statutory regulation appeared to lead to the 
disappearance of the broker, in the sense of facilitating the interfacing of a provider 
with a consumer, until its re-emergence in recent years with the introduction of the 
concept of execution-only business.  
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With execution-only business the customer determines a requirement and gives 
instructions to the broker to execute it. Apart from ensuring that the source of funds 
does not breach, or appear to breach the money laundering regulations, the broker’s 
only duty is to arrange the purchase of the financial product and charge a 
commission for the work undertaken. Under no circumstances must advice be 
provided to the customer and it is this rule that makes execution-only business 
attractive to very few financial services intermediaries.  However, where it does 
prevail little has changed from the days of pre-1986, although those working within 
this narrow sector will certainly have developed a greater knowledge and 
understanding of their product range. 
This group of organisations mirrors the ability of some species to survive within a 
generally changing landscape, which offers much smaller niche environments that 
remain capable of sustaining their unadapted lifestyles. It is the crocodile state, 
identified in the Broker to Adviser Progression Table, shown below, that survivor of 
the ancient form of life manifested by the dinosaurs who in general could not adapt 
to the rapidly altered environment.  
In the Broker to Adviser Progression Table this group of Sales & Execution Only 
firms is identified as serving Customer Wants, without guidance on the suitability of 
the product. In terms of its ability to transition into a fees-only advice-providing 
organisation it is the sector least capable of doing so; conversely it is the sector that 
is most able to avoid the need to change, since its role is protected by the existing 
legislation covering the restriction on the payment of commissions to their form of 
product facilitation. Like the crocodile it is a hardy beast with a tenacious 
determination to survive by protecting its territory wherever it can. 
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 Customers Clients 
 Wants only Wants/Needs Wants/Needs Wants/Needs 
Category of 
Provider 
No Advice 
Brokers 
Limited Advice 
Brokers 
Limited Advice 
Financial 
Planners 
Holistic Advice 
Financial 
Planners 
Development 
Level  
1. Crocodile 
Types 
2.Amphibian 
Types 
3.Simian Types 4.Homo Sapiens 
Types 
Organisation
al Focus 
Short-term 
Sales targets 
Short-term Sales 
targets 
Sales & longer-
term 
relationships 
Short-term & 
long-term 
sustainability 
Organisation
al structure 
Fundamentally 
sales teams; 
can be single 
or limited 
person 
structures 
Generally sales 
teams arranged 
on a larger scale 
Single or limited 
person 
structures 
including 
paraplanner & 
administrators 
Coordinated 
multi-skills 
organisations 
Charging 
structure 
Commissions Adviser charge 
& commissions 
Adviser charge, 
simple fee & 
commissions  
Activity based 
fees 
Intermediary 
role 
Source 
financial 
product on 
customers’ 
instructions 
Address want, 
suggest need  & 
provide suitable 
product  
Address want, 
identify need & 
provide 
solutions 
Address want, 
identify need & 
advise on 
required tactics 
& strategy  
Perceived 
barriers 
Ban on any 
form of advice 
resulting in a 
lack of advice 
competence 
Poor quality 
compliance 
oversight. 
Short-term 
management 
techniques 
Qualifications 
thresholds 
Regulation costs 
Lack of 
confidence & 
methodology for 
transitioning to 
fees-based 
practices 
Regulation costs. 
Lack of suitably 
qualified staff. 
Absence of  
suitable 
professional 
representation 
Experience, 
Education & 
Qualification 
requirement 
Basic 
qualification & 
limited 
experience 
Basic 
qualification & 
limited 
experience 
Professional 
qualifications & 
broad 
experience in 
financial 
services 
Professional & 
advanced 
academic 
qualifications & 
broad experience 
of financial 
planning 
Product & 
Service Range 
Financial 
products 
Financial 
products with 
suitability 
advice 
Financial & 
allied products + 
advice & limited 
planning 
guidance 
Holistic financial 
planning 
guidance & 
product sourcing 
Integrity Not evident Aim to meet 
professional 
bodies’ ethics 
standards & 
build trust 
Utilitarian-based 
ethics used to 
develop long-
term perception 
of integrity 
Categorical 
imperative ethics 
used to develop 
long-term 
perception of 
integrity 
Table 10 - Broker to Adviser Progression Paths 
 
The protection of that environment is often supported through the deft promotion of 
self-interest of insurance companies and fund managers through the use of financial 
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support for professional bodies such as the Chartered Insurance Institute and the 
Institute of Financial Planning, to which I have referred in Chapter 3.8. This allows 
them to acquire representation, either by direct membership of governing bodies or 
in the form of providing training courses which emphasise the importance of 
financial products and their distribution to consumers. Insurance companies are also 
adept at employing the services of lobbyists, recognising the importance of needing 
to attempt to influence legislators, both current and potential, in the field of financial 
services.  
The existence of such activity is confirmed in a paper produced by Money 
Marketing, entitled “Who is pulling the financial services policy strings?” 
(21/8/2014), which shows the Association of British Insurers meeting with UK 
Government Departments and the Financial Conduct Authority on thirty-three 
occasions in a twelve-month period. Banks, including the British Bankers 
Association, arranged 147 such meetings, all within the last year.  The only 
professional body making similar efforts was the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales with 26 meetings. Representation of the views and aims of 
financial advisers through any of their professional bodies did not appear.  
Does this matter? According to a paper which appears in the autumn  2014 edition of 
Perspectives on Politics titled “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, 
Interest Groups and Average Citizens”, it does (Gilens and Page 2014). This 
suggests that not only do ordinary citizens not have uniquely substantial power over 
policy decisions: they have little or no independent influence on policy at all. 
However, those with the biggest influence are the economic elites, (defined as those 
in the top 10% by earning power) and interest groups representing business. 
Conversely, the research concludes, “mass-based” interest groups such as trade 
unions have little or no impact. The Institute of Financial Planning certainly has 
common characteristics of a mass-based interest group, whilst its competitor for the 
affections of IFAs, the Personal Finance Society exists only as a subsidiary of the 
Chartered Insurance Institute, which has amongst members of its controlling board 
representatives of the aforementioned insurance companies.    
Whilst the influence of special interest groups cannot be seen as being automatically 
negative, since they bring to the table of the legislators their expertise and 
perspective on the potential outcomes of following particular directions, the 
possibility that such influence will also provide fertile ground for a continuation of a 
self-interest which conflicts with the aims of the proposed legislation continues to 
exist. In other words it fails to avoid a conflict with the interests of other less well 
represented, but no less important groups. Again this raises the question of the 
quality of independent representation for the group of IFAs intent upon developing 
fees-based practices. 
A major manifestation of this political choreographing is the espoused determination 
of the Financial Conduct Authority to eradicate the payment of commission from the 
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functioning of the retail financial services sector with the reality that insurance 
companies have replaced the term commission with the nomenclature Adviser 
Charge. Their defence is that the adviser charge has to be agreed with the consumer 
before it is paid to the adviser. As already commented upon in Chapters 3.3 on the 
characteristics of fees and 3.4 on the features of commissions in a financial planning 
context, these charges have identical characteristics to commissions and have now 
spawned ongoing adviser charges to add to the burden placed upon the performance 
of the financial product.  
So whilst the Crocodile intermediary continues to earn commission on sales of 
financial products, the technically described financial advisers of all types have to 
resort to other terminologies, but not necessarily different methods. 
Finally, before concentrating on the characteristics of the Amphibian type of adviser 
it might be worth reflecting upon how deceptively similar, from a distance, the 
outline of a newt appears to a crocodile. 
Amphibian Types - Financial Advisers 
When life-forms developed an ability to live in water and on land, the amphibians, 
they did so and continue so to do by living around the margins of their former 
environment. The manoeuvring over the terminology applied to incentive payments, 
commission to adviser charge, has allowed those formerly in the “crocodile” 
category to mutate into amphibians. They continue to operate close to their former 
environment of selling financial products to customers, but justify their imposition of 
an adviser charge by providing product suitability guidance, as they are required to 
do under statute  (Alcock 2000).  
Retail banks have occupied this landscape for many years, but have now discovered 
that their drive for sales has carried with it the risk that their “advisers” had failed to 
provide accurate justification for the sales that they had promoted. Compensation 
payments, together with massive fines imposed by a very frustrated regulator, have 
served to wipe out profits for later years and forced those banks to consider whether 
they should continue to operate in that area of financial services sector at all and if so 
whether the employment of sales targets was an appropriate tool.  
Conversely, according to a report from the Economist Intelligence Unit (A Crisis of 
Culture – valuing ethics and knowledge in financial services 2013) more than forty 
years ago Handelsbanken decided that the setting of sales targets for its branches was 
inappropriate and left the efficient, effective and profitable management of each 
branch in the hands of its local management. Its only concern is that its return on 
equity is above the annual average of its peers and where it is each employee 
receives a share of the profit. However, this is only payable at the age of 60, thereby 
removing the damaging aspects of short-term incentivised remuneration. This bank 
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has beaten its Return on Equity target in each of the last forty-one years thereby 
providing encouragement for the notion that short-termism is not the route to 
sustained rewards (Wilson 2013). 
Rather more recently the wisdom of Handelsbanken was supported by the actions of 
UBS, a Swiss international bank. Their recovery from the disasters of 2008, referred 
to later, embraced a wider reassessment of its wealth management mandate and led 
to wealth managers and even their retail staff being retrained to focus upon advisory 
services rather than selling products (A Crisis of Culture, Economist Intelligence 
Unit 2013).  
How successful were UBS in turning their business around from the disaster of 2008 
when they suffered losses of US$17 billion? Those events were seen as a wake-up 
call and they vowed to redefine their wealth management structures to ensure that 
their various divisions would, in  future, work together for its clients’ benefits, rather 
than operate in separate silos. (These silos included wealth and asset management, 
retail banking and investment banking). In July 2013 UBS had not only returned to 
profit but had also become the world’s biggest wealth manager (Broom 2013). 
With these amphibian types withdrawing from the distribution channel a massive 
problem emerges for the insurance companies. Not only were vast tranches of 
products sold through banks now being treated as never having been sold at all, but a 
major source of future sales was disappearing. It should be remembered that 
insurance companies measure their performance partly by recording their new 
business volumes over short time-spans, not the level of business previously sold and 
remaining under their management. The churning of products, that is encashing or 
cancelling an existing policy/investment and replacing it with a new one, generally at 
a cost to the customer, favours businesses measuring their success rate by the levels 
of new business achieved and ignoring the maxim that whilst turnover is vanity, 
profit is sanity.  
At the other end of the spectrum a fees-only financial planner can measure success 
on the basis of total fees earned from the provision of advice and the major 
transparent source of those fees will be from existing clients. As a result 
organisations in the former category can be subject to a conflict of interest between 
their own aims and the preferences of their customers.   
Amphibians are naturally under constant threat. If they attempt to return to their 
former environment they will come under aggressive attack from the natural 
survivors of that realm. However, they are not equipped to survive in the margins 
they currently occupy and as a consequence their numbers continue to decline 
(Clinch 2013). Hence, perhaps, the regulators concern that some Amphibian types 
attempt to pass themselves off as crocodiles when the selling of a product without 
advice on its suitability is convenient, using the camouflage of a “bamboo curtain” 
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between the two separate activities undertaken within the same organisation 
(Abrego, 2014).  
Simians and the Independent Financial Adviser standing up for Clients 
Interests 
As amphibians evolved in the natural world  some began to recognise that to enhance 
the likelihood of their flourishing in the future they must expand upon the range of 
skills and environmental engagement and the earlier they did so the greater the 
chance that their species had of thriving.   
When we speak of a child reaching adulthood we often refer to their being able to 
stand on their own two feet. To reach this level of independence and remain equal to 
the challenges that lie ahead it is necessary to acquire some basic skills and 
knowledge, which they do at an early stage in their existence. For those determined 
to be more successful and  useful to the society in which they live, as opposed to 
simply surviving, a recognition that continuously developing their skills and adding 
to their knowledge banks not only assists in meeting those aims, but also separates 
them from the crowd.   
For the financial adviser wishing to flourish in the world of personal finance a 
recognition that working in the service sector requires more than simply doing what 
they do well is required. Identifying and then determining how to satisfy the 
requirements of consumers in a targeted sector of the market at a profit is necessary. 
D H Maister’s Second Law of Satisfaction states that satisfaction is the process of 
meeting or exceeding the expectations of a client/customer. Thus we reach a point 
where meeting that client’s want will satisfy them, but addressing some of their 
previously unidentified needs will demonstrate the advantages of discussing 
financial planning needs with an organisation that is not simply focused upon 
making a sale to their short-term advantage, but has at its heart the client’s longer-
term interests (Maister 1984; Dickson, Ford et al. 2005).  
Maister’s Second Law does not suggest that every need has to be addressed 
immediately or at all, but it does emphasise the need to ensure that the sale of a 
product is made on the basis of it being consistent with the needs of both the buyer 
and the seller. In theory, at least, this should ensure that conflicts of interest are 
avoided. Independent Financial Advisers categorised as operating in this way can do 
so only after acquiring professional qualifications at an advanced level whereby they 
have an in-depth understanding of the wider technical spectrum of financial planning 
coupled with a practical application of the professional ethics standards set by their 
professional body.   
Because of the innate contradiction of placing clients’ needs first with being a party 
to more than one primary agency agreement, this group of IFAs would find it almost 
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impossible to function as part of a financial services network organisation. The 
contradiction is often a consequence of the network being the body directly 
authorised by the regulator and the adviser firm and their employees being granted 
an appointed representative of the network status. This makes the network the 
gatekeeper to the future maintenance of authorisation to practice and the holder of 
considerable power over its member firms with regard to the setting of rules and 
minimum standards of activity required to continue to retain membership. In other 
words the member firms lose overall control of their operations and the fulfilment of 
their purpose to serve their clients appropriately (Carney, 2011). That is not to say 
that the outsourcing of certain needs, such as compliance guidance, to third party 
specialists should inhibit the ability to place a primacy of focus upon the legal 
requirement to act appropriately upon behalf of a client. Therefore, a decision 
regarding whether to become part of a financial services network is one of critical 
strategic importance and not simply a “make or buy” assessment (Welch and Nayak 
1992) 
Training and continuous professional development requirements can have a critical 
influence upon the way in which organisations operate, because within the process of 
disseminating practical information for employment within the practice cultural 
influences can also be interwoven. Insurance companies have long recognised this 
and seized the opportunity to be considered the primary source of such training. 
Their success in inculcating an ethos of maintaining a focus upon product sales has 
been underpinned by their willingness to spend large sums of money training and 
updating financial advisers, who are supposedly entirely independent and therefore 
separate from them. Insurance companies are profit-making entities and allocating 
substantial funds for this purpose must therefore have a considerable self-interest as 
opposed to altruistic motive, as one would expect. 
This is why it is important that IFAs wishing to develop and maintain a level of 
independence should have a balanced programme for training and development 
demonstrating a greater reliance upon the services of their professional and 
educational bodies. It is why those professional bodies need to ensure that they are 
much less reliant upon funding from insurance companies and far more focused upon 
the needs of clients, as revealed in Chapter 3.8. This could lead to them taking a very 
close look at their professional ethics standards with a view to dealing with the 
glaring avoidance of addressing the conflict of interest issue emanating from a focus 
on selling products that provide commission income, or adviser charges in the 
revised parlance.  
As things stand it is more than possible to meet the professional standards set by the 
professional bodies, and still have a conflict of interest issue, as demonstrated by the 
Premium Bond test referred to in Chapter 3.8. The difficulty is that where sources of 
income rely upon product sale a failure to make that sale can ultimately translate into 
commercial failure. It is one that can only be overcome by transitioning to an 
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operational method which ignores product sales and relies upon advice with fees 
reflecting the cost of providing that advice. Identifying that cost is, therefore, vital. 
A weakness for IFAs operating within this “Simian” grouping is that whilst they will 
invariably seek to act in the client’s best interests, it does not always work in reverse. 
Sometimes this is a matter of woolly disorganised thinking by the client or potential 
client, but sometimes there are moral issues whereby individuals attempt to acquire 
technical guidance and advice without ever having to pay for it. This has always 
been a weakness of the sales-based remuneration model and is responsible for two 
unintended consequences. The first is that a great deal of work can be undertaken 
without reward so the adviser becomes alerted to the need to employ more forceful 
selling techniques in an attempt to avoid this. The second is that the pressure to meet 
targets that will assist the organisation to survive is increased where time has 
effectively been wasted on non-remunerative activity and that pressure converts into 
a greater emphasis on making a “sale” to the next consumer, which may not be as 
appropriate as following higher ethical standards would require.  
To avoid and overcome the drawbacks underpinning this type of sales-remunerated 
model a method of agreeing at the outset of the relationship between adviser and 
client as being rooted in paying for the advice and its underlying associated 
processes is required, which is where the final stage in the Broker to Adviser 
Progression Paths Table takes us. 
Homo Sapiens Types and the Wisdom of Financial Planning for a Fee 
The evolution or transition of IFA firms to cost and activity-based fee charging 
independent financial planning can be followed by considering the attributes, aims 
and constraints of the previous class of IFAs and comparing these with improving 
the range of services for clients whilst at the same time overcoming any constraints 
which might impinge upon that relationship.  
This is to a great extent a matter of competence and will; for the IFA wishing to 
provide a client-focused service inclusive of providing remunerating financial 
products accompanied by a high standard of technical advice the level of competence 
within the organisation must be supported by higher professional qualifications 
which cover not just an understanding of the wider range of products, regulated and 
non-regulated, but are supported by a management structure that is framed by a 
formal medium-term plan. It will almost certainly be an organisation employing a 
number of advisers who will each have particular specialisms to run alongside the 
basic financial advice requirements, referred to in Chapter 3.5. Continuous training 
will also be a core feature of that plan, not an inconvenient obstacle to be tackled as a 
minimum requirement to maintain authorisation.   
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However, if clients require a more sophisticated form of service the firm will need to 
have at its disposal, in addition to all of the above, competences that have been 
gained outwith the sector, because sophisticated holistic financial planning requires 
the recognition of the broader context and recognising context is an art form most 
developed in academic, not professional circles (Rumelt, et al 1994) 
From a client’s perspective what is important is that their investments are suited to 
the continuous fulfilment of their financial plan and that their financial plan is 
constructed in such a way that it can succeed within a volatile future. Selling a 
product to meet a particular current need, perhaps within a period of a rising stock-
market may not, therefore be suitable within a context of, for example, a looming 
UK general election, Scottish independence ambitions, or potential open warfare in 
an area critical to economic stability such as Saudi Arabia (Dyson, 2004).Very little 
of this need for attention to political and economic factors is addressed within 
professional qualification curricula, whereas its importance is very high when 
attempting to create a balanced and flexible plan suited to a client’s risk profile, 
wants and needs.  
The additional attributes needed to meet these additional levels of practising 
competence will of necessity involve acquiring an academic understanding of these 
techniques, almost certainly at master’s level for management and certainly not 
below bachelor’s degree level. In that respect I refer in Chapter 3.5 to Smith’s 
argument for an increasing presence amongst IFAs of high academic achievements 
as a way to ensure a great deal more lateral thinking being imported into the sector 
(Smith, 2014).  
There is however, a further change that is required to the fabric of the organisations’ 
processes and ethos and that relates to the ethical standards employed to drive 
forward the attainment of the firm’s stated purpose. At present sets of professional 
ethical standards are set by the various financial services professional bodies. The 
weakness in these standards is that they manifestly avoid addressing the issue of 
conflict of interest, possibly because they recognise that to do so would conflict with 
the providers’ needs to sell financial products and providers protect their own 
interest by establishing either a direct or indirect influence over those bodies. 
The recognition that the avoidance of such conflicts requires single-minded 
concentration upon the employment of Kant’s categorical imperative is high-minded, 
but in practical terms, and certainly in terms of the three previous classes of advisers, 
likely to be costly in terms of short-term profitability.  However, if the client is to be 
the focus and the highest ethical standards employed to drive that focus then a model 
for achieving this to the advantage of both client and adviser is required for the long-
term. It is combination of the employment of the highest ethical standards with the 
practical requirements of a business seeking to develop a long-term future that is the 
challenge; the demonstration of employing business ethics as a rational choice as 
opposed to a marketing ploy (Hooker, 2011).  
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Therefore, because such levels of support for clients’ needs must come at a cost and 
to avoid the organisation becoming little more than a hobby in times of economic 
distress, that cost must be recovered from those benefiting most from its delivery, the 
client.  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Theodore Levitt made it clear that an organisation should only make what it could 
sell, not attempt to sell what it could make simply because that was all it could make 
(Levitt, 1960). This observation lies at the heart of the progression contained within 
the Broker to Adviser Table. But can it make what is needed and if it cannot what 
other options remain? 
We have already established that there is a difference between a want and a need, so 
an organisation seeking to satisfy a want is not necessarily going to be identical to 
one satisfying a need (Slater, 1998). That is not to say that one is wrong and the 
other right, unless satisfying a want is presented as satisfying a need. In Chapter 3.6 
identifying a customer or client need and separating it from what they had suggested 
they needed (Chapter 3.7) was exposed as being substantially different. To determine 
the full extent of the need, plotting a path and timescale towards meeting it and then 
bringing the whole to fruition will almost certainly require a great deal more than 
carrying a stable of financial products of one or more product providers and sticking 
them over the wound. The consumer, of whatever variety, will require an 
organisation capable of planning and advising on the appropriate pattern of 
processes, applications and artefacts required, so the importance of having that 
organisation describing itself in such a way that the consumer can expect with 
confidence that they will receive the service, not only that they want but what they 
need, is key.  
To refer back to the issue of terminology used in the financial services sector, is the 
financial adviser advising on matters of a broad financial character or simply 
restricting their message to that which facilitates the sale of a financial product? Will 
an independent financial adviser be independent in the sense that they are beholden 
to no-one but the consumer for their remuneration and future existence, or are they 
reliant upon income from the introduction and arrangement of a provider’s financial 
product?  Does the term Independent Financial Adviser mean that the person 
authorised by the financial regulator to bear that title implies that the bearer is 
independent and competent in matters of broad financial planning or is it simply a 
convenient but misleading label? 
It is clear that the regulator is keen to assist in a process which will eventually lead to 
all IFAs being remunerated by a fee charged directly to the consumer (FSA, 2013). 
This should lead, it is believed, to the adviser providing advice which is free from 
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bias and avoids any conflict with the interest of the consumer. Exactly what is meant 
by the term fee has not been made particularly clear by the regulator and it is this 
that is sustaining the existence of what is to all intents and purposes a commission, 
namely the Adviser Charge.   
A requirement for transparency in charging clients was deemed to be the answer to 
the entire difficulties attendant upon the world of commissions. So it is that many 
IFAs believe that as long as they tell their customers/clients the amount of the fee 
and suggest that it is for arranging the sale of a financial product the transparency 
requirement has been met. Notwithstanding the insidious presence within that 
transparency of the ongoing fee, which usually appears to lack any real purpose or 
justification, this deception is allowed to continue and we are left asking in whose 
interests this may be. Certainly, it is difficult to identify any specific advantage to the 
consumer, but easy enough to see what it is for the “adviser”, namely continuing 
income without further effort. Conversely, if the advice is given to the consumer and 
they decide not to purchase through the adviser but directly through the product 
provider, what is a suitable piece of advice has been obtained without payment, an 
advantage to the consumer ,but detrimental to the welfare of the organisation.   
Let me return to the definition applied to the term fee. This has already been defined 
as “A payment made to a professional person or to a professional or public body in 
exchange for advice or services.” (Chapter 3.3) The key word here is “exchange” 
and was central to a product provider contributor’s remarks about the whole business 
of financial planning needing to be based upon an exchange of values whereby the 
IFA made clear at the beginning of the relationship the service they would be 
providing and at what cost and the consumer beginning the relationship by signing 
an agreement acknowledging their commitment to paying for that service.  
The fee is the identified cost of providing a service or services and invoiced 
accordingly; it is not the receipt of payment from a fund manager. An unwanted by-
product of the process of charging fees carries with it the possibility of there being 
bad debts arising because the consumer cannot or will not settle their account, but 
that is a commercial risk that most businesses have to accept. However, it does 
reinforce the need to screen potential clients for the integrity of both parties to the 
agreement is essential for the existence of a long-term relationship.  
What is important is that the consumer understands exactly what service is being 
offered and at what cost and that from the perspective of the adviser firm it is 
confident that all of its efforts, not just some or perhaps none of them, will generate 
income. On that basis the adviser, assuming that they have the competence, can 
provide complete unbiased advice suitable to not only the clients’ wants, but also 
their overall financial planning needs. The existence of and the need for a conflict of 
interest is removed by separating fee charging from fee settlement. 
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So can the IFA firm provide for those needs, holistically, or if not how are they to 
overcome the impediments that cause that restriction. The next chapter looks at the 
facilities that each of our intermediary/adviser types has and whether it would be 
possible to use these as a substantial foundation for moving towards the regulator’s 
ideal of a fee-based holistic financial planning world and the financial planner’s aim 
of operating a business with a long-term future, either independently or within the 
framework of another profession. 
  
168 
 
Chapter 5 – From Broker to Adviser: Serving 
Common Interests 
   
Summary of the Main Themes Discussed in this Chapter 
 The resources required for progression from broker to adviser 
 The accumulation of appropriate competence 
 The role of accounting and finance 
Wants, Needs and Sources from the Intermediary Perspective  
The activities of an organisation, whether planned or emergent, usually start with 
either determining or believing that a market exists for their product or services. This 
should then involve segmenting the potential market to avoid exhausting resources 
inefficiently and then targeting the chosen segment by gathering and then focusing 
the required resources towards satisfying the identified needs of that targeted 
population (Wedel, 2000). The term planned might suggest an element of 
inflexibility, whereas emergent may carry connotations of entrepreneurialism and 
adaptability.  In a world increasingly suffused in rules of compliance and regulation 
too little planning and too much entrepreneurial pushing of boundaries is likely to 
lead to disaster. (It could be argued that The Financial Services Act 1986 and The 
Building Societies Act 1986 were instrumental in giving birth to the former, 
resulting in the latter)  So deciding upon which market the financial intermediary 
wants to focus should provide the basis for determining the resources needed. With 
those resources identified where they might be acquired can be considered. 
In Table 10 - Broker to Adviser Progression Paths, the consumers’ expressed 
requirements, their segmented wants, are matched to the minimum level of delivery 
and the type of service provider. It also suggests the developments required of each 
intermediary type to facilitate a move along the spectrum towards provision of 
holistic advice funded by client fees and away from product sales and commission 
remuneration. When considering this table note the link between the Levels shown at 
the head of each column and the same classifications appearing in Figure 16 - The 
Service-Focus Quadrant in Chapter 4. 
Some organisations plan ahead whilst others attempt to undertake them as they 
operate, representing deliberate or emergent strategies (Mintzberg, 1985). From 
discussions with contributors to this research and recorded in Section 2 themes 
emerged that suggested that organisations designated as being at Level 1 and Level 2 
fall within the emergent, as opposed to planned strategy category. That is not to say 
that such organisations do not have an efficient operating framework, but these are 
169 
 
tactical and focused upon the here and now, not the medium to long-term future and 
as such suggest a barrier has been created in their marketing planning process 
(McDonald, 1992).   
The Level 1, Crocodile Type of financial intermediary seeks to work in the remains 
of a world that pre-dates the Financial Services Act 1986, earning a commission 
from the supply of certain financial products, but crucially, without providing any 
form of advice to the consumer in relation to that supply.  Importantly, this type of 
intermediary meets the need of a certain kind of consumer, namely one that believes 
that they have the competence and understanding to undertake a financial transaction 
without requiring professional guidance and consequently are certain about the 
products they require for their purposes. The Financial Conduct Authority describes 
execution only sales as, 
“A transaction executed by a firm upon the specific instructions of a client 
where the firm does not give advice on investments relating to the merits of 
the transaction and in relation to which the rules on assessment of 
appropriateness ("COBS 10") do not apply.” 
The Financial Ombudsman Services’ interpretation of  what is required to ensure that 
transactions fall within the term require that there is clear and credible evidence that 
the following rules have been followed: 
The "clear and credible" evidence that a business usually provides is 
in the form of an execution only notice. This is a statement signed by 
the consumer, agreeing that:  
• they are aware the transaction is execution only;  
• they have not asked for or received advice;  
• it is their decision alone to take out the investment; and 
• the business is taking no responsibility for the product's 
suitability. 
If a statement like this is clearly worded and signed, it cannot be 
dismissed easily. A notice does not have to be signed. But unsigned 
notices can lead to questions about whether the consumer saw them.  
An execution only notice can be a stand-alone document – or it can 
be included as part of another document. 
(Financial Ombudsman Service, 2014) 
These are “broker-lite” transactions, that is they provide the consumer with the 
desired product but without a scintilla of advice or guidance in respect of the 
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transaction other than to advise that consumer that a commission will be paid by the 
product  provider to the broker and that the value of that commission will be “£x”.  
What resources will be needed to ensure that this intermediary type can function in 
an appropriate manner? Sales and marketing are a must and indeed were it not for 
the existence of the regulators this could be sufficient. Given that professional advice 
and guidance are not a requirement the level of professional competence with regard 
to the appropriateness of financial products is not a requirement for sales personnel, 
although an appreciation of the product range and possible suppliers is. That is not to 
say that those working in this sector will not be better qualified, but that the 
requirement for a full appreciation of needs is absent from this model. 
However, in the present climate maintaining adequate records of each transaction, 
including an audit trail is vital if the business is to be able to demonstrate that it is 
acting strictly within the rules. The regulator’s mantra has always been, if it isn’t 
written down, it didn’t happen, so written evidence is vital and this requires the 
employment of administrators, preferably qualified in financial administration and 
ideally competent in at least the basics of book-keeping. In this respect the work of 
Thomas Gutheil is illuminating, not least because of his reference to the instant 
substitution of attitude to suitable record-keeping from soporific to paranoia when 
faced with the need to present evidence on a case handling to a court of law (Gutheil, 
1980). 
Crocodiles survive by operating within their own watery habitat, but it is not 
unknown for them to occasionally seek additional sustenance beyond those 
boundaries by entering the realm of another species and it is at this point that they 
come into contact with those seeking to protect their own interests by restricting the 
aggressor’s movements to their natural areas, so strict adherence to the regulations is 
a must if survival of this type is to continue to the benefit of that particular consumer 
segment. What is significant is that those regulations are designed to inhibit any 
form of development of the model. 
What about the other types which make up the financial advice sector, the 
amphibian, simian and homo sapiens, all to a lesser or greater extent sharing the 
same “above-water” environment and all attempting to survive, but in different 
ways? How similar are the resources required by each to one another’s and in what 
sense do these aid survival? 
To progress from a Level 1, Crocodile type to a Level 2 Amphibian type requires the 
provision of suitable advice to the consumer, because the service provided is by its 
very definition not undertaken on the basis of simply following the consumer’s 
instructions and is not, therefore, covered by the rules governing execution only 
sales. In turn this relies upon the acquisition of the additional characteristics 
displayed in the Progression Table. 
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As in nature the Amphibian type is the most vulnerable to decline and extinction 
(Think of the newt). In nature attempting to return to its original environment is 
fraught with danger, not the least of which is the crocodile desperate to destroy 
anything that appears to threaten its own existence. In financial services this sector is 
inhabited by those least qualified, meeting only the minimum standards by way of 
examinations that have become suborned by a multiple choice approach to testing 
ability. Furthermore, they operate in the sector most wedded to the achievement of 
sales targets, rewarding failure with the loss of office. In such a climate placing the 
customer’s needs ahead of the adviser’s is expecting a signal change in the natural 
order of things. Ethical issues are managed mechanically by ensuring that the 
professional standards required by the professional bodies are met, or said to have 
been met by way of ticking boxes. Product advice is provided on the basis of 
avoiding going into areas unlikely to yield product sales, an attitude of “what the 
customer doesn’t know the customer won’t miss.”  
Unsurprisingly, this adviser type has suffered the greatest damage by way of 
regulatory reviews with fines and compensation payments running into billions of 
pounds.  
In February 2010 the FSA reported that it had fined RSM Tenon Financial Services 
Ltd £700,000 for significant failings in its advice and sales processes relating to 
Lehman-backed structured products and for having poor systems and controls to 
prevent unsuitable advice in its structured product and pension switching business. 
In the same month the FSA again recorded that they had censured Park Row, a 
national IFA Network, for failing to ensure its sales were suitable and in addition 
secured between £5 million and £7.8 million in customer redress. They also imposed 
a fine of £49,000 on Park Row’s Chief Executive. 
In January 2011 the FSA announced that it had fined Barclays Bank plc £7.7 billion 
for investment advice failings and secured as much as £60 million in redress for its 
customers. 
By 2014 the magnitude of the fines and provisions for compensation had risen 
substantially with an estimate of £23 billion alone being placed upon the total cost of 
Payment Protection Insurance mis-sales (Guardian Newspaper, 2014).  
Small wonder that Amphibian types appear to be an endangered species. 
In the light of the aforegoing, for Amphibian types to move into an area where they 
must leave behind their customary practices and seek the higher moral and ethical 
higher ground of the professionally qualified adviser, handling clients as opposed to 
customers, the practicalities may be equally fraught with danger. For an employer it 
would require the managing of a complete attitudinal change in their 
technician/advisers’ cultures, whilst at the same time preparing them for the higher 
professional qualifications referred to below. Furthermore, it is suggested that they 
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would need to embark upon a programme of recruiting graduates already familiar 
with financial planning routines through a system of work experience encountered 
during their undergraduate days (Morgan, 2000). 
The time needed to do this would be substantial and time is money, which probably 
accounts for the major banks’ decisions to withdraw from the sector, at least for the 
present (Abrego, 2014). Whether they will use that time as an opportunity to lobby 
regulators and legislators as discussed in Chapter 4 or attempt to move to the next 
level of advice provision remains to be seen. 
The Level 3 type designated “Simian” is the most interesting in progression terms. It 
is the one that often contains practitioners with the highest professional 
qualifications, levels of experience and substantial academic achievement. Thereby it 
exhibits the greatest potential for future survival, because whilst still being wedded 
to commission-type remuneration, it is already charging some clients by way of a 
simple rule-of-thumb fee. Furthermore, its exponents exercise a utilitarian approach 
to ethics and do not preclude the application of alternatives which may be to their 
clients’ greater advantage. Transition to the Level 4, Homo Sapiens type should, 
therefore, represent less of a challenge than for “Crocodiles” and “Amphibians.” 
Their weakness is that they can quite often be in a position where they provide 
professional advice without being remunerated by the client for the service and 
therefore have to rely upon unconnected product fees in an attempt to remain viable. 
This however, can only function as a strategy where remunerative activity is present 
and in times of economic decline, apparent or real, that is far less likely (Sayer, 
2012). To avoid suffering from the opportunity costs of providing free advice the 
subliminal response must be to avoid work of this nature, thereby effectively 
providing the restricted service shown in the Service-Focus Quadrant for this 
provider type.  
Nevertheless, they are in the best position to evolve into fully fee-based practices 
providing holistic financial planning and advice, a pathway illustrated in the 
Progression Table. It can do so, but as asked before, will it? 
The What and the How 
In Chapter 3.6 we managed to ascertain what it is that many clients of professional 
IFAs need, as opposed to the initial requests that first triggered that relationship. 
Throughout this work I have also discussed the ability of IFAs and intermediaries of 
many types to meet those needs. In the previous chapter the way in which each of the 
four identified types seeks to exist has also been discussed. 
A recurring theme from many of the IFAs who have contributed to this research has 
been a desire to assist their clients to the best of their abilities. This was made 
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particularly clear in Chapter 3.2 when considering the role of the IFA. Paradoxically 
they also expressed the frustration they experience as a result of their unwillingness 
or inability to take the steps necessary to provide a completely unbiased service 
across the broad spectrum of personal financial planning, whilst at the same time 
continuing to maintain a sustainably profitable business. Even if a solution is offered 
why, they ask themselves, abandon a practice which is working in the short term for 
something untried and untested, at least by them, and therefore not necessarily 
guaranteed to provide them with a living into the future. Furthermore, they might 
reason, do they have the skills and experience required to adopt such an alternative? 
This dilemma is played out in the Premium Bond test examined in Chapter 3.8.  
There exists a common interest in that both the client and the adviser wish to be 
financially advantaged as a result of the relationship, so what is it that is missing 
from the mix that is preventing even some of the better qualified advisers from 
achieving their dual ambition of serving their clients and themselves to maximum 
advantage and effect?  
In a knowledge-based sector the answer is often to be found in the form of a paucity 
of knowledge-based experience and its application, as opposed to simply a lack of 
information or data. For both the organisation and their clients not only is the 
development of knowledge acquisition important, but whether and how it is 
employed to the advantage of both. That is, within the simple model of input-
process-output is knowledge displayed as a certificated trophy framed in atrophied 
triumph upon the walls of the business, or has it a dynamic existence, constantly 
being increased, developed, challenged and drawn upon as the inexhaustible well-
spring that it should be (Leonard, 1995)?    
There is also a natural reluctance on the part of the self-employed individual to 
sacrifice total control of his or her business by entering into partnerships with others 
who have complementary skills that would facilitate the development of a practice 
capable of delivering a much wider range of services through an enterprise of 
coordinated expertise.  
Conversely, some of those very same self-employed advisers cheerfully sign up in 
droves to become part of an IFA Network, thereby sacrificing the very control of 
their businesses that they seek to protect.  
Furthermore, in avoiding the creation of an organisation of complementary attributes 
such individuals, far from displaying attributes of the entrepreneurs that some style 
themselves, effectively lock themselves into the narrowness of the mental straitjacket 
of single-loop learning. It is the antithesis of the argument supporting the notion of 
knowledge synergy, where the product of the amalgamation of separate inputs is 
greater than their arithmetic sum. That this approach is more the norm than might be 
desired is borne out by the responses recorded in Chapter 3.1, when the function of a 
financial planning organisation was considered. Those that recognise that such 
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small-minded small businesses cannot expect long-term survival must also 
acknowledge the need to reorganise on a larger scale, or suffer corporate demise 
(Davenport, 1998).    
Such changes offer an improved organisational management and operational 
structure (Chapter 3.1) and the benefits of scale overcoming some of the barriers 
referred to in Chapter 3.5. 
You cannot sell what you have not made or do not stock and in the case of a service 
organisation what you should have in stock is the appropriate knowledge and 
experience. A basic understanding of this fundamental truth should be part of any 
IFA’s armoury and would be if they studied a suitably constructed course covering 
accounting and finance. If expertise is what the organisation is selling then a 
capability and structure for making that product needs to be in place. 
So if the basis for charging a fee is already in place for some firms of financial 
advisers, what is it that continues to impede its application? 
At the heart of the matter is the lack of understanding that there is a difference 
between a fee charged for the provision of the product and the payment for a fee and 
that is a result of the community of intermediaries believing in a vague sort of way 
that by including in their title the word “financial” they must know about the 
academic discipline called finance. If the reality was that they did then they would 
understand what lies between the two terms, fee charged and fee settlement. 
A well-defined understanding of the discipline of accounting and finance would 
assist in bringing enlightenment to this issue of fees and settlement, whilst 
contributing to a deeper understanding of the principles of finance. Any course 
covering accounting and finance embraces a vast array of disciplines and subjects, so 
any attempt to engage with an in-depth experience of such a course needs to be 
tempered with an acknowledgement of the purpose of such an engagement and the 
aims it seeks to satisfy, namely to enhance the practice and experience of both 
adviser and client.  
For a suitably constructed accounting and finance course to be of practical value it 
would have to aim to ensure that both adviser and client were to be better informed, 
but not necessarily with the same goals in mind. Certainly the Chartered Institute of 
Personnel and Development incorporate such a programme as a core module of their 
advanced (Level 7) qualification and for professional bodies deemed to be guiding 
the professional progress of financial advisers not providing such opportunities for 
their members seems to be something of a bizarre oversight.   
To have a comprehensive grasp of the main financial planning areas a course should 
include aspects relating to the balance sheet, income statement, management 
accounting, gearing and finance and financial markets. From it both the adviser and 
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the client would be empowered, although in different ways, to appreciate the validity 
of fees and how they were to be paid.  
The value added for each party is described in the following sections. Firstly, 
however, the following Common Interest Matrix illustrates how the requirements of 
the clients can be met by the application of the adviser’s added knowledge of various 
aspects of accounting and finance. 
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Figure 17 - Common Interest Matrix (Cawdell K E 2015) 
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The Relevance of the Balance Sheet 
The ability to understand what information and from that, what knowledge is 
contained in the first of the Financial Accounting Statements is essential to providing 
a firm foundation for financial planning. Within this document lies the summarised 
list of the assets and liabilities of the organisation, separated between those of a long-
term nature and those regarded as temporary. In addition it records the different 
types of capital employed in the operations, their sources and applications. For 
advisers involved in corporate financial planning the link with their role should be 
obvious, but may not be so clear with regard to those specialising in personal 
financial planning. However, the ability to identify as different the short term assets 
such as a current account from the normally long-term asset such as a pension plan is 
essential in determining what assets are available for immediate use and which are 
there for use long into the future. Similarly an awareness that a short-term liability 
such as a credit card bill must rely for immediate servicing upon the existence of a 
short-term asset is equally important where current affordability is being considered. 
Long-term liabilities such as a mortgage often contain a short-term element and if 
defaulted upon could lead to total financial collapse.   
Furthermore for a business the existence of debtors valued at a figure which 
represents a high proportion of annual sales suggests that this form of short-term or 
current asset is increasingly unlikely to be available to meet the operating costs in the 
short term. Fees invoiced to clients fall within this category. 
Organising that list of assets and liabilities into the form of a balance sheet offers all 
parties the opportunity for a greater understanding of the current financial position of 
the entity, be it corporate or personal and, therefore, the chance to reflect upon the 
possible need for changes in strategy if thought necessary. In essence it is one of the 
vital discussion documents to support the financial planning process, although 
whether the necessary discussion takes place depends upon whether the management 
accounting activities referred to below are employed.  
For a business there are two main sources of long-term capital, namely equity 
provided by shareholders and loans provided by institutions such as retail banks, or 
in the case of large organisations corporate bonds. The former need never be repaid 
to the investor, whereas borrowings must so borrowing is accompanied by risk for 
the borrower and risk to the lender. The borrower must pay interest on the borrowing 
as agreed at the outset and repay the loan at the end of the contractual period. The 
lender runs the risk of the borrower not adhering to one or both of these conditions. 
The greater the ratio of borrowed capital to equity appearing in the balance sheet the 
greater the risk profile of the organisation. 
If the adviser does not appreciate these fundamentals they will be unable to guide 
their clients according to those principles and planning and maintaining an 
investment framework consistent with the client’s own risk profile then becomes a 
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matter of chance. So it is important, both from a business and personal financial 
planning stance to be able to assess how much capital or savings is placed with 
deposit holders, how much as equity and how much in  the form of borrowings and 
importantly the identity of the borrower. (The latter could reveal that the borrower is 
the UK Treasury in the form of Premium bonds, or a little known company offering 
high rates of interest reflecting the riskiness of the loan.) (Redhead, 2003) What is 
important is that both adviser and advised are suitably informed so that they can act 
accordingly. 
The Income Statement’s Contribution to Understanding Current and 
Future Affordability 
Income statement, Profit and Loss Account and/or Income and Expenditure 
Statement are all titles adopted to refer to the second Financial Accounting 
Statement. They describe what they do and the various names reflect the technical 
nuances of recording what has been spent and what has been received during a given 
period of time. The simplicity of this record suggests that it should be commonplace 
in the affairs of individuals as well as businesses. The reality is that most individuals 
and businesses rarely record their income and expenditure on a regular basis, being 
obliged to do so only when they find themselves at a financial crossroads which 
demands more information as part of a critical decision-making process.  It follows 
that the majority of IFAs are similarly afflicted, as suggested in Chapter 3.3. 
That is not to say that businesses do not keep Income Statements; if they are a 
limited company they are obliged to do so and even when unincorporated the need to 
submit supporting evidence of profits and tax payable to HM Revenue and Customs 
suggests that they will do so. However, such records are often historical with some 
of the data nearly two years old. 
The purpose of maintaining current income and expenditure records is to ascertain 
continuing affordability and, by making modest adjustments to these records, short-
term cash availability. In other words it is an important element in the planning and 
survival process and at a relatively advanced level of study provides useful measures 
of viability, a mainstay of this work from the perspective of the financial planning 
firm.  
For the private individual most of the aforegoing applies and although it might be 
expected that keeping a note of incomings and outgoings was the norm experience 
teaches that the reverse is true and that this simple tool is ignored, sometimes with 
unfortunate results. An appropriately informed financial planner will be able to 
provide this record as part of the assessment and planning process and indeed should 
do so to protect the client. They will also be able to check the robustness of some of 
the data provided by clients insofar that they apply the  simple formula A – B = C, 
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where A is equal to income, B to expenditure and C should therefore be the net 
increase or decrease in cash assets. Where C does not result in the expected outcome 
the opportunity for an iterative conversation with the client is then offered, which in 
turn will better inform the planning process. 
Strategy, Sustainability and Long-term Planning in the Financial 
Planning Sector    
If an organisation claims to be in the business of providing plans for others to follow 
and it really believes in the value of this maxim it must have a plan of its own, 
because as concluded in Chapter 2 it is about ensuring the survival of the business, a 
precursor to success and ultimately the prospects for providing a comfortable 
retirement for all the parties to the relationship (Lusardi, 2007).     
I have already emphasised the need for any organisation to understand its purpose. It 
follows that having decided upon that purpose understanding how it is to be achieved 
and maintained is paramount to its survival. To do so requires the setting of goals 
and the identification of the routes to be followed to fulfil those goals (Locke, 2002). 
Strategy is the pattern of activities undertaken by an organisation or individual in the 
pursuit of its (their) long-term objectives and it is this long term element that sets it 
apart from the tactical or operational activities which are performed (McDonald, 
1996). Indeed operational activities should be set in place with the aim of being in 
concert and as part of the fulfilment of the determined strategy (Stacey, 2007).  
So it was alarming to observe, in Chapter 3.1 that not one contributor recognised that 
a prime requirement for any organisation wishing to survive in the long term is the 
need to develop a strategic plan. Indeed mention of its short-term planning cousin, 
the budget was also absent so the requirement to collect together any idea of the 
costs of running the business was also missing. 
When an IFA is approached by a potential client that client’s needs will include 
consideration of longer-term issues. These needs may include areas such as 
retirement income requirements and long-term care costs in addition to any wants 
that they may have, perhaps in the form of a mortgage, or investment, or an 
affordability dilemma.  These are strategic issues requiring the sustained support of 
the adviser, so it is important for the client that the adviser remains in business over 
the longer term to work alongside them, a clearly common interest.   
If the main reason that a business ultimately fails is that it runs out of money then 
ensuring that sufficient money will continue to flow into the business over the longer 
term will safeguard its interests and those of its clients (Balcaen, 2006). Clients who 
are prepared to recognise this and its relevance to themselves and are willing to pay 
for a sustaining and sustainable service will be the bedrock of financial viability for 
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themselves and the business, by virtue of the fashioning of a virtuous and ethical 
circle. 
Gearing, Sources of Finance and Debt Management   
For decades financial advisers and brokers funded their businesses on the basis of 
indemnity commission, an approach which worked quite well in positive economic 
periods, but, as observed in Chapter 3.4, invariably drove mis-selling and eventual 
terminal decline as sales opportunities reduced in the less attractive environment of a 
recession. For any business a fundamental resource is capital, which will provide the 
means to acquire necessary equipment and funds for day-to-day operations. How that 
capital is employed is learned when considering the balance sheet, referred to above, 
but how it is to be acquired precedes that decision. As stated earlier, for businesses 
there are two main general methods, namely borrowing or equity (Modigliani, 1958) 
(Berger, 1998). A fundamental rule of gearing, that is the proportion of borrowing to 
total capital employed, is that the higher the proportion of long-term capital 
provision that is provided by borrowing, as opposed to equity, the more exposed the 
business becomes to financial risk. Failure to recognise this maxim has often led to 
financial ruin for many brokers and advisers in the past (Bates, 1990). 
At a personal level understanding the effect that a borrowing can have upon personal 
finances and whether deferring a capital acquisition, or taking a short term or long 
term loan is a better option is critical in the determination of future financial stability 
(Hilgert, 2003).  
In both a business and non-business sense the same holds true, that the greater the 
reliance upon borrowing the greater the risk is to financial stability over the longer 
term, sometimes even where the borrowing is nominally short-term as in the case of 
a credit card. 
For a financial adviser there is a need to understand that any intended borrowing is 
assessed on the basis of the validity of the proposed capital acquisition in terms of 
adding value, however that is assessed. The ability to do this is not something which 
is learned by experience in the field, but by genuine academic study which can then 
be employed to the business’s and the clients’ advantages. It is also a competence 
whose provision should be subject to a fee.  
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Understanding Financial Markets and their relevance to Investments and 
Savings  
IFAs are not stock pickers; they are not qualified to undertake such work and as such 
should not attempt to do so. That is the preserve of stockbrokers and fund managers 
who are paid by way of a percentage of the fund or funds they are overseeing and for 
which the bulk of private investors already pay by way of an annual management 
charge on their collective investments (AMC.) That is not to say that IFAs should 
not have any role in the selection and choice of appropriate funds in which their 
clients place some of their savings with a with a view to enhancing the return on 
their savings. 
For a client their main concerns are risk level and accessibility, perhaps best summed 
up as wishing to achieve the highest return on their investments without any 
exposure whatsoever to the possibility of loss or illiquidity, for we are all risk averse 
whilst also displaying aspirational characteristics (Markowitz, 1991). The IFAs role 
is to ensure that investment portfolios reflect their client’s risk attitude and 
accessibility requirements, consistent with current and probable future needs 
(Sharpe, 1964).  
In this role an IFA needs to have a firm understanding of how the financial markets 
work as opposed to working in the financial markets. They need to acknowledge that 
financial planning is a process extending over the medium to long-term and that the 
important issue is one of trends, not the short term trading methods of the bourses.  
An amateur trader is one that buys at the top, sells at the bottom and continues to 
repeat the process until their money runs out, according to a joke which circulates 
amongst the stockbroking community (Tilson, 2005). It is this characteristic, the 
temptation and panic approach, which the IFA is required to temper in the client, but 
to do so they need to be able to explain the rationale behind their guidance and to do 
this they need to have a real understanding of the markets supporting the investment 
funds and vehicles they are recommending as being suitable to their clients’ needs. 
Again such advice should be provided by way of a fee, which, if the guidance assists 
the process of adding value the clients should be happy to pay.    
Functions and Aims of Management Accounting in the Financial 
Planning and Control Process 
In management accounting the fundamental question is, “what will it cost?” It is a 
simple enough question, but in the course of my research and particularly in 
discussions on the desirability of cost-based fees in Chapter 3.3, I was repeatedly 
informed by IFAs that they had little or no idea of the cost of providing their service 
to their individual clients. Yet the information and data to respond to the question is 
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already within their records, with some certainly held within the latest Balance Sheet 
and Income Statement and their underlying source documents. 
The financial accounting process is rooted in the concept of recording what has 
happened in the past.  Management accounting, or what was originally called costs 
and works accounting (Chapter 4), is about planning for the future and then 
comparing the planned future with the reality as it unfolds. Contrary to the popular 
argument that it is not possible to predict the future, doing so is comparatively 
straightforward, relying as it does upon past records for guidance and an assessment 
of possible changes within the political, economic, social and technological 
environments. The difficulty is not the process of prediction, but attaining a level of 
accuracy which provides the enquirer with the confidence to plan ahead (Neely, et al 
2003).  
For a business entity the process involves creating a budget that assesses the 
resources required and their availability and what they are likely to cost, if available. 
The intention is that having assessed total costs including regulatory costs a full 
costing system can be employed to ensure that these are contained in the pricing 
mechanism for services. One of those resources will be cash, so a cash flow forecast 
is also vital. Another will be capital equipment and in a knowledge-based 
community acquiring employees of the right calibre and mix will also need to be 
included (Atrill, 2006). 
Whilst there are many expensive software packages being sold to advisers on the 
basis of providing cash flow forecasting for clients at the press of a button, these are 
unhelpful and indeed could be dangerous in the hands of those whose ability to 
understand the data source and unable to interpret the data outcome is fragmentary or 
completely absent. It is the Identikit approach described by an IFA contributor 
(IFA2) in Chapter 3.2. Where that experience is rounded an inexpensive Excel 
spreadsheet will provide the solid foundation for providing the possible trends 
expected over the longer term. 
Any business needs to ensure that it has control over its activities and is in a position 
to respond to performances which were not part of the original plan. Comparing 
actual outcomes with planned outcomes is vital as any variance from the plan 
impacts upon both future profitability and cash requirements. Regular comparison 
ensures that the causes of such variances can be assessed and addressed in a timely 
manner, a revised plan completed and a clear idea of future based upon the 
amendments plotted. For clients this translates into regular planning reviews, 
consistent with their needs, changes in personal circumstances and the actual or 
expected changes in the wider environment; a general election in the next few 
months could be an example of this and the relentless nibbling away at long-term 
care is another .  
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Interestingly, regular reviews was the most desired service highlighted in our own 
survey and this is supported by the NMG survey undertaken for the FCA (NMG 
Research, 2015) 
However, knowing the limitations of any data processing techniques, and indeed the 
weaknesses inherent in any forecasting process, is key to enhancing the advice and 
planning process and emphasises the need for the appropriate level of training and 
development of any financial adviser and planner (Archer, 1987). Having said that, 
such enhanced knowledge will lead to the provision of advice and guidance for the 
client, suitably supported with caveats regarding probability and possibility and 
highlighting in advance any issues that should be given early attention (Armstrong, 
2001) (Baudrit, 2007). 
For a client reducing uncertainty is one of the main mechanisms for satisfying their 
needs and their confidence in their adviser grows as the passing of the years 
demonstrates that the adviser is competent in the techniques of financial planning 
and capable of responding to changing circumstances (Berger, 1975). 
For the adviser understanding this enables the provision of a well-costed product, 
namely advice, to a demanding consumer at a price that both can recognise and agree 
as being transparent, fair and sustainable.  
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Chapter 6 - From Broker to Adviser - 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Summary of Main Themes Discussed in this Chapter 
 An Evaluation of the Identified Strategies 
 Opportunities for Development and Progression 
 Charging structures  
 The Intermediary Role 
 Integrity 
Introduction 
Before commencing the process of considering the outcomes of this research 
programme it would be useful to reflect upon and consider the pathways followed 
towards the results and the nature of the classifications employed as part of the 
process of determination. 
All organisations have a strategy, be it planned or emergent, strategy being defined 
as a pattern of activities undertaken by an organisation in pursuit of its long-term 
purposes (Cassells 2002). In the financial services sector that strategy is underpinned 
by the employment of knowledge-based resources. However, no organisation or 
individual has perfect knowledge and the husbanding of those resources and how 
they are applied can affect the ability to achieve such purposes, be they specific or 
simply as vague as seeking to survive.  To provide a basis to judge the value of the 
strategies being followed I have re-contextualised in terms of the financial services 
sector the Johnson & Scholes’ evaluative suitability, feasibility and acceptability 
approach (Exploring strategy: text & cases 2011).   
The pathway to reaching this evaluative stage, as illustrated in Fig 18 at the end of 
this introduction, commenced with employing the data generated from the 
application of the Applied Thematic Analysis (ATA) framework. This framework 
served to determine significant themes that arose from the face-to-face interviews 
that had been held with a range of contributors working in the financial services 
sector.  Table 11 below is an extracted example from the ATA codebook constructed 
to identify recurring themes that emerged.  
 This particular extract identifies the prevalent themes and sub-themes emerging 
during the semi-structured interviews with IFA’s on the topic covering the Purposes 
of a Financial Planning Organisation.   
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The codebook also provided the source for the creation of the Figures placed at the 
beginning of each of the chapters covering a detailed analysis of the discussion 
topics (Section 3).   
Themes Identified from Transcripts of Conversations with IFAs 
Themes and Sources Emerging Sub-themes  
Discussion Topic 
Source Theme 
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Purposes of a FP 
Organisation Making a profit x x x x x x 
Purposes of a FP 
Organisation Training of employees     x   x x 
Purposes of a FP 
Organisation Regulatory oversight       x   x 
Purposes of a FP 
Organisation 
Interface between 
providers, advisers & 
other stakeholders       x     
Purposes of a FP 
Organisation Not product driven x x x x x x 
Purposes of a FP 
Organisation RDR       x x x 
Purposes of a FP 
Organisation 
Providing structure to the 
adviser process       x x x 
Purposes of a FP 
Organisation Consistency of process   x   x x x 
Purposes of a FP 
Organisation 
To consider cost base for 
the provision of advice     x       
Purposes of a FP 
Organisation Scale         x   
Purposes of a FP 
Organisation 
To consider the ethical 
implications of S/E 
advisers within a FP org x x         
Purposes of a FP 
Organisation 
Creating a framework for 
long-term relationships 
with clients       x x   
Purposes of a FP 
Organisation Providing structure       x x   
 
 
Table 11 - Extract from Code Book 
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My Table of Identified Client Financial Planning Needs (Table 7) extracted from our 
firm’s client file records has been employed to provide an additional consumer 
perspective, given that conversations and other forms of enquiry with consumers 
failed to yield any discernible trend or themes.  Together with this table the themes 
in the codebook were channelled through the Marketing Mix Comparison Table, 
which in turn informed the Broker to Adviser Progression Table and the 
segmentation of the two generic types, broker/intermediary and adviser, and four 
organisational types.  
The benchmarks provided in the Marketing Mix Comparison (Table 15), are my 
synthesis of Borden’s original work on the Four P’s of Marketing (The Concept of 
the Marketing Mix 1964) and Lautenborn’s later work (New Marketing Litany: 4 P’s 
Passé; C-words take over – 1990) but in a financial services setting.  
Conformity or non-conformity with those  benchmarks has been used to measure 
whether the pathways actually being followed are consistent with the legislative and 
commercial requirements within which the two generic organisational types operate; 
that is are these strategies likely to lead towards success or failure .   
The Service-Focus Quadrant 
 Consumer Espoused Requirement 
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A
d
v
is
er
/I
n
te
rm
ed
ia
ry
 S
er
v
ic
e 
F
o
cu
s F
in
an
ci
al
 P
ro
d
u
ct
s 
A
g
en
cy
 S
u
p
p
li
er
 Crocodile Type 
 
Limited Product Range 
Commission based sales model 
not requiring advice 
 
 
 
Amphibian Type 
 
Broad Product Range 
Wider product range offered with 
some advice 
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Simian Type 
 
Financial products and 
associated advice 
Tendency to link advice to 
Adviser-charge producing 
financial products  
Homo Sapiens Type 
 
Holistic financial planning advice 
Standalone fees based upon 
service provision cost. 
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I created the archetypal Service-Focus Quadrant model (Fig 16), repeated above, to 
differentiate between the various complex dynamics operating in the financial 
services advice/broking sector in a simplified form with a view to stimulating further 
discussion and to assisting that aim with provision of a simplified platform. 
This determines that the first of these two generic types is defined as Advisers, sub-
divided into organisational types referred to in this work as Amphibians, Simians 
and Homo Sapiens, and as the name suggests the legal requirement is that they 
provide their consumers with appropriate advice when discussing the provision of 
financial products and/or guidance. The second generic type is the 
Broker/Intermediary, designated in this work as the Crocodile, for whom the exact 
opposite ruling on advice applies; they must not give any. Full definitions of each 
organisational type and their characteristics are provided in pages 155-167, 
supported by the Organisational Purpose Table (Table 16) and the section on 
Opportunities for Development and Progression commencing on page 210.  
I developed my Strategic Differentiation Model (Figure 19) to uncover the drivers 
for the Strategies Identified as being present in the financial services sector, namely 
the consumer relationship, organisational structure and consumer charging basis. 
These in turn help to inform the composition of the tables of “Factors Necessary” for 
the purpose of assessing the Suitability, Feasibility and Acceptability of those 
strategies when viewed in the context of the desirability of them being present to 
attain the achievement of satisfactory outcomes for both the organisations and their 
consumers (Tables 12, 13, and 14).  
The following table absorbed the results contained in the codebook and Table of 
Identified Client Financial Planning Needs as they related to the suitability of the 
Identified Strategies contained in the Strategic Differentiation Model. These 
necessary factors were then compared with which of those factors were judged to be 
employed by the various adviser/intermediary types, as identified by the Service-
Focus Quadrant and recorded in the Broker to Adviser Progression Table (Table 10).  
By way of illustration, the codebook extract above, which considered themes arising 
during the  discussions relating to the purpose of a financial planning organisation, 
noted that “Training of Employees” and “Regulatory oversight” signalled the need 
for the inclusion of those factors as a basis for determining the suitability, or 
otherwise, of the strategies being followed. In the table below these are incorporated 
into the Suitability Factor “Overseeing robust training programmes,” Suitability Item 
Number 2, or S2. 
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Table 12 – Factors Necessary to the Suitability of Identified Strategies 
Feature being Assessed Suitability (S) Factors Sources 
Organisational purpose as an 
intermediary or advice 
provider 
S1. Setting of organisational 
culture 
 
 
 
Chapter 3.1, pp 48 - 60 
Figure 6, p50 
S2. Overseeing robust 
training programmes 
S3. Financial oversight 
 
S4. Market orientation 
towards consumer 
The role of the financial 
adviser/intermediary 
S5. Fulfilling a duty to the 
consumer 
 
Chapter 3.2, pp 61-71 
Figure 7, p62 S6. Serving the 
organisation’s purpose  
S7. Maintaining suitable 
levels of competence 
Chapter 3.5, pp 93-106 
Figure 10, p94  
Chapter 3.6, pp 107- 122 
Figure 11, p109 
Characteristics of the costs to 
consumers 
S8. Related to costs & 
activities &/or performance. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3.3, pp 72 - 83 
Figure 8, p73 
 
Chapter 3.4, pp 84 - 92  
Figure 9, p85 
S9. Bad debts management  
S10. Transparent charges 
S11. Not reliant upon the 
sale of certain financial 
products. 
The role of experience, 
education & qualifications 
S12. Enhances business 
structure and management 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3.6, pp 107- 122 
Figure 11, p 109 
S13. Competence fitness 
 
S14. Positive links to 
charging structures 
The range of products and/or 
services offered 
S15. Full range of financial 
products, guidance and 
planning can be provided 
Chapter 3.7, pp 123 - 132 
Figure 12, p 124 
Chapter 3.6, pp 107- 122  
Table 7, p 119 
The influence of integrity on 
the shaping of the advice and 
planning process 
S16. Avoids conflicts of 
interest 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3.8, pp 133 - 151 
Figure 14, p 135 
S17. Avoids deceptive 
description of firm’s service 
 
S18. Potential for long-term 
relationship development 
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These Necessary Suitability Factors were organised into a table which separated 
what was necessary for intermediaries who were barred from offering advice and the 
other generic group describing themselves as financial advisers and consequently 
required to offer advice, as shown in Table 17. 
The factors were then set down in a table of comparison, delineated by 
organisational type (Crocodile, Simian, etc) which considered which of the necessary 
suitability factors was apparent in the identified strategies of each (Table 19). The 
outcomes of these comparisons were presented firstly in tabular form, (Table 20), 
then in graphic form on a scale of 0 – 5, (Table 21)   
The procedure followed in assessing the suitability of the identified strategies was 
repeated to assess the feasibility of those strategies and whilst an extract from the 
relevant section of the codebook is not included in this reprise it played just as 
important a part in the process as the example provided for the suitability assessment 
indicated. 
The table of factors necessary to the feasibility of the identified strategies is shown 
below, with the relevant chapter, figure and table references included for ease of 
clarity. 
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Table 13 – Factors Necessary to the Feasibility of the Identified Strategies 
Feature being Assessed Feasibility (F) Factors Source of Factor 
Organisational purpose as 
an intermediary or advice 
provider 
F1. Structure capable of 
delivery to purpose.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3.1, pp 48 – 60 
Figure 6, p 50 
 
 
F2. Capable of identifying 
anticipating & satisfying 
consumer needs profitably  
 
The role of the financial 
adviser/intermediary 
F3. Range of competences 
sufficient to fulfil purposes 
 
 
 
Chapter 3.5, pp 93 - 106 
Figure 10, p 94 
Characteristics of the costs 
to consumers 
F4. Debtor invoicing & control 
systems in place 
 
 
Chapter 3.3 (Page 80) &  
Chapter 4 (Page 166) 
F5. Uncomplicated utility  of 
chosen method  
Chapter 3.3, pp 72 - 83 
Figure 9, p 85 
F6. Competences available to 
provide a fee-based service 
 
Chapter 3.5 pp 93 - 106 
Figure 10, p 94 and 
Chapter 4, p 165 
F7. Not subject to clawback of 
commission/adviser charge 
Chapter 3.2, pp 61 - 71 
Figure 8, p73 
Chapter 3.3, pp 72 - 83 
Figure 9, p 85 
The role of experience, 
education & qualifications 
F8. Sufficiency to support the 
spectrum of products & 
services offered 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3.6, pp 107 - 122 
& Figure 11, p 109 F9. Capable of supporting 
SWOT contextual 
understanding 
The range of products 
and/or services offered 
F10. Few financial constraints 
dictating range limits in respect 
of product/advice sourcing   
 
Chapter 3.7, pp 123 - 132 
& Figure 12, p 124 
The influence of integrity on 
the shaping of the advice 
and planning process 
F11. Motivated by a desire to 
serve the consumer, not by a 
sales target 
Chapter 3.8 , pp 133 -151 
Figure 14, p135 compared 
with Chapter 3.3, pp 72- 
83 and Figure 9, p 85 
 
The table of factors necessary for the acceptability of the identified strategies is 
shown below, again with the relevant chapter, figure and table references included 
for ease of clarity. 
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Table 14 - Factors Necessary to Acceptability of Identified Strategies 
 
Feature being Assessed Acceptability (A) Factors Sources 
Organisational purpose as an 
intermediary or advice 
provider 
A1. Builds long-term 
sustainable & reliable 
relationships  
 
Chapter 3.2, pp 61-71   
Figure 7, p 62 
The role of the financial 
adviser/intermediary 
A2. Can meet current & 
future requirements of 
consumers & regulators. 
 
 
Chapter 3.5, pp 93-106 
Figure 10, p 94 
A3. Delivers improved 
financial understanding 
Chapter 3.2, pp 61-71 
Figure 7, p 62 
Characteristics of the costs to 
consumers 
A4. Charges regularly 
invoiced to consumers 
 
 
 
Chapter 3.3, pp 72-83 
Figure 8, p 73 
A5. Compliant charges 
 
A6. Capable of assisting 
business continuity 
Chapter 3.7, pp 123-132   
Figure 13, p 126  
The role of experience, 
education & qualifications 
A7. Increased financial well-
being & reduced uncertainty  
 
Chapter 3.6, pp 107-122  
Figure 11, p109 
The range of products and/or 
services offered 
A8. Range offered contains 
the ability to satisfy consumer 
needs, not simply their wants 
 
Chapter 3.6, pp 107-122   
Table 7, p62 
The influence of integrity on 
the shaping of the advice and 
planning process 
A9. Do internal practices go 
beyond satisfying professional 
bodies’ rules on ethics? 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3.8, pp 133-151 
Figure 14, p135 
 
The test for whether or not there exists apparent conformity or non-conformity with 
the requirement to operate a firm using these necessary factors relies upon a process 
of observations made by contributors in the semi-structured interviews, the analysis 
of consumer needs and observations referred to in the literature review.  
As an example, in adopting their strategy of growth and income the banks are 
judged, in the Overall Evaluation of Identified Strategies, to have fallen short on 
grounds of the suitability of their strategy, even shorter on its feasibility and to have 
failed entirely in terms of acceptability (Table 32) 
There is overwhelming evidence contained in current literature, both in terms of 
media reports and academic papers, to support the view that many banks, the 
Amphibians, did not observe the need to provide suitable financial products or give 
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appropriate advice, but concentrated upon the themed selling of products to meet 
specific sales targets, regardless of their customers actual needs. The outcome has 
been the imposition of massive fines by regulators and mounting compensation 
payments that run into billions of pounds.  
There is also evidence of an inability to provide a broad range of suitable advice 
above and beyond that required for the selling of financial products, because the 
knowledge base is limited in the main to Level 4 testing and a reliance upon a sales 
training philosophy (Chapter 3.6 pp 107-122) Theodore Levitt’s observation that 
“you should make what you can sell, not attempt to sell what you can make” in the 
context of financial advisers and planners reflects upon the inability of many in the 
sector being able to charge professional fees because they do not have the knowledge 
resource to underpin the charging of that fee (p 165). This is one of the underlying 
causes for the feasibility aspect of the strategies of all generic types being identified 
as being generally weaker (Table 32).  
The comparative figures offer the opportunity for the reader to contrast this author’s 
view of what is necessary for the consummation of a successful strategy with what 
has been observed as being present in the operations of the various types of 
organisation.  
The final judgements on the efficacy of the identified strategies employed by the 
different types of adviser and intermediaries are collated in Table 32 and Table 33. 
The graphical synopsis of the underpinning pathway towards reaching these 
judgements is shown below and should assist the reader when considering the more 
detailed reflections contained within the remainder of this chapter.   
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The title of my project is intended to convey the message “how to earn a compliant 
living now and in the future” 
As part of this exploration I have employed techniques of semi-structured interviews 
with IFAs, consumers and product provider representatives covering a range of 
topics (See Table 1). These included the existence or absence of organisational 
structure within the intermediary sector, the role of the adviser, commissions and 
fees, barriers to the continued existence and development of the IFA, experience, 
education and qualifications and integrity. Recurrent themes were logged and 
analysed and note taken of any persistent avoidance of providing a response. 
A constant theme was that to succeed it was necessary to address the needs of 
consumers, perhaps a statement of the blindingly obvious. This generates a 
requirement to identify what those needs are, an activity which might also be 
described in the same way (See Table 7). So if the objective is so clear what is it that 
could impede or aid its consummation? 
At the beginning of this work I argued that we are all agents acting on behalf of 
others, be it familial, societal or corporate and that when acting as an agent there is 
always the temptation to act more in one’s own interest than in the interest of the 
principal (Bosse, 2014). Furthermore, I suggested that if we could provide all of our 
needs by our own hand in a way that was less costly than inviting others to provide 
them for us we would do so. The reality is that in a modern world the option of being 
totally self-sufficient does not exist; indeed it is the complexity of agency 
arrangements that underpins the functioning of the modern world. 
In what way can the IFA sector fulfil and continue to fulfil a role of agent by 
meeting the needs of its principals, whilst at the same time maintaining a focus upon 
its own survival and success?  
It has been argued that in many areas of business intermediaries have become more 
important than they have ever been in the past (Mukti Khaire cited in The Economist 
Schumpeter column 18/10/2014). Consumers, far from becoming better informed by 
the emergence of the Internet, are now more confused and bewildered by the 
overwhelming wealth of data and information that it offers, suggesting that the need 
for trustworthy professional guides is increasing. That the need for an old-fashioned 
product salesman in the financial services sector is declining should not be a 
surprise, but the ability to supply a suitable alternative at a pace consistent with the 
needs of both suppliers and consumers is the main barrier to its consummation.  
Note, it is the dearth of ability underpinned by more than a little confidence, not 
simply a lack of will, that is the barrier, at least on the part of the adviser community. 
Product selling appears to be the default position for suppliers, not unnaturally, and 
rather more surprisingly the existing professional bodies. The latter should be the 
main source of assistance and support in facilitating the enhancement of ability, both 
through the provision of a regime of education and examination fit for purpose and 
194 
 
by developing a recruitment programme that encourages suitably academically 
qualified graduates to join the sector. 
However, all of this depends upon three things, mapped out in The Strategic 
Differentiation Model below: how is the consumer principal perceived by the IFA, 
what is the organisational structure, if it exists at all and how does the consumer pay 
for the service? 
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Components of an Independent Financial Planning Organisation seeking a 
long-term sustainable future built upon a collaborative culture 
Figure 19 - Strategic Differentiation Model (Cawdell K E 2015) 
 
This model not only emphasises a difference in attitudes and cultures regarding the 
treatment of consumers, but also identifies whether such attitudes embody short-term 
or long-term plans. Put another way, do the separate approaches reflect the existence 
of a set of tactics concentrated upon short-term aims, or an operational plan that 
forms part of a planned strategy, which in turn is a component part of achieving the 
organisation’s goals and purpose? 
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If the latter then are the chosen strategies likely to be successful in achieving those 
goals, but if the former how helpful are what are effectively emergent strategies 
likely to be in the longer term?  
An Evaluation of the Identified Strategies 
Any organisation’s strategies can and should be tested and evaluated. In Chapter 2 I 
referred to methods developed for the testing and evaluating of strategies and in 
particular that of  Johnson and Scholes who advocated examining them on the basis 
of their suitability, feasibility  and acceptability (Johnson, et al 2011), but suitable, 
feasible and acceptable to whom?  
The Strategic Differentiation Model, shown on the previous page employs the Four 
P’s Marketing Mix model to demonstrate the paths followed in selecting particular 
forms of consumer partnerships, organisational structure and consumer charging. 
The suitability, feasibility and acceptability of these adopted pathways are assessed 
using the following definitions: 
 Suitability asks whether the strategy employed by the organisation makes 
sense for the organisation in terms of addressing external opportunities and 
threats, whilst capitalising on its strengths and avoiding weaknesses 
 
 Feasibility considers whether the organisation has the necessary resources 
and competences, which includes its financial strength, technical and 
managerial skills  
     
 Acceptability is concerned with the desired performance outcomes from the 
perspective of a range of stakeholders, including the organisation. 
Viewing the provision and acquisition of a service or product from the perspective of 
the marketer and also from that of the consumer highlights the conceptual 
differences in attitudes. For the transactions to take place at a commercially 
successful level the consumers’ perceptions of the product or service have to be 
addressed and maintained; a failure to do so will suggest that the organisation’s 
future is in jeopardy and that the strategy being followed is flawed. A re-
contextualised Table 4 Comparative Marketing Mix Attributes, from Chapter 2, page 
38 is shown overleaf as a basis for undertaking this strategic assessment process 
following my synthesising of the two original concepts of Borden and Lautenborn.   
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Borden’s 4 P’s Product–centred 
Concept 
Lautenborn’s 4 C’s Consumer-oriented 
Concepts 
1 Product – The provision of a 
financial product, advice or a 
combination of the two consistent 
with the organisation’s purpose 
1 Client’s needs, wants and 
expectations  A service embracing 
savings, protection & financial 
planning guidance  
2 Price – Is the basis for setting it 
logical & viable from the 
organisation’s perspective? 
Is it transparent 
2 Cost/benefit advantages  
Equitable and acceptable payment 
structure  
3 Promotion means the promotions 
mix or the communications mix. 
This mix includes advertising, sales 
promotions, publicity, direct mail, 
exhibitions, display, packaging, 
selling and even word-of-mouth. 
3 Communicating the benefits to 
consumers in the context of the 
satisfaction of their needs and value 
added, both current and evolving.  
4 Place – methods employed to 
interface with the consumer 
4 Convenience of the delivery of the 
product or service and whether this 
will enhance the client’s experience 
through the continuing availability 
and regularity of support and advice 
provided beyond the initial contact  
Comparison of Attributes of the 4P’s and 4C’s Approach to the Marketing Mix in 
the Context of Financial Advice and Planning (Cawdell K E 2015) 
With acknowledgements to the work of Kotler P et al (1999) 
 
Table 15 - The Marketing Mix Comparatives in the Context of Financial Advice 
and Planning Sectors 
 
The Four C’s shown in Table 15 provide guidance on what should be included as 
Acceptability Factors from a consumer perspective. The Four P’s analysis offers an 
insight from an organisational angle, both in terms of process and feasibility. 
The determination of Consumer Charging Factors is driven by two main forces, the 
first of which is the regulatory requirement that fees be transparent and 
representative of a service provided and that a commission, except in specific 
situations, cannot be paid. The second relates to the management systems needed to 
ensure that the fees charged reflect the costs of the service provided and that clients 
settle their accounts in such a way as to maintain a robust cash inflow to the 
organisation.   
In the following assessments I have taken into account the feasibility, suitability and 
acceptability of the product or service offered compared with the consumer’s needs, 
the price of the product or service with the cost/benefit to the consumer and the 
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adviser/broker, the promotion methods employed and whether they communicate to 
the consumer an understanding of how the product or service meets their needs and 
finally, whether the method of provision by the adviser/broker is consistent with  
enhancing the  consumer’s service experience both at the initial stage and beyond. 
Such evaluations are by their very nature subjective and can at best only give a 
general evaluation of an identified strategy’s worth; they are unlikely to provide a 
precise answer. Nevertheless, employing such an assessment will aid the 
determination of whether an organisation’s current and future plans have the 
potential to result in its further development, demise or stagnation. 
To commence the evaluative process the organisation’s purpose must be defined, so 
that a foundation is laid to answer the question, is the strategy fit for purpose? Table  
16 below provides definitions for each type of organisation. 
Organisation Type Purpose 
Crocodile To act as a broker in the provision of financial products 
Amphibian The successful sale of financial products  
Simian The successful sale of financial products appropriate to consumers’ 
needs  
Homo Sapiens To provide holistic financial planning advice and support 
appropriate to consumers’ needs 
Table 16 Organisational Purpose 
 
 
The type and total number of factors deemed necessary for the achievement of a 
successful strategy, consistent with purpose and consumer satisfaction and 
compliance are shown in Tables 12, 13 and 14. The summary of those required 
factors, for each element in the Strategic Differentiation Model together with a 
summary of those observed as being present, is provided as part of the evaluations 
that follow. To what extent account is taken of each factor in terms of its relevance is 
a matter of subjective interpretation by the assessor, in this case mine. Nevertheless, 
these factors represent a coordination of best practice required both from a general 
business management perspective and that of the financial services sector’s 
consumers and regulators. 
The evaluative process begins with an assessment of the Consumer Relationship 
Strategies employed using an analysis of the number of factors deemed necessary for 
each type of broker/adviser to succeed in the aim and comparing those with the 
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number of factors observed as being present. The links between Factors Necessary, 
Factors Observed, the Tabular and Graphical Comparison Analyses are colour coded 
to assist following the pathways. 
 
Table 17 - Factors Necessary to Underpin Good Consumer Relationships 
Deemed to be Required by Crocodiles 
(Execution only Brokers) 
Deemed to be Required by Financial 
Advisers 
Suitability Feasibility Acceptability Suitability Feasibility Acceptability 
S1 F2 A8 S1 F2 A1 
S4 F7  S4 F7 A2 
S5 F8  S5 F8 A3 
S13 F10  S7 F10 A7 
S16   S10  A9 
S17   S11  A10 
   S13   
   S15   
   S16   
   S17   
   S18   
Total = 6 Total = 4 Total = 1 Total = 11 Total = 4 Total = 6 
 
Table 18 records which of the factors identified above appear to be present in the 
operations of the Execution Only Crocodiles and different types of financial 
advisers. This is followed by a table of comparisons (19) of which of the Necessary 
factors recorded in Table 17 are present in Table 18. 
This pattern is repeated for the assessments of Organisation Structures and 
Consumer Charging. 
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Table 18 - Factors Observed as being present in the maintenance of Consumer 
Relationships 
Crocodiles Amphibians Simians Homo Sapiens 
S1 F2 A8 S6   S1 F2 A1 S1 F2 A1 
S4 F10  S10   S4 F7 A2 S4 F7 A2 
S5      S5 F10 A3 S5 F8 A3 
S13      S6  A7 S7 F10 A7 
S16      S7  A9 S10  A9 
S17      S10   S11  A10 
      S11   S13   
      S18   S15   
         S16   
         S17   
         S18   
 
Table 19 - Comparison of Necessary & Observed Factors in Consumer 
Relationships 
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The following two tables summarise these determinations in tabular and graphical 
form. 
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Table 20 - Rating of Consumer Relationship Strategies in Tabular Form 
 
 
 
Table 21 - Rating of Consumer Relationship Strategies in Graphical Form 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the course of my research it has become clear that how the consumer is seen 
by the intermediary or adviser is a driver with regard to how that consumer can 
expect to be treated. How that consumer wishes to be treated should also be reflected 
in the providing organisation’s plans and strategies; a mismatch is unlikely to lead 
towards a long-term success for the business. 
In this respect the Crocodile type is quite open and transparent about this matter. The 
consumer is a customer who demands a product, is supplied with that product, 
knows that they will not receive any advice or guidance and does not receive it and 
therefore enjoys exactly the customer service that they expect. That service is 
uncomplicated, easy to provide and acceptable to all parties, including the regulator. 
Its weakness lies in its reliance upon the sales of products during periods of 
economic decline, when customers are more inclined to withdraw their savings 
instead of adding to them. 
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The Amphibian type also sees the consumer as a customer, but in this case the 
intermediary organisations hold themselves out as financial advisers, not financial 
products sellers. They tend to be large organisations, typically high street banks and 
employ advisers who hold the minimum professional qualification required by the 
regulator. This has emerged as a disappointing area of financial planning, built upon 
a focus of sales target achievements and rewards, with the result that the customers 
have been receiving often unsuitable advice.  
That is not to suggest that the suitability of the advice in relation to the product 
provided is not consistent with the requirements of the regulator. Rather it is a matter 
for determining whether in spite of the fact the advice might be suitable for the 
customer’s want, the want may not be suitable for the customer. As an example, 
customers are sometimes spurred to request the provision of an Equity Release Plan 
to fill some perceived gap in their ability to meet their regular living costs following 
retirement. Whereas a holistic approach to assessing the need would probably 
provide an answer to the problem by way of identifying unnecessary expenditure 
and/or tax being deducted from pensions at too high a rate the desire of the 
organisation’s mortgage adviser to meet a sales target may lead to an outcome based 
upon a much narrower overview.  
As with the Crocodile type in periods of economic difficulty this model is barely 
sustainable. The ultimate assessment of acceptability of this approach to customer 
relationships has been dictated by both regulators and courts, to the disadvantage of 
this type of intermediary following recognition that its operation was unacceptable to 
them and the customer.  
The Simian type contains many boutique sized operations employing anything from 
one person upwards. The qualifications of the adviser are often at the professional 
level, which, together with generally higher levels of experience, should ensure that 
the service they provide is suitable for the type of client seeking professional 
financial planning advice over a range of financial plans. A tendency to limit advice 
to those areas likely to lead to payment of an ad valorem adviser charge means that 
complete suitability may be in question. 
Nevertheless, the provision of a service at an albeit unknown cost to the adviser to 
clients paying by this method ensures that it remains an active and acceptable form 
of customer service for the majority of clients. 
The Homo Sapiens type adviser enjoys a close relationship with the client, because 
they build upon a very full knowledge and understanding of their needs. In 
consequence they can provide suitable guidance, not only with regard to products, 
but on far wider issues including taxation, estate planning and long-term care. By 
maintaining a team of advisers and managers capable of supporting a holistic 
financial planning and advice business they can ensure the feasibility of this 
relationship on an ongoing basis.  
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For the client and organisation the maintenance of the long-term relationship is 
entirely acceptable, with the former having confidence in the ability of the firm to 
meet their various financial planning needs across a broad spectrum and the firm 
developing a sustainable future. 
My assessment of the Organisational Structure produced the following outcomes:  
Table 22 - Factors Necessary to Underpin Relevant Organisational Structures 
Deemed to be Required by Crocodiles 
(Execution Only Brokers) 
Deemed to be Required by Financial 
Advisers 
Suitability Feasibility Acceptability Suitability Feasibility Acceptability 
S3 F1 A2 S2 F1 A1 
S4 F2 A5 S3 F2 A2 
S6 F7  S4 F7 A6 
S7   S6 F9 A7 
   S7   
   S12   
Total = 4 Total = 3 Total = 2 Total = 6 Total = 4 Total = 4 
 
The factors identified as being necessary in Table 22 are not always present in 
practice, as demonstrated in Table 23, below. 
 
  
Table 23 - Factors Observed as being present in Organisational Structures 
Crocodiles Amphibians Simians Homo Sapiens 
S4 F1 A2 S6 - - S2 F1 A2 S1 F1 A1 
S6 F2 A5    S4 F2 A6 S2 F2 A2 
S7 F7     S6 F7 A7 S3 F7 A6 
      S7 F9  S4 F9 A7 
      S12   S6   
         S7   
         S12   
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Table 24 compares the requirements of Table 22 with the perceived reality of Table 
23.  
Table 24 - Comparison of Necessary & Observed Factors in Organisational 
Strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 25 collates the ratings included in Table 24 in tabular form, whilst Table 26 
presents it graphically. 
 
 
 
 
Table 25 - Rating of Organisational Structuring Strategies in Tabular Form 
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Table 26 - Rating of Organisational Structuring Strategies in Graphical Form 
 
 
 
Organisational structures should be fit for purpose. Crocodile types need a structure 
that ensures the regular flow of product sales, thereby driving a demand for 
competent sales personnel. To assist that flow the services of able marketers will also 
be required, together with clerical assistance to ensure that suitable records of 
transactions are maintained. Creating such a structure does not present any major 
difficulties, suggesting that it is entirely feasible. 
Ensuring acceptability amongst consumers, regulators and employees within the 
organisation should be high, because it is designed to be fit for purpose. If the flow 
of business dries up it could well be the fault of the sales team or the marketers, but 
not the structure if it has been properly designed at the outset. 
The same may not be said for the Amphibian organisation. As revealed in the Broker 
to Adviser Progression Table 10 it suffers from poor quality compliance oversight, 
short-term management techniques and a dearth of professionally qualified advisers 
capable of questioning doubtful ethical practices. The result is a fractured, 
dysfunctional structure which is neither suitable, feasible nor acceptable to any of the 
interested parties over the longer term, thereby representing a flawed organisational 
strategy. 
With the Simian operation focused upon the client the presence of a perceptible 
organisational structure depends upon the size of its operation. In Chapter 3.1 it was 
noted that many IFAs failed to recognise any difference between the role of an IFA 
and that of a financial planning organisation. The reason was that they did not 
discern that there were different roles, even where only one person might be 
involved. For larger IFA firms a pattern developed of having a team of advisers, 
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well-qualified support in the form of paraplanners and administrators harnessed into 
a recognisable functioning structure. Where the one-man operation persists the 
suitability of the structure is therefore questionable, in part because there is a lack of 
purpose and vision and it may simply fail the fit-for-purpose requirements on 
grounds of an insufficient range of financial planning competences. 
As observed earlier, in some cases such firms are tempted to address these apparent 
deficiencies by joining IFA networks who promise to fill the gaps, although this may 
be seen as something of a Faustian exchange. 
With the right structure in place the feasibility of overseeing and monitoring a 
strategy is high and in consequence the outcomes entirely acceptable to the relevant 
stakeholders, but it does very much depend upon the ability of the firms to create the 
appropriately relevant structure.  
For those organisations operating or attempting to move into the Homo Sapiens type 
the question of whether or not a suitable structure exists cannot arise. If the structure 
is not in place the organisation is not operating at that level. The challenge arises 
around the feasibility of assembling the required personnel with the desired skills. 
When that has been achieved the outcomes are very acceptable in that they can 
provide high levels of satisfaction for clients, advisers, organisations and regulators. 
A failure to achieve it leaves the organisation vulnerable to the flaws of the 
Amphibian, because of the incomplete management structures and applications that 
will inevitably arise.  
Assessing the strategies employed as a basis for Consumer Charging produces the 
following results: 
Table 27 - Factors Necessary for Consumer Charging  
Deemed to be Required by Crocodiles 
(Execution Only Brokers) 
Deemed to be Required by Financial 
Advisers 
Suitability Feasibility Acceptability Suitability Feasibility Acceptability 
S10 F5 A2 S8 F3 A2 
S16 F9 A5 S9 F4 A4 
 F10  S10 F5 A5 
   S11 F6  
   S14 F7  
   S16   
   S18   
Total = 2 Total = 3 Total = 2 Total = 7 Total = 5 Total = 3 
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Table 28 - Factors Observed as being present in Consumer Charging Methods 
Crocodiles Amphibians Simians Homo Sapiens 
S10 F5 A2 S10 - - S10 F4 A5 S8 F3 A2 
S16 F9 A5    S18 F5  S9 F4 A4 
         S10 F5 A5 
         S11 F6  
         S14 F7  
         S16   
         S18   
 
 
 
 
Table 29 - Comparison of Necessary and Observed Factors in Consumer 
Charging Methods 
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Table 30 - Rating of Consumer Charging Strategies in Tabular Form 
 
 
 
Table 31 - Rating of Consumer Charging Strategies in Graphical Form 
 
For the Crocodile type it might be argued that charging commission on an ad 
valorem basis has the advantage of being transparent and unambiguous. Its weakness 
is that it does not reflect the effort brought to the activity by the intermediary and 
therefore any link between cost and reward is at best accidental. However, its 
application is completely feasible and given that customers are responsible for giving 
the instructions and are aware of the cost it must be assumed that this method is 
acceptable to them. It remains acceptable to the organisation for as long as they 
manage to remain in business, so periods of economic downtown place the method 
under strain as it is bound to do for any remuneration system that relies upon product 
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Consumer Charging Strategies
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sales. For the regulators the system is acceptable for as long as the rules on non-
advice are met. 
In the case of the Amphibian type the difficulties become almost schizophrenic. On 
the one hand they are obliged to sell financial products and achieve sales targets set 
by their organisation, a position that also exists for Crocodile types, but openly. On 
the other hand commissions are banned and the provision of advice to the customer 
on the suitability of the product for the purposes identified is mandatory. In an 
attempt to surmount these limitations Amphibian types determined that commissions 
would be renamed Adviser Charges and advice would be provided by a system of 
stereotyped paragraphs linked together to provide an often very long “suitability 
letter” to the customer in respect of every sale. The outcome is that the customer 
pays the intermediary a sum of money by way of a deduction from their investment 
or product, using once again the ad valorem method which in turn fails to reflect the 
amount of effort and skill required to complete the sale or the benefit to the 
customer. 
Thus, the suitability factor scores poorly, as does acceptability for in the long run 
much of what has been sold through this channel becomes subject to investigation 
and regulatory scrutiny. The method’s strength is its weakness; it is initially very 
easy to employ and therefore entirely feasible.  
From the perspective of their underpinning ethos for charging their clients, Simian 
types remain largely with the Crocodiles and Amphibians. However, they are now 
more inclined to employ additional fee techniques to cover the provision, although 
not necessarily the cost of providing non-commission bearing activities. This leads 
to a suitability rating that is similar to those other two Levels. Furthermore, the ad 
hoc nature of the fee-charging, where it exists at all, suggests that there is a lack of a 
rational system for its application, making feasibility an issue. There is also the 
problem of using the phrase “adviser charge” to effectively mislead the client into 
believing that they no longer pay a commission based upon the value of the product 
provided to them. This is an ethical issue that many, but not all, within this type 
acknowledge and which my research suggested they wish to overcome.   
Unsurprisingly, this Simian type scored rather less well in terms of the suitability, 
feasibility and acceptability of their consumer charges methods.  
The Homo Sapiens type fared better in many respects. As might be expected the 
suitability of its charging structure was high, because the method is cost-based, 
transparent and offers sustainability to both client and organisation. Its difficulty lies 
in the application of the fees, which without the aid of suitable software can be rather 
pedestrian. Software costs money and therefore additional cost is added to the fees 
that will be charged to clients, because fees are cost-based. Notwithstanding this 
drawback clients should find this method entirely acceptable, because they know that 
their fees are linked to activity levels and not the value of their investments. For the 
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firms it is known that their costs are or should be covered because they are linked to 
client activity and the method also offers an opportunity for the development of 
long-term relationships, which in turn create sustainable futures based upon the 
provision of advice, regardless of economic circumstances. The regulator must find 
this acceptable because the method completely rejects commission-based 
remuneration and is entirely transparent. 
By collating the three assessments a judgement can be made on the overall 
practicality of the different types’ strategic patterns, as demonstrated below. 
 
Table 32 - Overall Evaluation of the Suitability, Feasibility & Acceptability of 
Strategies Employed by Different Broker/Adviser Types in Tabular Form 
 
  
 
 
Table 33 - Overall Evaluation of the Suitability, Feasibility & Acceptability of 
Strategies Employed by Different Broker/Adviser Types in Graphical Form 
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Crocodiles 13.8 8.3 15.0 37.1
Amphibians 2.5 1.0 0.0 3.5
Simians 8.4 11.1 9.6 29.1
Homo Sapiens 15.0 12.1 15.0 42.1
Overall Evaluation of Identified Strategies
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Whilst it must be acknowledged that this form of assessment is open to the influence 
of the assessor’s personal ontology, it can also be argued that the presence of trends 
can be ascertained by employing such applications. 
In this case it is clear that Crocodile types employ a strategy which is consistent with 
the needs of the sector within which they work. It is also apparent that a pattern 
emerges when considering the strategies of the three different types of adviser 
groupings, with Amphibians exhibiting tendencies of being dysfunctional. Simians 
and Homo Sapiens with strategies suggesting a tendency towards greater cohesion, 
also appear to bear characteristics of sufficient similarity as to offer opportunities for 
progression from the former to the latter.  
Opportunities for Development and Progression   
The possibility of there being a relationship between the various types and if so how 
this might assist transformation is explored with the aid of Table 10 (The Broker to 
Adviser Progression Paths). This table also offers the opportunity to consider the 
consonance that exists amongst types that in many other respects should be set apart 
from one another.  
In this respect the position of the Crocodile type demands immediate comment; it is 
set apart from the other three types in that it does not and cannot apply or suggest 
that the term “adviser” is in any way a part of its ethos. Thus, instead of being looked 
upon as a part of a development rising to ever higher levels it exists as an annexe to 
the development, wherein those uninterested in the guidance aspect of financial 
planning can meet in a clearly defined retreat from it. By extension the Crocodile 
type does not need to think in terms of progression, because it already inhabits its 
chosen territory and seeks only to defend it; seeking to extend it would almost 
certainly lead to a clash with regulators and would also surrender its distinctively 
separate identity. 
It follows, therefore, that the other three types share a common general nomenclature 
that includes the suggestion of the availability of advice. This does not however, 
mean that consonance at this point translates into consanguinity in any other 
respects, so even before giving consideration to different attitudes present in respect 
of the research topics employed during this work, it is important to recognise that 
whilst Amphibian advisers prefer to refer to their consumers as customers, Simian 
and Homo Sapiens prefer the term client. The former reflects the aim to sell a 
product, whilst the latter suggests a more professional advice-based relationship. 
Attitudes revealed in or deduced from the responses of various contributors and 
recorded in the research part of this project have been organised in the Adviser 
Progression Paths Table above with the aim of discovering where transition from 
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one Level to another might be possible, before considering how the reflections in 
Chapter 5 could possibly assist its attainment. 
In terms of organisational focus shifting from an Amphibian position to a Simian and 
ultimately Homo Sapiens model requires a move away from short-termist thinking 
set within a culture of sales targets and customer form of consumers to an ethos of 
long term planning underpinned by a strategy aimed at sustaining the business and 
the relationship with the client. This may demand a change of mind-set on an almost 
Damascene level. 
The issue of culture, raised in the previous paragraph, is linked with the prevailing 
attitudes that exist within the structure of an organisation, where such a formal 
structure exists in the first place. As already highlighted, Amphibian types are 
generally organised on a large scale sales teams basis, employing language such as 
“winners,” “failure” and “losers.”   
The structure of such an organisation does not encourage thinking in terms of 
cost/benefit either to itself or its customer. Given the scale of the operation, often 
supported by the economic power of a bank or insurance company, they should be in 
a strong position to build a financial planning organisation composed of 
professionally qualified specialists, including advisers, paraplanners and 
administrators. In that respect moving to a Homo Sapiens operation ought to be 
entirely feasible if the will to do so is present. However, as IFA3 commented 
(Chapter 3.5) when discussing scaling up, until a Sir Richard Branson-type 
entrepreneur invests in such an organisation the likelihood is that a market of 
sufficient size does not exist to encourage such large organisations to commit to such 
a change in their structures. 
This suggests that the sector is to be dominated by smaller organisations capable of 
meeting a niche demand and to do this they will need to desist from operating as 
very small or even one person businesses and embrace the structure of multi-skilled 
partnerships. The evidence is that partnerships, above all other organisational 
structures, are best placed for maintaining an ethos of long-term thinking and 
delayed gratification (Wilson, 2013). The challenge for the successful consolidation 
into larger groupings would be to ensure that common or similar cultures exist in the 
existing organisations before an amalgamation is consummated (Wilkof, 1995) 
(Weber, 2003). 
Charging structures 
That the attitudes of Amphibian and Simian types remains firmly committed to being 
remunerated by commission, albeit by another name, has already been clearly 
revealed in earlier chapters, including Chapters 3.3 and 3.4 on the characteristics of 
fees and the nature of commission in a financial planning context. What these two 
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types have in common is that effectively they look back to the methods continuing to 
be available to the Crocodiles. However, as already pointed out when considering 
their view of the consumer, the Amphibians see a customer, whereas the Simians see 
a client. Their mind-sets are at odds in this respect, although their practices are 
similar.  
For the Simians to move to the charging structure employed by the Homo Sapiens 
will require them to relinquish their claim to adviser charges and embrace a more 
technically demanding activity-based client fee. This is not necessarily a simple step, 
but it might be argued that in terms of protecting the business in the longer term it is 
necessary. Given that some Simians are already charging some ad hoc fees to clients 
where they believe an additional service has been provided those doing this enjoy the 
advantage of knowing that clients will pay fees, if and when they are asked, 
confirming the notion put forward earlier by an existing fee-charging financial 
adviser (Chapter 3.3).   
For all advisers charging fees, however notated, the question has to be answered, for 
what are they charging? (Financial Conduct Authority TR14/21, 2015) They must be 
able to respond to this by confirming that they are meeting the needs, not just the 
wants, of their clients and then being able to detail that provision. In Chapter 5 I have 
built upon the understanding gained on what it is that clients need and what 
additional skills are required to address the practical delivery of the service (Knights, 
1994).  
In a recent article placed in Money Marketing (8/1/2015) Martin Wheatley, the 
FCA’s chief executive, is quoted as saying that clarity of charges remains a sticking 
point with regard to the attainment of the aims of the Retail Distribution Review 
(RDR). The article then goes on to say that: 
“There has been a long-held concern about how far the FCA will go in 
policing advice charges, although the regulator and trade bodies have 
dismissed the prospect of an outright ban on charging based on a percentage 
of assets invested.”  
This one short phrase contains much of the confused state of mind existing in the 
minds of the regulator, The Personal Finance Society, The Institute of Financial 
Planning, financial advisers and consumers; commissions are banned, but adviser 
charging on a percentage of the value of the sale is supported, but only in relation to 
the initial process of product provision; the trade bodies talk piously about the ethics 
of transparency and fee-charging as long as it does not interfere with the age-old 
model of commission income, albeit by a different name. Where is the incentive for 
financial advisers to move to a model that embraces the charging of a fee for the 
provision of a range of services when the compliance regime overseers offer such 
contradictory guidance?  
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It is little wonder that when it comes to addressing the issue of ongoing adviser 
charging, referred to in Chapter 3.8 on Integrity, that the barriers seem to be 
insurmountable.   
The Intermediary Role 
For anyone who has ever received a lump sum of money and deposited it in their 
bank account the scene is familiar; the cashier invites the depositor to make an 
appointment with one of their financial advisers who will then seek to reposition that 
lump sum in a financial product which the bank is selling. The initial desire of the 
customer to deposit money in their bank account then becomes, in the hands of the 
adviser/sales person a need to take advantage of some perceived reward which was 
previously unknown to the depositor and is often subsequently not understood. That 
is not to say that the advice provided is unsuitable or inappropriate, although the 
motivation for providing it will certainly have included a desire to meet a sales 
target. Persistent failure on the part of the adviser to convert these referrals into sales 
will undoubtedly lead towards their being encouraged to leave the organisation, so a 
conflict of interest is rarely far from the formulation process attending the advice.  
At the other end of the spectrum sits the holistic financial planner who understands 
the role to embrace consideration of the client’s current circumstances and needs, 
their future requirements and how these are to be met over the longer term. How 
might it be possible to move from being an adviser working within the Amphibian 
organisation to one operating within the Homo Sapiens arena and what might 
prevent that transition?  
A required fundamental change in approach will be a move from short-termist tactics 
to operational procedures which are designed to be constituent parts of long-term 
strategic aims and working to sales targets can frustrate such a manoeuvre. 
Furthermore, such a move requires an ability to provide a service that extends 
beyond the simple provision of financial products and into the realms of advice areas 
such as taxation, estate planning (a need already identified as a major requirement of 
clients) and long-term care information. After all the service is presented as being 
holistic and holistic is defined as being “characterised by the belief that the parts of 
something are intimately interconnected and explicable only by reference to the 
whole.”(Oxford English Dictionary) 
In turn that ability needs to be nurtured through a programme of professional 
examinations focused upon the wider panoply of financial planning. This does not 
include examination courses on sales supervision and how to motivate sales teams to 
achieve their targets, as is currently the case with the PFS examinations regime. 
Indeed such examinations are counter-intuitive to the whole notion of providing 
professional advice uninfluenced by conflicts of interest. They also miss the 
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opportunity to broaden understanding of the role of marketing in business, including 
the financial planning profession. 
Completion of a suitable programme of study combined with working in a culture of 
advice provision will encourage the development of appropriate experience, which is 
rooted not just in longevity but in knowledge and understanding. 
Academic qualifications are often decried by the current cohort of tenants of the IFA 
sector, declaiming that individuals in possession of such achievements enter the role 
without the experience that longevity brings. The downside of such longevity is that 
its experience has been forged during a different time warp, one that the Crocodile 
type still recognises, but which is becoming increasingly untenable in today’s 
market. Smith (2013) argues that an ability to understand that market and how it sits 
in the wider context of commerce, economics and politics is not only useful, but vital 
to the survival of the independent advice sector (Bates, 1990).  
This does not mean that every adviser has to hold a master’s degree, but it does mean 
that they should be professionally qualified, motivated by job satisfaction and be part 
of a team led by holders of such professional and academic qualifications.   
In the case of Simian type firms many of their advisers have completed or nearly 
completed their professional qualifications. In itself this does not lead to a business 
that is free from the temptations of conflicting interests, so a transformation will be 
required embracing the activity-based fees model, before pressure from a regulator 
forces the issue and presses unprepared organisations to change or cease trading. 
Clearly, such change should not automatically require the leadership of a graduate 
per se, but the reality is that those having a wider understanding of the context will 
also have the confidence to proceed. The real underlying barrier to transformation is 
fear of the unknown, not issues which are more irritants than obstruction, such as 
regulatory costs and professional indemnity insurance (Weeks, 2004) (Mullins, 
2007).  
Integrity 
Where integrity is considered the concept of transition is questionable; as IFA4 
remarked, “you either have it or you don’t.” (Chapter 3.8) It is not something that 
comes in stages, although achieving it may well do. It is effectively a state of mind, 
both in those being judged and those judging and it reflects the belief that someone 
who has integrity embodies a quality of being honest and having strong moral 
principles and is prepared to practice and defend those principles in public, if 
necessary (Calhoun, 1995). 
Developing a mind-set wherein integrity can flower is a different matter. For Level 2 
advisers the belief is that if an action or activity is allowed by the professional body 
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or regulator then it is ethical. As a method of conducting business this is placing a 
great deal of reliance upon two elements, namely that the professional body or 
regulator is acting ethically in setting such guidance and  that in the fullness of time 
further retroactive reviews do not re-set that standard, leaving the business exposed 
to more cost in terms of fines and compensation.  
The ability to think outside of the conventions of the community of practice could 
lead businesses to recognise that a deeper awareness of what is right and what is not 
could provide a better oriented moral compass. Simian type IFAs have an inclination 
to put their clients’ interests first, but find that they must still cling to the concept of 
seeking remuneration through a system of commission- linked sales of financial 
products. This is inclined, in turn, to undermine their client-focused ambitions, with 
the desire to do what is considered right for the client clashing with the need to 
ensure that remuneration is received for the service provided. Given the evidence 
provided in review after review by the regulator and the Financial Ombudsman 
Service, IFAs provide a service which generates very low levels of complaints, 
suggesting that effectively employing utilitarian ethical standards works well in 
practice, within the context of selling financial products.  
Although the Personal Finance Society and the Institute of Financial Planning both 
promote the idea that trust is the factor upon which adviser businesses should 
concentrate, the reality is that trust is an unreliable tool, readily used by confidence 
tricksters and too prone to emotional subjection.  
Honesty requires that IFA firms are transparent in their dealings with their clients 
and demands that their descriptive titles mean what they say and if they do not then 
that should be admitted. Are they truly “independent” in terms of ownership, 
management and philosophy, do they really have skills in finance and are they 
professional advisers and guides or sales people masquerading as such? Are they 
really acting as the agent of the client or is a conflict of interest likely to sway advice 
and in doing so place the client in a less beneficial position and the adviser in a 
perceived better position than absolute integrity would demand? 
Sometimes people do not recognise when their pattern of activities are not of the 
highest quality, a result of restricted education or groupthink. Nevertheless, when 
ethical imperfections are exposed integrity is immediately lost and will be almost 
impossible to recover. Therefore, it would be better to build towards achieving a 
name for integrity as part of the philosophy of the firm and its employees and a long-
term view encourages this. With it repeat business is virtually assured, but without it 
any future business is uncertain and, in the experience of the banks, the penalties and 
compensation costs of the absence of high standards of ethics, honesty and integrity 
is at best significant and at worst crippling.    
An ethical ethos based upon the categorical imperative is a sound basis for guiding 
the culture of IFA firms. It places the client at the centre of its purpose and strategy, 
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does what its title says it will do and creates a regular inflow of cash for the business 
far into the future. The existence of the firm is thereby assured and in turn its ability 
to continue to assist its clients through their changing circumstances over time. 
Summary 
To summarise, to create and maintain a sustainable business the model must have a 
purpose embracing the provision of a service to clients by professionally qualified 
advisers, remunerated by a salary and supported by an experienced and well 
qualified team of paraplanners and administrators. The firm must contain advisers 
that in total have an expertise in every major field of financial planning, so that the 
firm, as opposed to the adviser, can address any client financial planning issue with 
confidence and competence. The firm will be managed by individuals having 
advanced academic as well as professional qualifications, who will also be salaried. 
Fees will be billed to clients and they will identify the activities undertaken by the 
firm on their behalf and the costs of those activities; so-called adviser charges or 
anything that suggests the presence of a product related ad valorem charge must not 
be present. The setting of fee levels will be dependent upon the drafting of budgets, 
expressed both in terms of resource volumes and money, and the careful monitoring 
of actual performance and planned performance, both in terms of profitability and 
consistency with the strategies and purpose of the organisation. 
So to finish as I started, with a diagram; the pathway followed by an organisation 
will ultimately be shown to have symmetry with its objectives and purpose, or not. 
Asymmetry means a loss of focus and loss of focus will eventually lead to an 
organisation’s demise. Whilst symmetric pathways suggest the presence of planning, 
the absence of symmetry will suggest the opposite, at least of the long-term kind. In 
the final diagram the objective is the achievement of a sustainable future for a 
financial planning organisation, regardless of the economic context.   
It is entirely possible to interpret the existence of symmetry within this Diagram of 
Symmetric and Asymmetric Pathways for the Crocodile type, whose strategies have 
already been demonstrated to be suitable, feasible and acceptable. However, even 
with the symmetry that these strategies provide the final outcome for Crocodiles can 
only be uncertainty in times of weak economic periods.  
The aim of this work has been to consider how to avoid that calamity and indeed 
thrive in such an environment by exploring the influence of morality, ethics and 
remuneration on the existence, development and survival of the independent finance 
advice sector. For those categorised as being in the Homo Sapiens arena the evidence 
from own practical experience and the observations and the arguments contained in 
this work is that this is entirely achievable.  
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The difference is that my own organisation is doing it, whereas others could if they 
had the will to develop certain identified organisational structures, professional and 
academic competences and moral and ethical mind-sets and embed them within their 
own operations. Some clarity of thought and direction from the regulator and those 
trade bodies claiming to be representing the interests of financial advisers would 
assist this process of change and sustainable development through an alignment of 
objectives focused upon bringing common advantage to themselves, their members 
and consumers alike.    
218 
 
                    Figure 20 - Development Pathways Diagram (Cawdell K E 2015) 
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Chapter 7 – Looking Back on Looking Forward 
 
Summary of main themes discussed in this chapter 
 The why and the how of getting it right 
 Evidence of resistance to change amongst the IFA community 
 Myths and realities of fee-paying 
 The potential for future developments 
 Agency frameworks – a final thought 
The Why and the How of Getting it Right 
When I decided to commence in business on my own account the very first thing I 
did was to draw up a plan of what was needed in terms of facilities and activities. My 
assumption was that I could and would acquire the former and undertake the latter, 
but having identified the requirements I then costed them and compared that cost 
with my assumptions regarding sources of cash inflows. It was at this point that I 
was faced with the devastating realisation that all would not be plain sailing. Timing 
is everything, they say, and in this case that is exactly the point at which to become 
aware of such a harsh reality, for the opportunity to change the plan or simply 
recognise that running this proposed business or perhaps any business is not the way 
forward for you.  
This, I believed, was surely what everyone did before deciding to commence in 
business, for how else would it be possible to determine that one’s future had a 
reasonable chance of success, or that following a particular course of action would 
probably result in disaster, without  having drafted such a plan? Whilst subsequently 
I have become aware that such an assumption was not particularly robust, until I had 
commenced my programme of academic activities I had not realised just how flawed 
it was in terms of the financial advice and planning sector. 
Such academic activities have provided me with the opportunities to reflect upon 
what and how I was approaching the development of our own financial planning 
practice, why others appeared to be, superficially at least, more successful in their 
endeavours and how we might match or even exceed their achievements. After forty 
years in business on my own account and more than fifty years of working in the 
financial services sector what has become apparent is the temporary nature of most 
of those competitors’ existences. Whilst I have not attempted, as part of this work, to 
provide vigorous statistical support for the notion that each ebb in the economy of 
the UK and/or the world generally  is accompanied by the decline or disappearance 
of financial advice organisations, the reality is that over the past forty years 
insurance companies have decreased in considerable numbers, their sales forces are 
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virtually a thing of the past, banks have similarly  contracted (does anyone now 
remember the District Bank, Martins Bank, National Provincial or Williams 
Deacons?) and few firms of IFAs have a lineage going back further than a decade.  
To repeat, my initial aim when considering whether or not to open for business on 
my own account was to ascertain whether it would be possible to survive and from 
that position develop an enduring and thriving enterprise. This required looking at 
the longer term and then determining how the required strategic structure was to be 
created on a day-to-day basis. There was also a critical ingredient in this strategic 
planning approach, namely to ensure that having defined what was the prevailing 
sociological, technological, economic and political context, how that might change 
and, therefore, how to prepare for that change.   
It struck me at the time I commenced my master’s course and has repeatedly 
reinforced itself since that it was only at that point and beyond that I began to 
understand why it was that our business survived.  Many argue that academic 
qualifications do not provide what in their opinion is appropriate experience and 
knowledge to assist them with the running of the businesses, an assertion that 
recurred frequently throughout my face-to-face meetings with contributors to this 
work. However, it is my understanding that whilst some of us manage to oversee the 
running of our enterprises using hard-won field experience blended with some innate 
or intuitive ability, it is still restricted by the limited landscapes with which we have 
come into contact.   
Benefiting from the experience and research undertaken by others, without having to 
wait for an opportunity to gain that knowledge through practice not only provides a 
platform for future developments in your own business, but also creates a foundation 
built upon the confidence of knowing why what has already been done has been 
successful.  As an example, those working with and for me have always been 
emboldened to undertake duties a little beyond their existing briefs, safe in the 
knowledge that if on rare occasions a problem arose blame would not be attached to 
them. The outcome of this approach, known as empowerment, has been to create 
teams capable and willing to extend our corporate knowledge and competence to the 
benefit of staff, clients and the organisation.    
Concepts such as “SECI” and “Ba” (Nonaka, 2005) covering corporate knowledge 
creation and worker empowerment (Vidal, 2007) have served to confirm that what I 
had been doing instinctively had some academically researched support as to its 
general utility. The acquisition of this level of confidence has served to drive the 
application of further change as altered business environments unfurled or were 
expected to emerge. The aim of the current regulator, the Financial Conduct 
Authority, and its predecessor to drive commission from the equation with regard to 
financial advice and planning is just such a change. Our perspective on this has been 
to ensure that a reliable inflow of cash is available to support the long-term future of 
the business, that is to charge our clients fees for the services they need and we 
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provide. On that basis commission does not enter the process and our belief is that 
the regulator would be better served in achieving its espoused aim by concentrating 
upon how to inculcate fees-charging as the preferred method of producing income, 
as opposed to simply banning a long-standing, familiar and popular method.  
During my research it has become apparent that the majority of financial advisers 
have qualified only to the level that legislation has required of them. Few have 
qualifications or experience gained from beyond the confines of the limited sector in 
which they currently operate and as such very few were able to articulate how they 
might move from a commission-type operation to an activity-based fees approach, 
even where they expressed the wish to do so. Lacking the platform which an 
academic background has provided for me they are left to continue their existing 
ways up until the point somewhere in the future where the deception that percentage-
based adviser charges are really just commission by another name is exposed and 
finally closed down.   
Evidence of Resistance to Change amongst the IFA Community 
In 2011 having reached a venerable age our business team agreed that in the interests 
of our clients we should begin the process of transferring ownership of the business 
to another team. We set down minimum standards which we would expect our 
acquirers to maintain as follows: 
1. Clients’ affairs would be reviewed frequently through the medium of face-to-
face or telephone meetings occurring at least annually. 
2. The basis for charging clients would remain activity-based; any form of 
commission charging would not be introduced. 
3. Acquirers would hold a minimum qualification of Chartered Financial 
Planner or be close to achieving it. 
4. On no account would this business suit an enquirer simply seeking to acquire 
a bank of inflowing ongoing adviser charges/commissions, so such 
approaches from that quarter should not be attempted. 
To assist the process we engaged a business transfer agent specialising in the IFA 
sector, making clear to them our benchmark requirements. Since that time we have 
been approached by twenty-seven different organisations. Of these nineteen held 
only the Diploma qualification or equivalent, six were qualified as chartered 
financial planners, two had been struck off by the regulator for inappropriate 
activities but were attempting to continue operating by purchasing an authorised 
business, six also held first degrees, two held masters degrees and one held a 
doctorate. In short only five of the twenty-seven enquirers matched or exceeded the 
criteria we had set down. 
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Notwithstanding this, we have met and/or discussed with enquirers in detail the 
processes that our firm employs, emphasising that the fees-based framework that we 
have and which our clients have sought meets all of the regulators current 
requirements and is ready to meet the demands of an outright ban on percentage-
based adviser charging/commission. Many agreed that this was in line with what the 
regulator would ultimately require. However, only one of the enquirers has 
acknowledged this and confirmed that they would maintain the current processes 
because it was exactly what was needed; all others indicated that they would simply 
return the clients to a percentage-based charging structure where this appeared to 
yield a benefit to the acquirer and abandon those with small investments altogether. 
Our decision to place our business on the market has effectively allowed us to 
undertake parallel research into the espoused desires of IFAs and the reality of how 
they would react given the choice between managing an existing fees-based practice 
with acquiescent clients and maintaining their own status quo. In essence it questions 
whether the pronouncements made by many IFAs interviewed during my research 
concerning a desire to become fees-based were really subliminal works of fiction. 
It also questions whether the desire of most IFAs is to concentrate their entire 
energies upon selling financial products, as opposed to organising and guiding a 
business. For the former purpose it remains sufficient to be qualified to the 
benchmark level prescribed by the current regulator, but for the latter qualifications 
and experience embracing those to which I refer at the beginning of this chapter 
would be required. Thus, it appears that because a fees-based practice will require 
business experience, demanding as it does cost analysis, fees charging and invoicing 
and debtor management, the achieving of such a development on a wider scale whilst 
relying upon the available human resource material will remain challenging. 
This is what is implied in the Strategic Differential Model (Figure 19) whereby the 
Organisational Structure alternatives suggest that those prepared to work within a 
strategically collaborative framework of specialists, including authorised financial 
planners, seek to provide common advantage to their clients, their firm and 
themselves; those working within a sales environment are inherently competitive and 
thereby inclined to avoid any form of collaboration which does not seem to add to 
their individual positions. 
What is disappointing is that the apparent approach of most IFAs, as exposed by my 
own research and the evidence produced by these potential purchasers is based upon 
the false premise discussed in the next section.  
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But has anyone asked them? 
The oft-repeated mantra of IFAs is that clients will not pay fees. They say it so often 
that it has become the equivalent of a creed within the sector; they say it so often that 
they have come to believe it, rather after the fashion of that Machiavellian thinker 
and observer of human character Joseph Goebbels (Stille, 2011). Typically Goebbels 
had plagiarised this quotation from the father of modern psychology William James 
(1842-1910) who had said:  
"There's nothing so absurd that if you repeat it often enough, people will 
believe it." (Klonowski, 2012) 
In my experience to say that clients will not pay fees is absurd, because in the words 
of the fee-charging IFA quoted in Chapter 3, “Has anyone asked them?” 
From my perspective the answer is a resounding “yes”, because some fourteen years 
ago we asked that very question of our existing client-bank and were astonished to 
discover that every one of those asked not only replied in the affirmative, but 
perhaps more importantly from a business standpoint, then signed the fee agreement. 
Our astonishment was that the reality of the response was in complete contradiction 
to the mantra regularly repeated amongst the community of IFAs. The only practical 
challenge was how we as a team were to find the time to meet the demand for this 
enhanced service, not how to find a client willing to pay fees. 
However, despite my recounting this record of events to IFAs around the country 
and in particular to those who enquired about the possibility of being considered 
purchasers of our business the key misconception that clients will not pay fees was 
clung to with an almost limpet like grip. There is the possibility that this mantra is 
repeated to provide a fig-leaf capable of obscuring the desire of most IFAs to hold to 
their sales-motivated culture of earning a living by being remunerated by 
commission, which in turn is linked to the size of the sale, not the level of activity 
and guidance provided. More research will be needed to test this proposition and 
more encouragement for change provided in the form of some quantitative evidence 
of income and profits achieved over intervals covering at least one period of 
economic decline.  
From my own stance the evidence supporting the long-term case for a fees-based 
practice rests within the statistics of our own business, which records relentlessly 
increasing cash inflows and long-term relationships with clients which have stood 
the test of two severe recessions since we substituted commission income with fee-
charging. This has enabled us to avoid the incongruity of working for clients without 
reward and even where this has occasionally resulted in the non-payment of fees it 
has allowed us to identify which of those clients do not maintain the ethical ethos 
within which we seek to work. 
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Our team has worked long and hard to amass the relevant academic and professional 
knowledge and expertise necessary to provide clients with a sophisticated service for 
which we expect them to pay a fee. Will they? -  well we have asked them and they 
have said, “yes”.  
What Next? 
What has gone before in this work relates to what has happened, what is happening 
and what might be desirable for the future. It is at the stage that I had reached with 
regard to our own business when developing my MBA, insofar that it contained 
much theory and planning, but was not of itself “action” to aid transition. If action is 
to take place then a pattern of activities will be required over the longer term, a 
phrase consistent with the notion of strategy. 
The initial step in developing a pattern would be to write a series of press articles 
with the aim of stimulating discussion and revealing, through the Readers Letters 
sections, embedded attitudes of those working in or affected by the working 
practices of the sector. To this end I intend to contact the editors of financial 
planning papers offering general articles on the basic theme of my work. Whilst the 
range and extent of responses cannot be pre-judged it would be expected to be 
diverse and robust, from opinions reflecting denial and a willingness to defend the 
status quo to a recognition that there must be change and an acceptance that this will 
both take time and a change in cultures. This tactic might also be employed with the 
national broadsheet press. 
Such articles should also provide a platform for the development of the pattern by 
encouraging the employment of the four additional routes referred to below, namely  
 Providing Seminar Presentations to the IFP/PFS Memberships 
 Encouraging changes to the Professional Examination Curriculum  
 Modifying Degree Courses for Undergraduates 
 Publishing a booklet providing guidance and support to new and existing 
IFAs on the building blocks required for the development of a fees-based 
independent financial planning organisation. 
Whilst it is recognised that not all members of professional bodies or associations 
attend such organisations’ gatherings it is assumed that many of those that do have 
an interest in developing their range of understanding. With this in mind, and with 
the topic having already been raised in the press, providing presentations to members 
incorporating ideas on operational change aligned to current and future  needs will 
offer opportunities for delegates to reflect upon and develop practical pathways 
towards implementation.  
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Although such activity is not expected to achieve change overnight it would form 
part of a programme set upon changing cultures, not only as a mind-set, but in 
offering practical signposts on how it might be achieved. My early employment in 
the forestry sector suggested that setting seedlings is more often the way to success 
in creating a new woodland than attempting multiple semi-mature transplants. In this 
case the woodland is the professional culture, the seedlings are ideas and the 
transplants are represented by opaque regulations and the vested interests influencing 
them.  
When asking contributors the question, “what is the purpose of a financial planning 
organisation,” what became clear was the lack of understanding of the generic role of 
organisations and the part that they should play in setting down its purpose and the 
long-term plan to achieve it in a sustainable way.  That this is a fundamental 
requirement if a business is expecting to survive, let alone thrive, has already been 
emphasised earlier in this work (Drucker 1974). By re-awakening my embryonic 
plans developed for the creation of a financial planning degree, referred to in Chapter 
2, and using them as the basis for discussions on broadening the core curriculum 
with the examinations-setting bodies the opportunity to address this weakness would 
emerge.  It should result in the requirement for aspiring financial planners to sit and 
pass a mandatory paper covering the purpose and utility of organisational structure 
and the role of accounting and finance, both generally and within the context of the 
financial planning sector. Where these aspects had already been incorporated in a 
degree held by candidates exemptions would be offered in the usual way. 
In my role as a senior lecturer in accounting and finance and as a businessman I have 
become aware of a number of universities’ whose business schools already offer first 
degree courses in financial services, often incorporating existing accounting and 
finance modules as part of the package to improve the efficiency and economy of 
presentation. It is clear, therefore, that opportunities exist to promote career options 
awareness to undergraduates planning a future in financial services by including the 
basic contents of the accounting and finance unit, in parallel with organisational 
structures, as a core element of their degree programme. This could be supported and 
encouraged through and by the professional bodies, both existing and proposed, with 
the creation of the latter currently being discussed within the confines of at least one 
university.  
In terms of looking to the future it is sensible to ensure that those entering a sector 
are suitably prepared for its demands and not those of the past. Modifying 
examinations courses, both academic and professional, will assist this.  
However, this does not address the issue of how existing practitioners are to be 
encouraged and assisted to change their practices. 
For a new entrant a practical guide in the form of a booklet would underpin the 
learning garnered through their academic and professional examinations 
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programmes. For existing practitioners, and as such the new entrants’ potential 
mentors, a short publication in the form of a guide will be needed to develop 
motivation and enthusiasm in such a way that confidence in abandoning their 
existing ways is developed.  The Broker to Adviser Progression Table (Table 10 - 
Broker to Adviser Progression Paths) identifies characteristics of various types of 
broker/advisers and seeks to determine the ease with which each might transition 
towards the changes that are expected. 
To assist that process the Guide will cover the following aspects: 
 The desired components of the organisation to meet its agreed purpose 
 How to create and maintain a plan covering resources, costs, fees-setting 
and cash flows 
 Governance and management accounting  
 Practical Marketing 
Such a Guide will sit alongside the presentations to professional bodies’ seminars, 
providing a reference point to the many thousands of practitioners espousing a wish 
to transition, but, as evidenced by those that indicated an interest in purchasing our 
fees-based business, unwilling to abandon old habits even when a ready-made 
opportunity is presented to them. 
A recurring theme throughout this work has been the overt or subliminal 
dissatisfaction expressed by IFAs with regard to the representation and addressing of 
their needs, free from the influence of those whose interests lie in a different and 
sometimes opposite direction. I also became aware of muted discussions aimed at the 
creation of such a body, albeit within a group of IFAs firmly attached to the 
development of their own academic achievements and allied to another university.  
Reference has already been made to an earlier attempt to create such a body having 
foundered. Attempts to analyse the precise cause for this failure have not been 
undertaken, but further enquiry would assist in another attempt avoiding whatever 
pitfalls were encountered.  
That there is a need for such a body is apparent, but the extent of the core 
requirements and therefore the cost of meeting them would be the subject of further 
research amongst interested parties of IFAs. History suggests that attempting to 
provide more than a core set of needs leads to the mushrooming of unnecessary 
costs, which insurance companies and their allies then “volunteer” to meet, with the 
return to the principle that there is no such thing as a free lunch.  Therefore, keeping 
it simple, focused and controlled would of necessity be of the essence if this new 
agent for IFAs was to be of real value. 
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Agents and Agency – A Final Thought 
In the introduction to this work I suggested that a modern society is one that is 
inextricably locked into a matrix of agencies. If it is accepted that this is the case 
then I would argue that the whole premise of this work is the product of blending 
together the experiences of others with my own to create what I hope can act as an 
agent which assists and extends the experiences of those who follow in the 
development of a profession of independent financial planners. In other words I have 
considered the thoughts of others who have undertaken research or have had 
practical experience in areas that I have not and in their doing so they have acted as 
the agents for the dissemination of that information and knowledge to me. 
My final reflection, therefore, is that whilst many claim that on-the-job experience is 
what really matters when it comes to being useful in making that claim they 
effectively limit the range of agents that they employ in the process of extending 
individual experience. True experience is the consummation of building upon the 
agencies of education, that in turn inspires a thirst for further career-focused study of 
courses compiled through the agency  of professional bodies, which can be 
harnessed with past, present and future practical experience gained individually and 
through the agency of colleagues and peers. That true experience offers much greater 
utility to its holder, because its acquisition path is fairly plain to see and because of 
its causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt 1982), wherein a potential consumer can 
see how and what was gained, whilst recognising that to replicate that model of 
knowledge to achieve their required outcome is not possible. As a result they can 
elect to pay the requisite fee to that chosen agent for satisfaction of their requirement 
in a manner that is more cost effective (Coase 1937).  
So, in a profession developed upon the foundation of supplying knowledge-based 
guidance, remembering that agents have been and will continue to be employed to 
acquire that knowledge and thereby empower its practitioners to be agents for 
discerning consumers is paramount. Furthermore, that knowledge must contain an 
understanding of the wisdom of maintaining high ethical standards whilst avoiding 
conflicts of interest and that is best achieved by this particular type of agent charging 
a professional fee for a professional service. To apply this final principle within this 
framework of agencies is to create a practice of integrity. 
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Appendix 
 
The Meaning of Words Employed in the Financial Services Sector 
Word or Phrase Financial Planning Context Concise Oxford Dictionary Definition 
Adviser Provider & guide on the products provided by 
another 
A person who gives advice in a particular 
field 
Agency  A formal arrangement imposed by a product 
provider on a financial adviser or planner not 
employed by the provider  
An attempt to create a  formal framework to 
determine the optimal contract between 
principal and agent 
Commission Denotes the remuneration received by the 
adviser as a result of a financial transaction 
implemented by him/her, when the same is 
calculated as a percentage of the value of the 
transaction – Institute of Financial Planning 
Code of Ethics 
a sum, typically a set percentage of the value 
involved, paid to an agent in a commercial 
transaction 
Commission agent Execution Only broker A person who transacts business on 
commission, typically on behalf of a principal 
Ethics A set of rules of conduct and professional 
practice 
The study of moral standards and how they 
affect conduct 
Fee “Fee-based” denotes a method of remuneration 
is received in the form of a fee, whether it is paid 
direct by the client or out of commission 
received by the member or by any related party 
in respect of any transactions carried out on 
behalf of the client which is then off-set against 
fees payable to the member -  (Institute of 
Financial Planning Code of Ethics) 
The Personal Finance Society does not provide a 
definition 
A payment made to a professional person or 
to a professional or public body in exchange 
for advice or services 
Field A particular branch of study or sphere of activity 
or interest 
 
A particular branch of study or sphere of 
activity or interest 
e.g. we talked to professionals in various 
fields 
Financial Financial products Relating to or involving money 
Financial Planning 1. Denotes the process of developing 
strategies to assist clients in 
managing their financial affairs to 
meet life goals (Institute of Financial 
Planning Code of Ethics)  
2. KInf4 p1 – financial planning implies 
to me a sort of longer term view; 
much ore a sort of trajectory rather 
than just solving a problem now. 
Strategic and tactical planning relating to or 
involving money 
Guaranteed A guide to intended outcome incorporating 
caveats to cover a failure to succeed 
In law an undertaking to answer for the 
payment or performance of another person’s 
debt or obligation in the event of a default by 
the person primarily responsible for it. 
Provide a formal assurance, especially that 
certain conditions will be fulfilled relating to 
a product, service, or transaction 
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Independent Not directly employed by an insurance company 1.Free from outside control; not subject to 
another’s authority: 
2.Not depending on another for livelihood or 
subsistence 
3.Capable of thinking or acting for oneself 
4.Not connected with another or with each 
other; separate 
Independent Financial 
Adviser 
1. A good IFA, mortgage broker or mortgage 
advisor will be able to give you advice and 
guidance on the process of applying for a 
mortgage (Taylor Wimpey) 
2. Independent Financial Advisers provide 
advice to their clients on savings and 
investments and other financial matters and 
recommend suitable financial products selected 
from across the market 
3. v. KInf4 p1   
None provided, but by incorporation of 
definitions already provided they are people 
who provide advice relating to or involving 
money and are free from outside control, 
unrestricted by a reliance for their livelihoods 
on others, capable of acting and thinking for 
themselves and not contractually bound to 
another.  
Industry The branch of economic activity concerned with 
the functioning and operation of the financial 
services sector 
Economic activity concerned with the 
processing of raw materials and manufacture 
of goods in factories; a particular branch of 
economic or commercial activity 
Integrity  The quality of being honest and having strong 
moral principles 
Professional Adviser holds a minimum of benchmark 
qualification required by the regulator to practice 
An occupation in which an individual uses an 
intellectual skill based on an established body 
of knowledge and practice to provide a 
specialised service in a defined area , 
exercising independent judgement in 
accordance with a code of ethics and in the 
public interest (UKIPG) 
Qualified Anything which meets the minimum 
requirements of the FCA, but used loosely viz. 
“all of our advisors are fully qualified” The 
Affinity Group referring to the DipPFS QCA 
Level 4 examinations 
Officially recognized as being trained to 
perform a particular job 
Restricted An adviser authorised by the regulator to advise 
on a limited range of financial products 
limited in extent, number, scope, or action 
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